Israeli War 1973. Yom Kippur War: A Victory That Changed the Middle East Forever

As for Soviet intelligence, it learned about this on the day the decision was made by the Egyptian and Syrian presidents - October 4.

On the eve of the war, the wives of the few Soviet officers (mainly teachers) and oil workers who were in Egypt were urgently evacuated to their homeland. This is how Antonina Andreevna Perfilova, the wife of the head of the group of military engineers, Colonel Yu.V., describes this episode. Perfilova, who taught Russian in Cairo:

“I was working in the evening. Suddenly, General Dolnikov’s car picked me up. The driver took me home. My husband and things already packed in a suitcase were waiting for me there. My husband told me that due to the current situation I was leaving for Moscow, and he was staying. That’s all. it was unexpected and incomprehensible, but no one explained anything.

Only at the airfield, at about two in the morning, literally just before departure, did he say that the war would begin tomorrow. We, the wives of officers and some oil workers, were put on a plane. It was, as they later said, L.I.’s personal plane. Brezhnev. We landed at a military airfield in Kyiv. From there, those who lived in Moscow were transferred on a small but comfortable plane to an airfield near Moscow in Chkalovsk, and then taken home by car. This was in October, and already in February I returned to Egypt again."

At 14.00 the Arabs launched a powerful offensive. The starting conditions were not in favor of the Israelis - the 100-kilometer Barlev Line on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal was defended by only 2,000 soldiers (according to other sources - about 1,000) and 50 tanks. The hour of the attack was chosen taking into account the solstice, at which time it was on the side of the Egyptians and “blinded” the Israeli soldiers.

By this time, the Egyptian armed forces, after mobilization, had 833 thousand people, 2 thousand tanks, 690 aircraft, 190 helicopters, 106 warships. The Syrian army consisted of 332 thousand personnel, 1,350 tanks, 351 combat aircraft and 26 warships.

The Israeli armed forces at the start of the war numbered 415 thousand people, 1,700 tanks, 690 aircraft, 84 helicopters and 57 warships.

The operation to break through the Israeli “insurmountable” fortified line, developed by Soviet advisers, was carried out with lightning speed. First, the advanced Egyptian shock battalions crossed the narrow canal on landing boats and cutters. Then the equipment was transported on self-propelled ferries, and the main group of Arabs was transported across the pontoon bridges. To make passages in the sand shaft of the Barlev Line, the Egyptians used (again, on the recommendation and with the participation of Soviet specialists) hydraulic monitors. This method of soil erosion was subsequently described by the Israeli press as "ingenious."

At the same time, the Egyptians launched a massive bombing attack on the eastern bank of the canal. In the first 20 minutes, Arab aviation, commanded by the future president of the country X. Mubarak, destroyed almost all Israeli fortifications.

Due to the surprise of the attack and the confusion that reigned, the defenders were unable to use an important defensive factor of the Barlev line - oil tanks dug into the ground. When storming fortifications, flammable material from containers had to be poured through special gutters into the canal. After the oil was set on fire, a wall of fire grew in front of the enemy assault groups.

After breaking through the Barlev Line and organizing crossings, the advanced Egyptian group, numbering 72 thousand (according to other sources - 75 thousand) soldiers and 700 tanks, entered the eastern bank of the Sinai. It was opposed by only 5 IDF brigades, forced to fight without their usual superiority in equipment and men, without air superiority and with limited mobility. It was possible to gain time until the reserves arrived only at the cost of significant losses. For example, on October 9, troops of the 2nd Egyptian Army completely destroyed the 190th Israeli Tank Brigade in 45 minutes, and its commander was captured. The main role in this battle belonged to the Malyutka ATGM batteries, which hit more armored targets than the T-62 tanks.

As a result of the breakthrough of the Barlev Line and the defeat of Israeli units, the path to Tel Aviv was opened. Front commander Shmuel Gonen, having lost control of the situation, was forced to transfer command to Ariel Sharon. Doyen (senior) of the Soviet military-diplomatic corps in Egypt, Admiral N.V. Iliev and Ambassador V. Vinogradov recommended A. Sadat to take advantage of the success and continue the offensive. However, the Egyptian president did not heed their advice, saying: “I have a different tactic. Let the Israelis attack, and we will beat them.” Perhaps this decision of A. Sadat saved the world from the third world war.

In any case, as it became known later, during these critical days, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir gave the order to attach nuclear bombs to the aircraft of the special purpose squadron.

In this situation, the last hope remained for the help of Israel’s long-term partner, the United States. “I called Ambassador Dinitz in Washington at any hour of the day or night,” writes Golda Meir in her memoirs. “Where is the air bridge with supplies for our army? Why isn’t it operational yet? I once called at three o’clock in the morning Washington time , Dinitz replied: “I have no one to talk to now, Golda, it’s still night here.” - “I don’t care what time it is! - I screamed back at Dinitsa. – Call Kissinger immediately, in the middle of the night. We need help today. Tomorrow may be too late."

On the evening of October 12, the first American military transport plane arrived in Israel, and soon the air bridge was in full operation. In total, during the period from October 12 to October 24, the Israel Defense Forces received 128 combat aircraft, 150 tanks, 2,000 state-of-the-art ATGMs, cluster bombs and other military cargo with a total weight of 27 thousand tons.

Note that the Soviet air bridge to Damascus and Cairo was organized two days earlier. In a short time, about 900 sorties were made. On board An-12 and An-22 aircraft, the necessary ammunition and military equipment were delivered to the country. The bulk of the cargo came by sea, so they began to arrive at their destination only towards the end of the war.

At the same time, no less bloody battles unfolded in the northern (Syrian) direction. The fighting on the Syrian front began simultaneously with the attack on the Barlev Line in Sinai. Intelligence reported the upcoming offensive to Israeli commanders in advance. The commander of the 77th Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Kahalani, writes in his memoirs that at 8 a.m. on October 6 he was called to headquarters. General Janusz, the commander of a group of troops on the border with Syria, informed the arriving officers that a war would begin in the afternoon with coordinated attacks by the Syrian and Egyptian armies.

By 12.00 the tanks were ready for battle: fuel and ammunition were replenished, camouflage nets were stretched, and the crews took their places according to the combat schedule. By the way, the Syrian battalion commanders received the order to attack only at 12.00.

The offensive began with an attack on fortifications on the Golan Heights in the Quneitra area with the forces of three infantry and two tank divisions and a separate tank brigade. (The apparatus of Soviet military advisers in the Syrian armed forces was headed during this period by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces V. Makarov.) Each infantry division had 200 tanks. The Syrians were opposed by one infantry and one tank brigade, as well as part of the units of the 7th Tank Brigade of the Israeli Army. The four battalions of the 188th Tank Brigade consisted of 90-100 tanks (mostly “centurions”) and 44 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled guns. The total number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights reached 180-200 units.

This is how Soviet military artillery specialist I.M. describes the beginning of the offensive. Maksakov, who was at that time part of the Syrian army. “October 6 came. In the morning, there was a wary silence at the brigade’s location. The command followed: “Get into cover!” Guns roared, rocket launchers roared, eight SU-20 attack aircraft flew low above the ground. They dropped empty fuel tanks over the brigade’s location, and explosions were heard bombs. The roar was unimaginable. Aviation appeared in the air, artillery and air strikes began on the front line of the Israeli defense. 15 helicopters passed low above the ground with a landing force that landed on Mount Jebel Sheikh (2814 m above sea level). It was visible from the territory of the brigade and was the highest point of the Golan Heights. About forty minutes later the helicopters passed in the opposite direction. The cannonade did not subside. The brigade was ready to attack.

Three hours after the artillery barrage, formations and units of the Syrian army broke through the defenses with heavy losses, overcame a heavily fortified anti-tank ditch and advanced 5-6 kilometers deep into the Golan Heights. At night the brigade marched and entered the battle in the morning of October 7. I had a chance to watch the battle from a shelter near the brigade command post.

Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and cars were burning (later the field on which the battle took place would be called by the Israelis the “Valley of Tears.” - A.O.). Israeli and Syrian Air Force aircraft were constantly in the air, covering the battlefield, storming the enemy, and conducting air battles. The command post was hit by a pair of Phantoms, one of them was shot down by a Syrian missile, the pilot ejected and parachuted, he was captured and taken to brigade headquarters."

By the morning of October 7, the maximum depth of the Syrians' penetration north and south of Al-Quneitra reached 10 km. A significant role in this was played by the technical advantage of the Syrian Soviet-made T-62 and T-55 tanks, equipped with night vision devices. Fierce fighting continued for several days. During this time, according to I. Maksakov, 26 Israeli aircraft were destroyed. By the end of the day on October 8, units of the 1st Panzer Division reached the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias, that is, the 1967 borders. However, reinforcements that approached the Israelis (three tank brigades of General Dan Laner) stopped the attackers.

On October 9, the Israelis seized the initiative and, despite the air superiority of Syrian aviation and strong air defense, bombed Damascus. Nevertheless, as a result of air defense actions, 2 Israeli planes with American pilots were shot down.

On October 10, the Israelis launched a counteroffensive and reached the “armistice line,” the so-called “Purple Line” established by the UN after the 1967 war. On the same day, Jordanian, Iraqi and Saudi forces entered the war. The Syrian brigade in which I. Maksakov was located, having lost more than 40% of its military equipment and personnel, was withdrawn to the reorganization area on the night of the 11th, and then to the reserve. During the fighting, the brigade's air defense division destroyed 7 Israeli aircraft and lost 3 anti-aircraft installations. In total, by October 13, 143 Israeli aircraft were destroyed, with Syrian losses of 36 aircraft.

There were also significant losses in manpower and armored vehicles on both sides. Thus, in four days of fighting in the 188th reserve brigade of the IDF, 90% of the officers were out of action. Only in the battle in the “Valley of Tears” the 7th Israeli brigade lost 98 (according to other sources – 73) “centurions” out of 150, but was able to destroy 230 Syrian tanks and more than 200 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

On October 12, thanks to an attack by the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division, the Israeli offensive was stopped, and on October 20, the opponents concluded a truce.

In total, as a result of the fighting on the Northern Front, Syria and its allies lost, according to various sources, from 400 to 500 T-54 and T-55 tanks, and Israel lost about 250 (according to Israeli data).

No less fierce fighting took place in the air, between the Syrian and Israeli air forces. Let us recall that at the beginning of the war the Israeli Air Force was armed with 12 Votour light bombers, 95 F-4E Phantom fighter-bombers, 160 A-4E and H Skyhawk attack aircraft, 23 Mister 4A fighters, 30 Hurricane fighters, six RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft. To solve air defense tasks, 35 Mirage fighters, 24 Barak (copies of the French Mirage, produced in Israel), and 18 Super-Mister fighters were used.

At the beginning of hostilities, the Syrian Air Force had 180 MiG-21, 93 MiG-17, 25 Su-7b fighter-bombers and 15 Su-20 fighters. The air defense forces were armed with 19 divisions of the S-75M and S-125M anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as three anti-aircraft missile brigades of the Kvadrat air defense system (an export version of the Kub air defense system). The actions of the Syrian Air Force and Air Defense were supervised by Soviet military advisers. True, according to the combat use adviser to the head of the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force of the Syrian Arab Republic, Colonel K.V. Sukhov, not always with an understanding of the situation and a correct assessment of the enemy. In his memoirs, he noted, in particular: “There were very serious shortcomings in the training of the Air Force. There was excessive centralization of control and, as a consequence, insufficient trust in the commanders of air brigades.

The flight personnel were often mixed from unit to unit, as a result of which there were no permanent combat crews in the squadrons, especially in flights and pairs. The commanders, flight personnel and command post crews had little knowledge of the characteristics of the enemy. Despite having good piloting skills, the Syrian pilots had unsatisfactory tactical, and many, fire training. Unfortunately, a large share of the blame for this lies with our advisers to the commanders of squadrons, brigades and even the Air Force and Air Defense Command, who also did not know the enemy well enough and were unable to develop effective tactics to combat them."

Not all was well during the preparation of air defense systems. Colonel K.V. Sukhov notes about this:

“The formation of the anti-aircraft missile forces (AATF) ended less than a month before the start of the war, so the units achieved only a satisfactory level of training. Combat crews did not have time to master complex types of shooting (at high-speed and high-altitude targets, in a difficult radio interference environment, in conditions of enemy use anti-radar missiles of the "Shrike" type and various decoys). The training program was not completed and the coherence of the command post calculations was not achieved. The interaction of air defense missile systems with fighter aircraft was practically not worked out. The equipment of the main, reserve and decoy positions was not fully completed." Subsequently, these shortcomings were used by the Syrian leadership to accuse the USSR of supplying outdated equipment and insufficient training of Soviet military specialists. At the same time, the “rushing” policy of the Egyptian president, who turned to the Soviet Union for help at a critical moment, when there was almost no time left for the necessary combat work, was obscured. For example, on the eve of the war, Syrian fighter pilots underwent special training under the guidance of Pakistani instructors. According to Colonel V. Babich, “they mastered the technique of piloting the MiG-21 quite well in flight modes close to critical” and learned many techniques for conducting single and double combat that Israeli pilots possessed. However, this did not protect them from significant losses. According to American data, in October 1973, the Syrian Air Force lost 179 aircraft. Other Arab allied countries, Egypt and Iraq, have 242 and 21 aircraft, respectively (442 units in total). At the same time, the Israeli Air Force lost 35 Phantom fighter-bombers, 55 A-4 attack aircraft, 12 Mirage fighters and six Super-Misters (98 units in total).

During the fighting, the Syrians experienced significant difficulty in obtaining operational information regarding the enemy’s intentions. However, the Syrian Air Force did not have a “pure” reconnaissance aircraft capable of obtaining such information, and they were again forced to turn to the Soviet Union for help. For this purpose, a detachment of MiG-25R reconnaissance aircraft was urgently transferred from the USSR to the Middle East. Officer of the 47th Separate Guards Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment Nikolai Levchenko recalls the formation of the first detachment sent to Egypt:

“On the morning of October 11, 1973, the 47th OGRP was alerted. Within a couple of hours, the regimental An-2 from Shatalovo transported those few who did not have time to leave for Shaikovka for replacement training in Poland. The task was set in the shortest possible time deadlines to disassemble and prepare four MiG-25s for transportation by military aviation, as well as to form a group of flight and technical personnel of about 200 people for a special mission to one of the countries of the Middle East.

Since many of our fellow soldiers had already visited “one of the countries,” almost no one had any doubts - this was Egypt again. And by the evening of the next day I learned that instead of Brzeg I would have to fly to Cairo.

By this time, the 154th separate aviation detachment (JSC) had already been formed, consisting of 220 regiment personnel. And in the evening of the same day, heading for Cairo West (with an intermediate landing at one of the airfields of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary), the An-12 took off with an advanced group of technical personnel on board, led by Guard squadron engineer Captain A.K. Trunov. Literally after them came the An-22 with dismantled MiGs on board and with accompanying personnel."

The group's first combat mission was carried out on October 22, 1973. It was carried out in difficult conditions - in radio silence, without the use of radio navigation aids, by a pair of MiGs piloted by Levchenko and Major Uvarov. The fighters headed north towards Alexandria, where they turned around and headed for the Sinai Peninsula. Having passed the traverse of Lake Korun, the scouts, having made a turn, returned to their airfield.

The flight duration was 32 minutes. During this time, hundreds of aerial photographs of the combat area were taken, from which a photographic tablet was compiled on the ground. Having seen this material a couple of hours later, the chief of staff of the Egyptian army, according to Levchenko, began to cry - “a tablet with a desert landscape impartially recorded black traces of burning and soot from dozens of burnt Egyptian tanks, armored vehicles, and other equipment on a light background of sand.”

The pilots of the 154th JSC made their last combat flight in December 1973. Nevertheless, until May 1975, the Soviet air squad continued to be based in Cairo West and conduct training flights over Egyptian territory.

The impending disaster on the Syrian front (especially significant losses of aircraft and ground-based air defense systems) forced President Hafez al-Assad to once again request urgent help from Moscow. Since the defeat of the Syrians was not part of the Kremlin’s plans, an air bridge was quickly organized through which a stream from the Soviet Union poured into Syria and Egypt. According to Army General M. Gareev, Soviet military transport aircraft flew about 4,000 sorties to Egypt alone, delivering one and a half thousand tanks and 109 combat aircraft to make up for serious losses.

Soviet military personnel also went to the Middle East with the equipment. This is how Colonel Yu. Levshov described his urgent business trip: “It all started early in the morning of October 14, 1973. I, an engineer in the missile weapons service of the unit, was called to the district headquarters at 7.00. They warned me that I would have to go abroad urgently.

At the appointed time, I and several other officers arrived at headquarters, where the commander was already waiting for us all. He announced his decision: four of us should leave as part of a repair and restoration brigade to Syria to work on anti-aircraft missile systems.

And if necessary, participate in the fighting near Damascus. The next morning we were already in Moscow, where a team of about 40 people was being formed at the General Staff. These were mostly officers under 30 years of age. We were advised to send home all the documents and consider ourselves members of the trade union who travel to developing countries. After a short briefing about the upcoming work and conditions of service, we were sent to one of the military airfields near Moscow, from where we flew to Hungary.

There, from the airfield where the Air Force of the Southern Group of Forces was based, a military transport plane with cargo on board took off every 15-20 minutes. Flight route: Hungary – Syria. At first, planes landed directly at field airfields to deliver equipment and weapons to the combat area. In the future - to stationary airfields in the Golan Heights and Damascus."

Upon arrival in Syria, Soviet officers were dressed in Syrian uniforms without insignia and placed in a hotel in the central part of Damascus. The next morning, the officers went to their duty station, to an anti-aircraft missile division stationed near the border with Jordan. The day before, Israeli aviation launched a missile and bomb attack on its positions, so the Soviet military saw a rather depressing picture: “After the strike, two diesel engines ended up upside down as a result of a direct hit. All launchers were black with soot, two were smashed to pieces. The control cabins were damaged. Almost half of the position is covered with ball bombs and shrapnel."

The tasks of Soviet officers were not limited to repairing damaged equipment. Within a few days, the specialists had to go into battle, directly participating in repelling Israeli aviation attacks: “In the first weeks, the missiles were not removed from preparation for 20-22 hours a day, since the flight time was 2-3 minutes. Attacks by fighter-bombers were carried out because of the mountains The strike group was in the fire zone for a few minutes and immediately went back behind the mountains.

I remember such a case. In one of the divisions in the front line, we checked the configuration of equipment. The receivers in the receiving and transmitting cabin were poorly configured, and our engineer took over the adjustment (in the case of the launch of a Shrike-type anti-radar projectile, it was a suicide bomber).

The division commander warned that, based on experience, Israeli planes might appear in the near future - a reconnaissance aircraft had just flown by, and they failed to shoot it down.

The complex is ready to open fire in minutes. The team leader recommended not to touch anything, but our specialist promised to do everything clearly and quickly, and, if necessary, switch to manual frequency maintenance mode. As soon as he started setting up, senior lieutenant Omelchenko shouted from the command post that, according to target reconnaissance data, an attack on the division had begun, and rushed into the cockpit to help the guidance officer. In the transmitting cabin they became nervous: how to ensure shooting when the setup is in progress? And suddenly they report from the command post that Shrikes have been launched into the division. Everyone who heard this immediately became silent. In the cockpit with a detuned receiver, the engineer was dumbfounded. I can't take my fingers off the tuning knobs.

The leader of our group jumped into the cabin and pushed out the would-be specialist, who was stunned with fear. In a matter of seconds, he himself tuned the receiver to the desired frequency and ensured that the complex was firing. A missile was fired at the target, and they managed to dodge the Shrike using a tactical technique.

The senior lieutenant, who was trying to set up the equipment, began talking a few days later, and he was urgently sent to the Union."

However, the success of the war was still decided on the Southern (Sinai) Front.

Early in the morning of October 14, the Egyptians launched a powerful frontal offensive. A grandiose tank battle broke out, comparable in scale to the Battle of Kursk during World War II. 1,200 of the latest Egyptian tanks (not counting the armored vehicles of the motorized infantry) were opposed by up to 800 units of Israeli M-60a1, M-48a3 and “tyrants”. As a result of the fighting, in just one day, the Egyptians lost 270 tanks and armored vehicles, the Israelis - about 200.

The next day, the IDF made an attempt to seize the initiative. On October 15, 18 Israeli brigades (including 9 tank brigades), with massive air support, launched a counteroffensive.

A day later, they pushed back the Egyptian infantry brigade of the 2nd Army on the right flank and broke through in the area of ​​Khamsa station to the Great Bitter Lake. In three days, Israeli units, having crossed to the other side, captured a bridgehead and, having accumulated significant forces by October 19 - about 200 tanks and several thousand motorized infantry soldiers under the command of General Ariel Sharon, launched an offensive to the north, northwest and southwest.

On the fourth day, this group, divided into small detachments, destroying command posts, communications centers along the way, suppressing anti-aircraft missile batteries, artillery and eliminating supply bases, approached the city of Suez and practically blocked the 3rd Egyptian Army. True, not only the Egyptians, but also the Israeli group itself found themselves in a very difficult situation. If she had lost communications, thousands of Israeli soldiers would have been captured. At one point, a group of Egyptian paratroopers, having made their way to the Israeli crossing, was ready to blow up the pontoon bridges, but... received a strict ban from Cairo to carry out this operation.

At the same time, Egyptian batteries were already firing at the crossings. And again an order came from Cairo to cease fire. The mysteries of these virtually treacherous orders were revealed thanks to the President of Egypt himself, A. Sadat. At the end of 1975, talking in Cairo with two Soviet representatives, orientalist E. Primakov and journalist I. Belyaev, the president admitted that the Egyptian army was quite capable of striking the Israelis at the final stage of the war. According to him, the Egyptian army had a double superiority in artillery, tanks and everything necessary to destroy the Israeli group on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

The Egyptian army could have destroyed Ariel Sharon's units, but did not dare to do so. Anwar Sadat was afraid of the warning received in the first days of the war from US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The latter told the president that “if Soviet weapons defeat American weapons, the Pentagon will never forgive this, and our “game” with you (on a possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict) will be over.” There were probably other good reasons for Sadat’s “compliance.” There is evidence that he was a high-ranking "agent of influence" for the CIA. In February 1977, the Washington Post published a story about CIA payments to various figures in the Middle East.

One of the recipients was Kamal Adham, a former special adviser to King Fakht of Saudi Arabia and a CIA liaison. The newspaper called him "a pivotal figure in the Arab world." Many assumed that part of the money Kamal Adham received from the CIA went directly to Sadat. A senior source, who wished to remain anonymous, confirmed that back in the 1960s, Adham provided Sadat, who was vice president at the time, with a regular private income. And finally, American intelligence agencies were aware that Anwar Sadat smoked hashish and at times suffered from attacks of fear typical of drug addicts, bordering on paranoia. Public disclosure of this fact was not in the interests of the Egyptian leader. Details of the president’s personal life, as well as state secrets, could have been supplied to the Americans by Sadat’s intelligence chief, General Ahmed Ismail, who had been associated with the CIA for many years.

Thus, the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion from the very beginning. On October 23, the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions 338/339, binding on the warring parties, and October 25 became the official date for the end of the war. The day before, Israel tried to “slow down” the decision to end hostilities in order to gain a foothold in the captured Arab territories, but this was met with the displeasure of Secretary of State Kissinger. Summoning the Israeli Ambassador Dinitz, he told him directly: “Tell Meir that if Israel continues the war, then it should no longer count on receiving military assistance from the United States. You want to get the 3rd Army, but we are not going to do it because of you.” get World War III!" . There were good reasons for such a statement. On October 24, the Soviet leadership warned “of the most severe consequences” that await Israel in the event of its “aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria.” Through diplomatic channels, Moscow made it clear that it would not allow Egypt to be defeated.

In a telegram from Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, sent to R. Nixon, noted that if the American side was passive in resolving the crisis, the USSR would be faced with the need to “urgently consider taking the necessary unilateral steps.” To back up their words with deeds, the USSR declared increased combat readiness for 7 divisions of airborne troops. In response to this, the Americans declared an alarm in the nuclear forces. The fear of being caught between "two millstones" forced Israel to stop the offensive and agree to UN resolutions. On October 25, the state of combat readiness in Soviet divisions and American nuclear forces was canceled. The tension subsided, but it was probably at this time that the Soviet leadership came up with the idea of ​​destroying the Israeli nuclear center Dimona in the Negev Desert. To implement it, four battle groups were formed. Their training took place at the TurkVO training center in Kelitu, where saboteurs practiced the operation to destroy them using life-size replicas of Dimona nuclear facilities. The training continued for more than a month, until the command “Resign!” came from the Center.

Leaving the occupied territories, Israeli soldiers, according to eyewitnesses, took with them everything that could be useful, including the household property of Arab residents, and destroyed buildings. Thus, according to G. Kaloyanov, a correspondent for the Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo, IDF units leaving the Syrian city of Quneitra carried out a five-day operation to “destroy the city.” Its many public buildings were first blown up with dynamite and then "smoothed out" by a bulldozer.

However, Israel's military success came at a high price. The IDF lost approximately 3,000 people killed and 7,000 wounded (according to Israeli official data - 2,521 people killed and 7,056 wounded), 250 aircraft and over 900 tanks. The Arabs suffered even greater losses - 28,000 killed and wounded and 1,350 tanks. Nevertheless, Israeli casualties, in proportion to the total population, far exceeded Arab casualties.

As for the Soviet military personnel who participated in the “October” war, in addition to artillerymen, air defense specialists, and infantry advisers, there were also Soviet pilots in the ranks of the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

It is impossible not to mention the combat work of the Soviet sailors who served on the ships of the 5th squadron of the USSR Navy. They were in the Mediterranean Sea, directly in the war zone. Moreover, in readiness to immediately use weapons against the enemy. Soviet warships carried out escorting transports (tankers), both Soviet and foreign, to the ports of Syria and Egypt, evacuating Soviet citizens and foreign tourists from these countries and other tasks. In total, during the war, from 96 to 120 warships of various purposes and vessels of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets were concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea, including up to 6 nuclear and 20 diesel submarines. Some of the diesel submarines were deployed in areas along the passage routes of Soviet convoys with transports with the task of anti-submarine defense. Among them was the submarine "B-130" under the command of captain 2nd rank V. Stepanov, which was on combat duty in the area southeast of the island of Cyprus - west of Haifa. For the successful completion of tasks for the protection and defense of Soviet transports, the commander of the boat, V. Stepanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle.

The only known case of combat contact between Soviet sailors and the enemy was the episode with the minesweeper "Rulevoy" and the medium landing ship "SDK-39" of the Black Sea Fleet. They were forced to open fire on Israeli aircraft trying to prevent Soviet ships from entering the Syrian port of Latakia. There were no combat losses.

In the West, the strengthening of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was seen as a sign that it could be used to support Soviet regular troops if they were sent to a conflict area. Such a possibility was not excluded. Let us note that at a critical moment for Egypt, the Soviet General Staff urgently worked out the option of landing a “demonstrative landing” of Soviet marines in Port Said. It is noteworthy, but according to a former employee of the operational directorate of the Navy General Staff, Captain 1st Rank V. Zaborsky, at that time there were no marines in the 5th squadron. The regiment was just preparing to be transferred to the Mediterranean Sea from Sevastopol. At the same time, most of the ships of the squadron had non-standard units for operations in amphibious assault on the shore. They underwent training in a marine brigade before entering combat service. Command of the landing forces was entrusted to the commander of the 30th division (command post - cruiser Admiral Ushakov). In this situation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered the formation of a company (platoon) of volunteer paratroopers on each ship of the 1st and 2nd rank and the preparation of ships and watercraft for landing personnel. The combat mission was to enter Port Said, organize defense from land, and prevent the enemy from capturing the city. The defense must be carried out until the arrival of the airborne division from the Union. Only at the last moment was this operation canceled.

Here it is appropriate to briefly dwell on the attitude of some socialist countries towards the policies of the Soviet Union pursued during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Most of the socialist countries - allies of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact Organization supported the actions of the Soviet Union in organizing assistance to Arab countries. The countries that were part of the Warsaw Division did not take part in military operations, although a significant number of military specialists from Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were in Egypt and Syria.

Bulgaria and East Germany organized the training and education of Arab military personnel on their territory. Czechoslovakia supplied Arab countries with some types of weapons. Bulgaria allowed the use of its airspace by Soviet transport aircraft transporting weapons to the Middle East.

Yugoslavia, although it was not a participant in the ATS, helped Arab countries; Soviet aircraft carrying weapons flew through the territory of Yugoslavia. The SFRY itself sold some types of weapons to the countries of the anti-Israeli coalition.

After the end of the war, it became known that Cuban units were planned to participate in the fighting on the side of Syria. According to the deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Forces of Cuba, Colonel Vicente Diaz, Syria asked Fidel Castro to assist it in military operations against the Israelis. The request was granted, and 800 Cuban tank volunteer volunteers were transported to the country in absolute secrecy. However, they did not have time to take part in the hostilities: by this time a truce had already been declared.

Nevertheless, starting in April 1974, Cuban crews began to move to the front line in small groups, where they took part in artillery duels with the Israeli army.

The behavior of Romania was completely different. The Romanian government has closed the country's airspace to aircraft carrying military cargo from the USSR to the Middle East. Moreover, the SRR supplied Israel with spare parts during the conflict to repair Soviet-made equipment that had been captured by the Israelis from Arab countries during previous hostilities. Israel received from Romania not only spare parts, but also modern samples of equipment components, in particular, radio-electronic, Soviet-made ones, which were in service with the countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War.

American units, trained to fight in the desert sands, fought on the Israeli side. According to some reports, the soldiers of these units had dual citizenship. In addition, according to the Russian émigré magazine "Chasovoy", there were over 40,000 (?) American military personnel in the Israeli army.

About 140 ships and vessels from the 6th Fleet of the US Navy were concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea, of which 4 attack (multipurpose) aircraft carriers, 20 amphibious helicopter carriers with a naval force of amphibious (landing) forces of 10-12 units, 20 cruisers, 40 destroyers and other ships.

Despite the official victory of Israel and its allies, the war “hardly” hit the economies of Western countries, primarily the United States. On the tenth day, the Arabs, without negotiations with importers, imposed an embargo on oil supplies to the United States. American imports from Arab countries fell from 1.2 million barrels per day to almost zero. In a matter of weeks, the price of crude oil increased more than 4 times - from 12 to 42 dollars per barrel. The result was a fuel shortage in America and an economic downturn throughout the world. Due to the high cost of fuel in the northern regions of the United States, many government agencies and schools were closed, and strict control over gasoline was introduced. The filling of gasoline into cars at gas stations was even regulated.

The crisis did not last long. In March 1974, the “Oil Summit” was held in Washington: the Arabs lifted the embargo and increased production. Nevertheless, the price of oil continued to rise intermittently. Gasoline was poured on even and odd numbers until 1976, and the economical “national speed limit” of 90 km/h lasted until 1995.

The “gasoline crisis” that broke out as a result of the embargo by the Arab Gulf countries clearly showed the vulnerability of the Western economy. This, in turn, was the impetus for the creation of an anti-crisis structure, in particular in America - the Department of Energy in 1977 and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1978.

As for the Soviet Union, the “gasoline crisis” even brought it some benefit. Higher oil prices allowed the USSR to purchase grain, maintain the same level of military spending, and fuel its economy for more than a decade.

In conclusion of the essay, it is important to touch upon another aspect of the Yom Kippur War, which is related to the study of the experience of the parties conducting combat operations and their use of modern types of weapons. This aspect received significant attention from both the USSR and the USA.

A Soviet group of 12 officers from all branches of the military was created immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. In addition to studying the experience of the war, military specialists who arrived from Moscow were tasked with collecting samples of the enemy’s latest weapons and equipment. The group's first "trophy" was an American-made Israeli M-60 tank. A week later it was delivered to the Soviet Union (Kubinka), and after another two weeks the Egyptian command received materials about the tests of the “American”, as well as recommendations for combating the M-60 in a combat situation. Other “exhibits” included the English Centurion tank, an American-made unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and other types of Western weapons and equipment. For completing this task, the group leader, Admiral N.V. Iliev was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Similar work was carried out by the American military. For this purpose, at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams, a special commission was created headed by Brigadier General Braid. Its tasks included studying the features of the forms and methods of action of the warring parties in the conflict and, most importantly, forming proposals for optimizing the development of US ground forces based on its results.

As a result of the work of the commission, the effectiveness of the combined arms combat theory adopted by the Egyptian troops (developed in the USSR) was noted - the use of infantry units with ATGMs in the battle formations of tank units and subunits; active and Arab-coordinated variety of air defense systems, which deprived the Israelis of the predicted overwhelming air superiority, etc.

The main conclusion made by American experts from the analysis of military operations in the Middle East in 1973 was the need to develop a national theory of operational art.

Immediately after the end of the war, by decision of the UN, the Emergency Armed Forces (EMF-2), created under the auspices of the UN, were sent to the conflict zone. Their task was to monitor the implementation of the terms of the truce in Palestine. The number of PMCs was 300 officers representing 17 countries. As a result of the persistent work of Soviet diplomacy, by decision of the UN Security Council, 36 military observers from the USSR were included in the peacekeepers (Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2746 of December 21, 1973). The first group of 12 officers under the leadership of Colonel N.F. Blika (deputy commander of the Kantemirovskaya motorized rifle division) began a peacekeeping mission in Egypt, in the Suez Canal zone, on November 25. On November 30, 24 more Soviet military observers arrived in Cairo. Among those who arrived there were many experienced officers, some of them had visited different countries, participated in hostilities and received awards. 18 military observers remained in Egypt, and 18 observers left for Syria.

Since the beginning of 1977, the USSR and the USA intensified their efforts to convene the Geneva Conference on a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. At the same time, activity on the “internal front” intensified: Egypt and Israel began to secretly establish direct contacts, preparing the ground for a separate deal. It is significant that top secret contacts between Egypt and Israel were kept under complete control both in Moscow and in Washington. The Soviet intelligence agency could obtain the necessary information in a matter of hours and transfer it to Andropov, and then to Brezhnev. In addition, three Soviet ships were constantly cruising in the Mediterranean Sea - “Kavkaz”, “Krym” and “Yuri Gagarin” with the necessary electronic equipment that “recorded” all radio and telephone conversations in Egypt, Israel and other neighboring countries.

On October 1, 1977, the USSR and the USA signed a Statement on the Middle East, in which the parties set the date for convening the Geneva Conference (December) and for the first time, at the insistence of Moscow, included a clause on the rights of Palestinians in the document. However, the American political establishment strongly recommended that the Carter administration that came to power maintain a position independent of the Kremlin. The bet was placed on an alliance between Begin and Sadat. On September 17, 1978, Israel and Egypt, with the participation of the United States, signed the David Accords. On March 26 of the following year, a peace treaty was concluded between the two countries in Washington. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula began, which ended in April 1982. The Soviet Union, not wanting to remain a mere observer in the Middle East issue, was forced to rely on Egypt's political opponents: Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Iraq, the PLO and Syria.

Notes:

The Algerian National Liberation Front was created on October 10, 1954 at a meeting of the commanders of the five zones (wilaya) and a representative of the group located in Egypt. At the same meeting, a decision was made to form the military wing of the Front - the National Liberation Army (ALN). The backbone of the Front and the ANO were the leaders of the paramilitary Security Organization (or Special Organization), which emerged in 1947 - Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, Kerim Belkacem, Ben Buland and others. The Security Organization, in turn, was created in 1946 (headed by Masali Hajj) on the basis of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms

Khazhderes S. From the Liberation Front to the Front of Creation // Problems of Peace and Socialism. – 1975. – No. 1, January. – P. 83.

Local wars: history and modernity / Ed. I.E. Shavrova. M., 1981.-S. 183.

Military-historical magazine. – 1974. No. 11. – P. 76.

Landa R. Algeria throws off its shackles. M., 1961. – P 73

Abbas Farhat - born on October 24, 1899 in the family of a wealthy peasant in the village of Shalma, Babor Kabylia region in northeastern Algeria. He studied at the “French-Arab” school of Taher, then at Jijelli, the Lyceum of Constantine. Received a bachelor's degree. In 1921-1923 served in a military hospital and rose to the rank of sergeant. After serving in the army, he entered the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Algiers. In 1919 he joined the assimilationist movement of the “Franco-Muslims”. In 1926 he became president of the Association of Muslim Students of the University of Algiers, and in 1927 - president of the Association of Muslim Students of All North Africa. In 1930 - vice-president of the National Union of Students of France. In the 1930s, he was elected to the municipality of Setif, the general council of the department of Constantine, and the financial delegations of Algeria. He published actively in newspapers and magazines. Joined the Federation of Native Elects (FTI). As a delegate of the Physicotechnical Institute he was introduced to the executive committee of the Muslim Congress. In 1938 he created the Algerian People's Union (ANS). One of the authors of the “Manifesto of the Algerian People” (1942), which proclaimed “recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination,” “elimination of colonization,” etc. In September 1943, he was arrested for “inciting” disobedience to the authorities, but was soon released. On March 14, 1944, he created the association “Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom” in Setif, which declared its goal to fight “the violence and aggression of the imperialist powers in Africa and Asia.” In 1945 he was arrested again for supporting the uprising against the French authorities. After liberation, on March 16, 1946, he created the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto. In the mid-1950s, he joined the National Liberation Front (FLN), which launched an uprising on November 1, 1954. In April 1956, he was introduced to the leadership of the TNF, and in August he was elected a member of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (NCAR). On September 19, 1958, he headed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPAR), created in Cairo. In 1961, at the session of the NSAR (August 9-27), he was removed from the post of head of the WPAR and resigned. Despite this, he continued to engage in political activities. On September 20, 1962 he became chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Algeria. On August 13, 1963, he resigned in protest against the “concentration of power in one hand” and the transformation of representatives of the people into “simple figures.” On July 3, 1964, he was arrested as an “enemy of the socialist choice” and deported to the Sahara. On June 8, 1965, he was released, and in March 1976, after signing the “Appeal to the Algerian People,” he was arrested again. After his release in 1977, he continued to engage in journalistic activities. He died on December 24, 1985.

In 1974, Ibrahim Shaheen, his wife Dina and two children were arrested by Egyptian intelligence services and put on trial. In 1977, when President Anwar Sadat was preparing to travel on a peace mission to Israel, the head of the family was hanged, and Dina and her children were released and soon fled with them to Israel.

Perfilov Yuri Vasilievich. Graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School, Academy named after. Kuibyshev, postgraduate degree. He served in the General Staff, taught at the Military Academy. Kuibysheva. In Egypt, he was the head of a group of military engineers, taught at the Academy. Nasser. Colonel. As an adviser (engineering troops) he participated in the October War. He was awarded the Egyptian Order. After returning home, he received the rank of major general.

Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. /Ed. V.A. Zolotareva. M., 2000. P. 200.

Israel failed to establish air supremacy, since a modern air defense system was quickly deployed in Syria with Soviet help, and Soviet officers were often at the control panels. Moreover, on the eve of the war, Syrian fighter pilots underwent special training under the guidance of Pakistani instructors and thoroughly mastered the techniques of piloting the MiG-21, including single and double pilots - tactics practiced by Israeli pilots.

Kamenogorsky M. Secrets of the Israeli bomb // Independent Military Review. 2004. No. 11. P. 5.

Meir G. My life. Chimkent, 1997; Smirnov A. Arab-Israeli wars. M., 2003. C, 318.

Smirnov A. Arab-Israeli wars. M., 2003. P. 318.

"Armor Collection". 2003. No. 2. P. 24.

Maksakov Ivan Mikhailovich. Born on April 23, 1940 in Ukraine. In 1957 he graduated from high school. In 1959 he was called up for active military service. In 1962 he entered the Kiev Higher Anti-Aircraft Artillery School, which he graduated in 1967. Until 1972, he served in the KDVO. From 1972 to 1974 he was on a business trip to Syria. From 1974 to 1982 - teacher at the Smolensk All-Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 1982-1984. – Combined Arms Military Academy in Algeria. From 1984 to 1990 – deputy head of the department of the Smolensk Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile School. In 1990 he was transferred to the reserve. Colonel.

Maksakov I. Business trip to Syria. In the book. Internationalists. 2001. Smolensk. pp. 213-214.

Isaenko A. In the footsteps of Lawrence of Arabia. Notes of a UN military observer // Independent Military Review. 2003, August 1. S. 8.

On October 6, 1973, on the Jewish Day of Judgment, Israel was attacked on all fronts by the armies of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Cuba, and North Korea. The aggression against the Jewish state was led by the USSR - the Arab armies were controlled by thousands of Russian officers and were armed with tens of billions of dollars worth of Russian weapons.

In the vastness from Sinai to the Golan, the largest tank battle in world history unfolded, in which 1 million 500 thousand troops and 7 thousand tanks fought on both sides.
In terms of the number of tanks and the ferocity of the battles, the Yom Kippur War surpasses the tank battles of the 2nd World War, incl. Battle of Kursk.
It would seem that everything was on the aggressor’s side:
factor of surprise, colossal superiority in tanks, aircraft and manpower. Motivated by hatred of Israel, Islamic fanaticism merged with traditional Russian anti-Semitism

However, the enemy did not take into account the tenacity and professionalism of the Israeli soldier, who managed not only to stop the enemy armada rushing towards Israeli cities, but also to inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy.

Despite the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment, multiplied by the factor of surprise, the Israeli army, during heavy and bloody battles, managed to stop the advance of the aggressor and, going on a counter-offensive, inflicted a crushing defeat on him:
Israeli tanks reached the outskirts of Damascus, the Egyptian army was defeated and the path to Cairo was open.

Recording of the first Israeli Radio news broadcast on the outbreak of war on October 6, 1973

Translation:

"Speaking from Israel Radio from Jerusalem, Aleph and Beth networks.
Gmar Khatima Tova, time – 3 pm.
An IDF spokesman reports that at approximately 2 p.m., our positions in the Sinai and Golan Heights were attacked by Egyptian and Syrian forces.
Our troops are repelling the advance of enemy troops.
Due to Syrian air raids in the Golan region, air raid sirens are sounded in a number of cities. These air raid signals are not training signals.
The government held an urgent meeting

The news is interrupted by a coded message apparently alerting certain categories of reservists to an emergency mobilization:

A pan of meat! A pan of meat! A pan of meat! .

Continuation of news

In light of recent events, the government decided to announce a partial mobilization of reservists. The Minister of Transport asked the population not to use motor vehicles, so as not to interfere with the intensive movement of military equipment on the country's roads.

Radio Cairo interrupted its broadcasts at 2:10 Israeli time and reported that at 1:30 Israeli troops attacked Egyptian positions on the Suez Canal in the areas of Soukra and Zaahana, Egyptian troops repelling the aggression. Radio Cairo reports that Israeli aircraft have struck Egyptian positions and several Israeli warships are moving westward. Radio Damascus reports that Israeli troops are attacking Syria.

Now let's move on to the first reports from our war correspondents.
Our correspondent in the Golan is on the phone:
- As you, of course, have already heard, here in the Golan, tank and air battles began around noon after the Syrians opened fire from artillery guns and tanks at our fortified points located on the ceasefire line. Artillery fire is also being conducted on our settlements located in the Golan and in the Hula Valley.

Around noon, Syrian planes were spotted over Kiryat Shmona, our planes flew out to intercept and entered into an air battle over southern Lebanon. According to reports from Lebanon, one Syrian plane crashed on Lebanese territory.

At these moments there is a battle between Israeli and Syrian tank forces. Our aviation is continuously delivering strikes - you can probably hear them as the background of my speech - on
advancing Syrian troops and their fortified positions.

As a result of air raids and artillery shelling of the Golan and Hula Valley, most of the inhabitants of these areas are in air-raid shelters. Several shells exploded in the vicinity of Rosh Pina, but there were no casualties.

Throughout the north of the country there is intense traffic of military equipment and vehicles transporting military personnel. Local residents, standing along the roads, say goodbye to soldiers and reservists with prayers.

In populated areas where the air raid signal has not been sounded, civilians are allowed to be on the streets.

Throughout the north of the country, thunderclaps of air battles over the Golan can be heard. Half an hour ago, local residents were instructed to go down to air-raid shelters. As evening falls, according to the order, residents of border settlements are ordered to leave their homes.

This is the news for this hour."

Knesset meeting October 16, 1973
Government update on the situation.
Speech by Prime Minister Golda Meir (excerpts)

Golda Meir, Prime Minister:
“Today is already the 11th day of a brutal war on all fronts of our country. The war that was started by our enemies on the holiest day for the Jewish people, the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur).

The Arab countries concentrated enormous forces for this aggression. Until October 15, the forces of the Arab armies were:
Egypt: 650,000 soldiers, 650 combat aircraft, 2,500 tanks.
Syria: 150,000 soldiers, 330 combat aircraft, 2,000 tanks.
Iraq (partially participating in the war): 230 tanks, 3 squadrons.
Jordan (partially participating in the war): 80 tanks.
Morocco: 1500 soldiers on infantry fighting vehicles.

Air defense systems:
Egypt - 150 batteries SA-2 (S-75 Dvina air defense system), SA-3 (S-125 Pechora air defense system) and SA-6 (Kub air defense system).
Syria - 35 batteries of the same air defense systems.
Artillery guns with a caliber of 120 mm. and higher: Egypt has 2000 guns, Syria has 1200 guns.

Members of the Knesset, it does not take much imagination to imagine what Israel's situation would be like today if we had remained within the borders of June 4, 1967.

It is hardly worth wasting the valuable time of the Knesset on quoting the statements of Arab leaders that we intercepted about the goals of this criminal war. You and I understand perfectly well that this is a war for the very existence of the Jewish state, a war for life for our people and our country.

Dear members of the Knesset, the USSR seeks to benefit from the war against Israel. It is known what an ominous role the Soviet Union played in creating the conditions that led to the Six-Day War in 1967. Every reasonable person is aware of the role of the USSR in subsequent events. The USSR restored the power of the armies of Egypt and Syria, supplied them with mountains of the latest weapons, and sent a huge number of advisers and instructors.

In August 1970, the USSR established air defense missile divisions in the Suez Canal area and relocated squadrons of combat aircraft there. Moreover, the Soviet Union was preparing the Arab armies for attack, not defense, although at that time it perfectly understood that the Arab countries were not in danger of attack from our side. The hand of the USSR is clearly visible in the weapons, military doctrine and tactics of the armies of our enemies in this war.

But the role of the USSR is expressed even more in the massive support of Israel’s enemies in the midst of the war, when Soviet transport planes and ships deliver the latest weapons, including missiles, to our enemies, and, we believe, Soviet military advisers also arrive on these planes.

The Soviet air bridge as of October 15 was:
- Since October 10, 125 An-12 transport aircraft have flown 125 sorties to Syria; to Egypt - 42 An-12 flights and 16 An-22 flights; to Iraq - 17 An-12 flights.
- From October 10, Soviet ships loaded with weapons began arriving in Latakia by sea.

This behavior of the Soviet Union goes far beyond simply unfriendly policies. This is an irresponsible policy not only in relation to Israel, but also in relation to the entire region and the world as a whole.

Our goal in this war is simple and clear, and it unites the entire people - we must repel the enemy and break his power on both fronts of this war. The defeat of the enemy is the main condition for ensuring our future.

When people ask me: “When will this end”? – I answer, “Then when we can defeat the enemy.”
We will do everything, and I emphasize everything, to achieve this goal as quickly as possible."

Birthday number 9 symbolizes a strong personality with potential intelligence, capable of high development. Here, success is given by the world of art and the arts, artistic talent and creative, creative power.

It is better for such people to immediately abandon the professions of a businessman, metallurgist, or military man. Their problem often lies in realizing their talents and abilities and choosing the right path in life.

The number 9 is often considered the main number of numerology, with a special, sometimes even sacred meaning. This is due to the fact that when multiplied by any number, nine reproduces itself. For example, 9 x 4 = 36 => 3 + 6 = 9. These people are capable of the best feelings towards loved ones. But they often find themselves in all sorts of unpleasant situations.

Lucky day of the week for number 9 is Friday.

Your planet is Neptune.

Advice: Great inventors, discoverers of new things, and musicians are born under this birthday number. It all depends on your abilities and desires. Both of these factors should be combined and directed towards one goal - then success is guaranteed.

Important: Love for people, striving for excellence.
Nine gives a person spiritual activity and promotes higher mental activity.

A Nine person is prone to religious revelations, cosmic contacts, synthetic sciences, and self-education. Patron of composers and musicians, sailors and poets, psychologists and hypnotists.

The fate of such a person can be changeable and fickle. Among the people of Nine there are many revolutionaries, drug addicts and alcoholics.

Love and sex:

These people give themselves completely to love and passionately desire to be loved. Their thirst for love is so great that they are ready to do anything for it, even humiliation.

Great importance is attached to the paraphernalia of romantic courtship. At the same time, they quickly lose interest in the object of their attraction if he (or she) does not succumb to temptation for a long time.

In many cases, marriage with these people is successful, if only because they are very sexy people. They take the issue of morality seriously. At some stage, these people may want to reconsider the marriage relationship, even if the family is happy and there is love between the spouses.

They will want to know why they love each other. After this, they will wish to see confirmation of love every day.

Birth number for a woman

Birth number 9 for a woman An extraordinary, elusive woman, always full of interesting ideas, always on the move. Prefers to communicate with educated and intelligent people, creative individuals whose interests lie in the field of philosophy, culture and art. She likes to go with her friend to all kinds of exhibitions and take part in public, social or political life. She expects a sea of ​​flowers and gifts from fans. A candlelight dinner in a formal setting has an intoxicating effect on her and leads to the creation of a lasting union. In relationships with a partner, he always strives to teach or demonstrate knowledge. She needs beauty, and she herself wants to be beautiful in every way. He takes care of his appearance, but at home he allows himself to dress in anything. She must be loved without regard to conventions. She hates possessive instincts and acquisitiveness in all its forms. She enjoys an informal lifestyle and the company of many friends. Always unpredictable. Has a tendency to get involved with men she doesn't really need. She can dissolve in love for her chosen one, give herself completely to him, or never know what love is and whether it was love. She can have a good long-term relationship with a partner who is undemanding to her and creates material comfort and a sense of freedom for her.

Birth number for a man

Birth number 9 for a man This is an intellectual, romantic, very erudite man. He is sociable, frank, lives with an open heart. Intellectual and spiritual communication becomes the main thing in relationships with him. He strives for people who have decided, who have found their self-expression. Strictly adheres to his beliefs; ideological differences can become an insurmountable obstacle in relationships. Love is something that happens more in his head than in his heart. He tries to control his own and his partner’s feelings with his mind. Makes high demands on his chosen one. She carefully plans meetings, thinking through all the details, and tries to use seduction methods that were used back in the 18th century. Values ​​respect and honesty with each other. Usually confident in his correctness and the high quality of his knowledge. His main problem is separation from reality and lack of restraint. He tends to avoid real intimacy in intimate relationships. It is important for him to maintain his freedom and the feeling that he belongs only to himself. Believes that sex is a physical continuation of intellectual communication between the sexes. Love is most often found while traveling. He is very sensitive, and can sacrifice his own needs for the sake of his partner. A relationship with him can turn into a delightful romance, but he needs to learn to see a real person in his woman.

Birth number 6

Magnetic personality and enormous sex appeal. They may be physically imperfect, but at the same time have a striking appearance and have phenomenal charm. By their manners and demeanor they attract people of the opposite sex, just as a flame attracts moths. Romantics and idealists. They become almost slaves to their lovers. They are very sensitive to the atmosphere, surround themselves with beautiful things if they have enough money for this. The rich can become philanthropists.

All these people live rich emotional lives. Their sex life is carefully balanced; they love equally with body and soul. Ardent and passionate lovers. Aesthetes love everything beautiful. Those who are sincere in their affections do not betray their fans. They sigh for the ideal, but love real people. They think clearly, are decisive and firm in the implementation of their plans. Their idealism and romanticism are organically combined with practicality and hard work in any business. They are close to ideal. They can go to extremes: their hatred for those who betrayed them is great. At the same time, their vindictiveness and hostility can increase over time to the extreme.

They should develop the ability to control their temperament. These people are good as friends, but you must beware of making them your enemies. If they get angry, they may lose control of themselves. Having overcome this disadvantage, they can become the most pleasant people to communicate and work with.
You should pay attention to the ear, throat, nose.

Pythagorean square or psychomatrix

The qualities listed in the cells of the square can be strong, average, weak or absent, it all depends on the number of numbers in the cell.

Decoding the Pythagorean Square (cells of the square)

Character, willpower - 3

Energy, charisma - 1

Cognition, creativity - 1

Health, beauty - 0

Logic, intuition - 1

Hard work, skill - 2

Luck, luck - 2

Sense of duty - 0

Memory, mind - 2

Decoding the Pythagorean Square (rows, columns and diagonals of the square)

The higher the value, the more pronounced the quality.

Self-esteem (column “1-2-3”) - 5

Making money (column “4-5-6”) - 3

Talent potential (column “7-8-9”) - 4

Determination (line “1-4-7”) - 5

Family (line “2-5-8”) - 2

Stability (line “3-6-9”) - 5

Spiritual potential (diagonal “1-5-9”) - 6

Temperament (diagonal “3-5-7”) - 4

Chinese zodiac sign Ox

Every 2 years the Element of the year changes (fire, earth, metal, water, wood). The Chinese astrological system divides years into active, stormy (Yang) and passive, calm (Yin).

You Bull elements Water of the year Yin

Birth hours

24 hours correspond to the twelve signs of the Chinese zodiac. The sign of the Chinese horoscope of birth corresponds to the time of birth, so it is very important to know the exact time of birth; it has a strong impact on a person’s character. It is argued that by looking at your birth horoscope you can accurately determine the characteristics of your character.

The most striking manifestation of the qualities of the hour of birth will occur if the symbol of the hour of birth coincides with the symbol of the year. For example, a person born in the year and hour of the Horse will display the maximum qualities prescribed for this sign.

• Rat – 23:00 – 01:00
• Bull – 1:00 – 3:00
• Tiger – 3:00 – 5:00
• Rabbit – 5:00 – 7:00
• Dragon – 7:00 – 9:00
• Snake – 09:00 – 11:00
• Horse – 11:00 – 13:00
• Goat – 13:00 – 15:00
• Monkey – 15:00 – 17:00
• Rooster – 17:00 – 19:00
• Dog – 19:00 – 21:00
• Pig – 21:00 – 23:00

European zodiac sign Libra

Dates: 2013-09-24 -2013-10-23

The four Elements and their Signs are distributed as follows: Fire(Aries, Leo and Sagittarius), Earth(Taurus, Virgo and Capricorn), Air(Gemini, Libra and Aquarius) and Water(Cancer, Scorpio and Pisces). Since the elements help to describe the main character traits of a person, by including them in our horoscope, they help to form a more complete picture of a particular person.

Features of this element are warmth and humidity, flexibility, divisibility, adaptability. In the Zodiac, these qualities correspond to the air trine (triangle): Gemini, Libra and Aquarius. The trine of Air is considered the trine of ideas and intellectuality. Principle: exchange, contact.
Air determines contacts and relationships. The element of Air endows a person with such qualities as mobility, activity, liveliness, changeability, flexibility, agility, receptivity, omnipresence, limitlessness, curiosity. The air is independent, free. It is responsible for the basic processes on Earth - movement, reproduction, procreation, that is, for the transmission of life.
People whose horoscopes express the element of Air have a sanguine temperament. Such people can make an impression. They are quick in decisions and deeds, easily and quickly grasp any information, then pass it all on to other people, processed in their own way. They instantly adapt to any changes and changes in life. They are characterized by spiritual flexibility, mental lability, mental mobility, they are tireless as long as they are passionate about something. The monotony tires them.
The character flaws of people of the Air element include a lack of thoroughness and depth in the sphere of thinking, in the sphere of feelings and activity; they are very unreliable and cannot be relied on. They are too superficial, nervous, indecisive, their goals and plans constantly fluctuate and change. But they can present their shortcomings as advantages.
Not a single trine has such abilities for diplomacy and a secular lifestyle as the Air trine. He is a virtuoso in the ability to establish numerous and varied connections, to grasp, connect and use heterogeneous information. Air people do not tolerate a sedentary lifestyle, business routine, and most often do not have a stable profession, unless it is related to information, travel and contacts.
People of the Air trigon have the greatest success in the field of science, technology, the world of art, especially literature. And journalism is simply their element. The best helpers of these people in their work are their constant desire for more and more new impressions, new experiences, continuous exchange of thoughts and ideas, views and opinions with the people around them and their ability to establish quick connections and contacts. Their ideal is to be at the center of all events.
Most often, people of the Air element do not fit into the generally accepted framework because of their craving for freedom, they do not like obligations, and avoid excessive dramatization of relationships. Even ordinary family life may seem like a certain “cross” for them, from which they will try to escape or at least alleviate it.
Monotony and monotony are their worst enemy, so crises in the sphere of love and marriage are a common story for them. Their superficial feelings can quickly ignite and be inspired, and close contacts can begin even from the first meeting and with the first person they meet, but all this will continue exactly until they meet the next object of delight and admiration, until a new reason for inspiration and passion.
Parents and educators of children of the Air trine should pay special attention to their excessive idealism, superficiality of thinking, and susceptibility to other people's influence. Therefore, it is necessary to lay in them as early as possible that moral core that will be their support in life. Since the child of this trine is very susceptible to both bad and good influences, it is very important who is next to him. The role of parents in choosing friends is very important. You need to be in constant contact with such a child, participate in his affairs and be nearby during rest, then the spiritual connection between parents and child will remain until the end of his life.
The greatest advantage of people of this element is the ability to contact the outside world, the ability to connect people and circumstances, and the greatest danger is mental and spiritual fragmentation, which often causes unnecessary worries and disappointments.

Aries, Cancer, Libra, Capricorn. The cardinal cross is the cross of will, the material basis of the universe, a new impulse of idea. His main quality is the desire for realization. It is always directed towards the future. It gives dynamism, activity, and the desire for a goal. A person in whose horoscope the Sun, Moon or most of the personal planets are in cardinal signs will be a man of action. Such people are energetic and live in the present; for them, the most important thing is the current moment in time and the feeling of “here and now.” Therefore, their emotions and sensations are bright and strong. Their joy is as strong and sincere as disappointment, but any emotions are short-lived, since soon these signs are immersed in a new life, in new sensations, and starting a new business. With age, their moods become more even and come to their usual businesslike mood. Obstacles do not frighten them, but only increase their pressure and desire for the goal. However, they do not have much strength to withstand the fight for their goal for too long. Therefore, if the struggle with an obstacle takes too long or the results of your efforts are not visible at all, then such an obstacle begins to seem insurmountable, which leads to disappointment, causes a loss of strength and can even lead to depression. Also detrimental to them is the lack of dynamics and the ability to take initiative. Such a person will always strive forward and upward, captivating him with his energy. He is always in sight, noticeably rises above his surroundings, achieves his life goal and reaches a high social level.

31. Israel and the Arabs on the eve of the war

Causes of the war. The decision to start a war against Israel was made by A. Sadat and Syrian President X. Assad in the summer of 1973. The exact date of the start of hostilities was determined by the two presidents in the strictest confidence only on October 4. On the same day, Soviet intelligence became aware of this.

Here is the reaction of Foreign Minister A. Gromyko: “My God! In two days the war will begin! October 6, Moscow time at 14:00! Egypt and Syria against Israel!.. They didn’t listen to us, they climbed in. But they themselves don’t know why they’re climbing.”

The Egyptian and Syrian presidents went into open military confrontation primarily because the lack of progress in resolving the conflict put them under unbearable pressure from public opinion within their countries. The armed forces of both states seemed to have learned lessons from the defeat of 1967, restored their combat power with Soviet help, and their morale increased noticeably. They could hope for limited military success. Of course, the leaders of Egypt and Syria understood that the United States would not allow a total military defeat of Israel. But, as before, they pinned their hopes on the fact that in case of failure, the Soviet Union would not allow its friends to be completely defeated.

Diagram of the development of conflicts in the Middle East. The October War of 1973 in the Middle East is a conflict with the simplest political justification. The usual multitude of intricacies of the interests of different powers and the claims of different peoples were not visible at that historical stage. Or rather, the pattern of development of conflicts in the Middle East group has become familiar and transparent. The Arab coalition intended to wash away the shame of previous defeats, which had formed a kind of inferiority complex after the Six-Day War of 1967. Israel sought at any cost to retain the captured power priority and annexed territories obtained during the last defeat of the coalition of opponents.

The superpowers occupied their usual positions in the region. The Soviet Union followed a traditional course of supporting the Arabs, selecting its assistance depending on the proximity and subordination of the political systems of the allied countries. The United States contributed in every possible way to Israel, which maintains a balance of power in the oil heart of the planet that is favorable to the White House. Drawn into the Vietnamese adventure, America could not allow the creation of a second resource funnel, but tried to maintain stability from a position of strength, relying on the triumphant outcome of the previous conflict for Israel.

UN Resolution 242. The legal incident that led to a new war was Israel’s reluctance to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, ordering Tel Aviv to clear the Sinai Peninsula and Palestinian territories seized from Egypt. The result of Israeli arbitrariness was the transition of the conflict to a new stage. The war became permanent, in 1969 fierce battles broke out along the Suez Canal, the Egyptians were located on the African coast, and the Asian coast was occupied by the IDF. It was possible to cease fire only in the summer of 1970, but the formal lull did not mean reconciliation of the parties. In fact, minor skirmishes, primarily in the air, lasted longer.

Rearmament of the Arab armies. The most consistent members of the anti-Israeli coalition, Egypt and Syria, having overcome the natural despondency of three unsuccessful wars, have begun yet another rearmament of their armies. By 1970–1972 this process was largely completed. The world situation was more than favorable, given that in 1973 the US defeat in Vietnam became completely obvious. In such conditions, the possibility of American intervention in the Middle East was assessed by international relations experts as unlikely or obviously ineffective. Israel turned out to be vulnerable despite its military-political dominance in the region, and even the presence in its arsenals of nuclear weapons developed in circumvention of UN restrictions.

Nuclear problem. In this regard, the pre-war planning of actions touched on the topic of nuclear weapons and the prospects for their use, which is rare for local wars. The successor of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who died in 1970, Anwar Sadat, was deciding for himself whether an attempt at Arab revenge would provoke the use of atomic warheads by the enemy. Interested intelligence agencies knew that the Dimon research and production center produced not very powerful “Hiroshima-type” plutonium bombs. However, the Israelis could compensate for the limited power of the charges by choosing the right target for use. The most likely target could be: the high-rise dam of the Aswan hydroelectric power station and the so-called “old British dam,” after which a high wave arose on the Nile, rushing to lower Egypt, capable of washing away the entire infrastructure of the country on its way.

Back in 1970, the Egyptian military shared concerns with their Soviet colleagues. Moscow did not promise direct nuclear assistance, except in the case of direct US intervention. But the Soviet side proposed an alternative idea to the allies. The coordinates of the Dimon underground complex were known and, if necessary, it could be hit by a series of cruise missiles with powerful charges of conventional explosives. Calculating the location and time of the missiles' impact ensured tectonic movements and put Dimon out of action, guaranteeing serious radioactive contamination of the surrounding area. The possibility of an irresistible blow to the atomic dungeons existed. Several Soviet MiG-25 fighters were based at Egyptian airfields, the altitude and flight speed of which made it possible to ignore Israeli air defense.

Consultations in France. Thus, the factor of nuclear deterrence in the Middle East has become mutual. The risk of radioactive contamination of Israeli territory would be no less dangerous than a tsunami on the Nile. However, the importance of the issue has forced the coalition to continue searching for a definitive answer to the question of whether Tel Aviv will use its weapons of mass destruction. In April 1973, Egyptian Commissioner Mohammed Heikal went to France for further consultations. Paris has traditionally been involved in Middle Eastern affairs, being a trade and political partner of both Israel and the coalition. In Heikal's conversation with General Golua, the latter made it clear that the bomb was not a means of combat for the IDF, but a last argument that would not be used except in the event of a threat of complete destruction of the Jewish state. The coalition set itself limited goals related solely to the return of Sinai, as well as the west bank of the Jordan and the Golai Heights. Consequently, Cairo and Damascus could not fear the enemy’s use of its strategic potential. In this way of looking at things, the operation could have been successful without the serious risk of pushing into a full-scale world war.

Moshe Dayan's position. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan really had no intention of resorting to the bomb. His country had already long and hopelessly been included in the list of states whose policies run counter to the principles of the United Nations. By launching the 1967 military “six days” with a surprise blow and refusing to yield to the will of the Security Council, Tel Aviv received an unexpectedly large amount of trouble related to the field of international cooperation. There was nowhere to widen the gap between Israel and the world any further. If it were not for the United States and the large diaspora abroad, the country’s situation could have become critical. Both the political and military leadership of the country were to a certain extent captured by a sense of inflated self-esteem. The lost sense of reality was accompanied by “hat-kicking” moods. The Israeli population and its leaders have bought into the illusion that the people of four million will at any moment prove their superiority to the Arab encirclement of 110 million people.

"Barlev Line". The military, however, relied not only on the mirages of future victories. The IDF's position on the Asian bank of the Suez Canal was difficult to overcome. Wide and continuous water barrier. An open area that prevents the enemy from secretly gathering troops. The proven power of Hel Haavir, who has shown his ability to successfully fight enemy air forces and turn Arab tank divisions into piles of iron. All these factors did not lull Dayan and his generals. To prove to Egypt the futility of hopes of returning the Sinai sands, Israel erected a continuous line of fortifications along the canal. It was called the “Barlev line”. The Jews were not lazy to work, and during the construction of this defensive line they managed to spend a serious sum of 300 million dollars.

In the bare desert, a shaft was built from scrap materials, mainly sand and gravel. In the embankment directly on the bank of the inactive canal, huge containers were strengthened, with a flow to the water. They were filled with a petroleum-based flammable mixture that has the ability to burn in water. This alone could completely discourage Sadat’s soldiers from crossing not the figuratively named, but the real fiery line. Along the rampart, at different distances from the shore, there was a chain of strong points with reinforced concrete firing points, scarps for armored vehicles, where tanks were buried up to the tower, as well as other types of barriers known from the First World War.

Three brigades of Israeli motorized infantry were constantly on duty on the line. A reserve defensive line was located 12–15 km deep in Sinai. It would not have been enough to fill the second shaft with excavators, but even without that the auxiliary fortifications looked good. Two tank brigades were on duty behind the reserve line, capable of quickly responding to calls from the rampart and counterattacking to throw any landing force back into the burning canal. With sound reasoning, the Israelis’ hopes for the invincibility of the “Barlev position” can be considered justified. It was with this confidence that the Egyptians caught them, doing something that, according to the enemy, could not be done under any circumstances. If Israel had a single potential front along the canal, perhaps it could become insurmountable. But there was a second threatened area. In the east.

Golan. That same year, the IDF recaptured a number of important territories from the second indispensable member of the coalition, Syria. Now the line of confrontation passed at the Golan Heights. The position in the Golan was very important. From there, the northern part of Israel was clearly visible. In addition to the observation tower of the heights, the lands along the banks of the Jordan were taken over. At the same time, Israel's security has undoubtedly increased, while Syria's has decreased. Damascus was within reach of one throw of tank ugdats (divisions). The Arabs felt sorry for losing the western bank of the Jordan and the territories on the other side of the river. There is little water in the region, and economic activity works better when there is plenty of moisture, so the loss of the floodplain was perceived especially painfully. Naturally, the Syrians intended to return to the “old” border at the appropriate moment.

"Purple Line". To prevent this, Israel created a second defensive line in the northeast, beautifully called the “purple line”. The scale of fortification work on it was smaller, mainly strengthening already difficult heights and creating bridgehead positions at river crossings. The natural fortress was defended by a smaller garrison than in the south, but it also required people and equipment, which generally contradicted the principle of concentrating all forces in a decisive direction.

Celestial evolution of the Arabs. There were reasons for IDF commanders to neglect the enemy in the early 70s. basically it was no longer there. The Arab armies were not only well equipped with Soviet weapons, as was the case in 1956 and 1967, but now they have learned to truly use them. With the help of Soviet specialists, who joined the Egyptian army in large numbers during the undeclared canal war of 1969–1970, the Arabs achieved a lot. The main secret of the successful use of Soviet aviation was revealed. It really existed, stemming from the specifics of the scientific and production base of the USSR and the concept of combat use of the Soviet Army.

Nowadays, near-war historians and journalists like to mock the weak elemental base of domestic electronics, pointing out its primitiveness and weakness in comparison with Western ones. It's hard to argue with this. Indeed, the electronic components of Soviet technology were often cumbersome and ineffective. When trying to create radar sights for on-board navigation and missile fire control systems, comparable in capabilities to American ones, our engineers produced large and heavy products. As a result, our planes carried a lot of extra pounds, compared to American ones, where special attention was paid to the miniaturization of avionics. The reasons for this discrepancy are objective and lie in the main trends in the economic systems of geopolitical opponents. The Soviet military-industrial complex managed to eliminate this shortcoming only in the late 70s, when the microchip became the common elemental base for the superpowers' intelligence electronics.

The nature of the use of aviation in the USSR. But even before this, Soviet vehicles were quite combat-ready. Domestic views on the use of aviation have always been distinguished by excellent logic, which makes it possible to neutralize the shortcomings of available combat weapons. Its essence was a correct assessment of the role of the Air Force in the overall structure of national defense. No matter what they say in the West, Soviet aviation has always been a defensive means, its basis was fighters of various types and purposes, they could be used as attack aircraft, but the basic function always remained the defense of the native sky. This was dictated by the military ideology of the geopolitical rival, who considered the aircraft primarily an offensive weapon. Consequently, the main work of the “wings of the Motherland” had to be carried out over their territory. Then the question arose, why lift heavy equipment into the air if the bulk of its weight can be left on the ground, where the weight of the electronic equipment does not matter.

"Pilot + operator." If a stationary radar weighs a ton more, it doesn’t matter, the main thing is that it “sees” well. The same can be said about ground-based radio stations and computers: they stand in concrete bunkers and don’t need to fly anywhere. Operators monitoring the situation in the sky will calmly, without being distracted by piloting the aircraft, receive information from numerous long-range radars through well-protected communication channels, process it and transmit it to the pilots in the sky as short, comprehensive, precise orders. The work of the “pilot-operator” tandem ensures greater efficiency. The pilot is not overloaded with streams of information that must be comprehended and the optimal solution selected. In air combat conditions, at high speeds, this is very difficult to do. It is much easier to get clear instructions from below where the enemy is, how many there are and how best to approach him. The pilot's fatigue is reduced, and the inevitable factor of combat nervousness, which influences decision-making, is almost eliminated. To clog such a system, built on stable radio communications, with interference, “the adversary will not burn out.” Land transmitters have powerful power sources capable of delivering orders to the recipient through a barrage of radio will deliberately distorted by the enemy. Finally, the totalitarian control system in defensive combat controls not only the fighter units, it also controls air defense missile batteries of all levels, anti-aircraft artillery and other means, and forms a combat composition that is impenetrable, powerful, and flexible.

The difficulties of the Arab Air Force. If the system works without failures, the fate of the air enemy is unenviable. But for this you need to have it. Nothing like this happened either in Egypt or Syria during the military defeats of 1956 and 1967. The pilots of the Arab Air Force tried to resist American aviation, which professed a different concept of combat use. The American plane in the sky is self-sufficient. The necessary detection, tracking and targeting devices are on board. It is not easy for his pilot to make independent decisions. But it is possible if he is cool-headed, knows the theory and has extensive practice. The Phantom's miniature instruments allow you to see further, monitor more carefully and shoot more accurately in comparison with the MiG, which has broken away from its totalitarian control system. In principle, this is not scary. The instrument superiority of Yankee or European products was not overwhelming. A tactically competent, skilled pilot will achieve success in a MiG even without advice from the ground, but it is more difficult to do this.

The beginning of the fracture. As a result, losses in air battles were usually 3:1, not in favor of the Arabs. But this insanity persisted only until the time when the celestial defenders of the space above Suez and other combat areas were not tied into the Soviet-style system. Our specialists managed to build one during the period of an undeclared war. The situation in the air began to change; downed Israelis or American mercenary pilots involved in operations began to complain that Hel Haavir did not have the ability to establish control from the ground. In the interrogation reports, phrases began to be heard like: “It was the Russians who came up with all sorts of things, but when we take off, we never know who will control us.”

Whose plane is better? Which view of a combat aircraft is better, Soviet or American, cannot be assessed unambiguously. It all depends on the intended application. The optimal solution, of course, is to create both an independent aircraft and a super-powerful consolidated control system. But this is a very expensive way. The relatively poor Soviet Union could not afford to create such combat systems until the late 70s. We had only shock machines that were “independent”. The strategic bomber easily lifts heavy equipment, the weight of which does not greatly affect the combat qualities of the aircraft.

The Americans had their own problems, their air tracking system was considered “leaky” and remains so to this day. They learned to solve this problem through the use of observation and command posts of the AWACS type, which make it possible to create a local control system in the areas of interest on air fronts. However, by that time the congenital defects of Soviet aviation had been largely eliminated. But it should be taken into account that Soviet aircraft sold worse abroad. Those who had enough money took American products. It was more expensive, but it allowed us to save on building a control system. Fans of local redistribution of their borders liked the American concept of independent aircraft more.

On the eve of the October War, Egypt became the owner of all segments of the Soviet system and gained local air superiority over the future combat zone. Of which Israel had a very vague idea, classifying the increasing losses as accidental or achieved exclusively by the Russians.

32. Qualitative growth of the Arab armed forces and their technical equipment

Intensified training of Arabs. As mentioned above, in 1972, President Sadat unexpectedly ordered the expulsion of the bulk of Soviet specialists from Egypt. In fact, not everyone was removed. Participants in those events recall that many advisers remained in their places. Perhaps this was the evacuation of foreigners disguised as a scandal, common in the pre-war period. Perhaps something else.

In any case, in December 1972, Egypt decided to extend “military-political benefits” to the Soviet Union for five years. In Moscow, this was accepted with “understanding”, so military supplies were supplied in the required quantities, and economic cooperation continued. From December 1972 to June 1973, Egypt received more Soviet weapons than during 1971–1972. In total, from 1955 to 1975, the total volume of military-technical cooperation between the two countries, or rather, gratuitous assistance to the USSR, amounted to about 9 billion dollars.

As for Israel, Dayan's circle relaxed. Tel Aviv believed that with the departure of the Russians, things would improve again. Out of habit, the Arabs were not taken into account there, but in vain. In 1973, Soviet observers stated that the Arabs had a level of combat training “above average” and could count on success in mastering the air.

A new attitude to “details”. Thus, the most important aspect of the preparation for Arab revenge in Tel Aviv was left unattended. What happened next was a matter of technique. The more experienced Arabs were now attentive to the “little things.” The transfer of troops and equipment to the starting lines on the African coast of Kapal took place secretly, in small groups and only at night. Everything concentrated was immediately masked in the most careful way. The negligence of previous years, when tanks were covered with camouflage nets with all care, but they forgot to remove traces of tracks, is a thing of the past. Cairo did not forget about the engineering preparation of the operation. Previously, the Egyptians were characterized by the desire to buy more tanks without providing them with the necessary funds, this time it was different. Pontoon parks were purchased to establish crossings over water obstacles that could allow heavy equipment to pass through. Fast boats for the first shock wave of the landing force. Masses of Soviet-made amphibious equipment. In areas inaccessible to most enemy reconnaissance assets, they learned to use this equipment.

New weapons. The newly recreated Egyptian army and the Syrian armed forces received new weapons. The main striking force of the ground forces was the excellent Soviet T-62 tanks. The infantry was rearmed. Instead of assorted machines, a single one was introduced. The famous “Kalashnikov”, AK-47, which the Israelis recognized as the best in the world and, having grossly violated the licensing rights, after minor modifications, were put into production under the “Galila” brand.

Infantrymen received an abundance of cheap but practical Soviet hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, which became the best means of combating enemy armor at short distances. On larger ones, the same function was performed by the Malyutka ATGM (anti-tank guided missiles). A small racket on a machine, carried by two crew numbers and easily camouflaged, terrified the tank crews. Along the trajectory, its flight was controlled by an operator. In his hands was a joystick transmitting commands through a long, thin and very durable cable connected to the projectile. It received signals that provided flight correction and the possibility of hitting a “tank” type target with a probability of 65–70%. Prepared calculations easily covered these figures. During training with expensive shells, the Arabs were not stingy, ensuring that they could take one tank for one ATGM. While conventional anti-tank guns spent 10 or more shells to destroy tanks. “Malyutki” were also placed on the chassis of armored vehicles and traveled as part of mechanized columns, providing enhanced anti-tank defense at a distance of up to 2 kilometers. Even more dangerous for the enemy were armed anti-tank helicopters based on Soviet Mi vehicles. The revolution of military technologies in the world of global confrontation has reached the Middle East. Moreover, its manifestations were not exhausted by the above.

Reconnaissance of positions. Before the offensive, much attention was paid to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and forces. For which the already mentioned MiG-25 fighters were successfully used. Equipped with modern photographic equipment, the planes safely entered the airspace over Sinai at a speed of 3 thousand km, delivering the information the planners needed. Israeli fighters and anti-aircraft missiles could reach them only in case of serious pilot errors. But the MiG-25 was flown by the best pilots. In 1970, two such vehicles, mocking enemy air defense, made a high-altitude raid on Tel Aviv. They did not bomb, they simply showed off their inaccessibility and went home, leaving a bad feeling in the souls of those who were responsible for the air defense of the Israeli capital.

If the information obtained by the Migars was not enough, the coalition had at its disposal streams of information from the stream obtained by Soviet reconnaissance satellites. In the early 1970s, the orbital groupings of the superpowers made it possible to view the entire world and, naturally, they studied the explosive region most carefully, gradually sharing interesting details with their allies.

Changing the air defense structure. But the main innovation was still a change in the air defense structure of the Arab armies. The first Soviet guided anti-aircraft missile systems delivered to Egypt had a glorious military history. Having made a name for themselves with the destruction of American Francis Powers' U-2 spy plane and the defeat of the US Air Force in Vietnam, they nevertheless began to grow old. The enemy has learned to fight the backbone of the Arab air defense, consisting of the S-75 and S-125 complexes. The probability of successful combat with aircraft at missile batteries remained high, but there was a tendency for their effectiveness to decrease. The pilots of Hel Haavir learned to blind the search radars of these systems with beams of radio interference, hit them with special missiles heading towards the target, focusing on the pulses of battery locators, find and destroy the command posts of the missilemen. The fight was still going on “on equal terms,” but the Israelis were already disparagingly calling the missiles of the Volkhov and Pechora complexes “flying telegraph poles.”

"Shilka" But the main disadvantage of these complexes, which form the backbone of the air defense of Egypt and Syria, was their limited mobility. The Eskies could, having annoyed the Israeli pilots, withdraw and leave their old position, escaping the revenge of Hel Haavir, but this process took hours. During the defense, such a speed of redeployment and deployment to a new location was sufficient. But an offensive was launched. Respect for the enemy's air power prompted the need to provide air defense for troops on the march and when deployed in combat formations. “Pechora” and “Volkhov” were not suitable for this. Strengthening the military air defense of the Arabs, the Soviet Union provided its wards with new weapons systems. To work against low-flying targets, the so-called “Shilki” were included in the Arab divisions. The ZSU 23/4 was a tank chassis topped with a voluminous turret, in the box of which a quadruple installation of 23 mm automatic guns was placed. When 4 barrels opened fire, a real barrage of heavy bullets rushed towards the target. The high rate of fire of the installation made it possible to literally “rip” enemy aircraft and even cruise missiles from the sky. "Shilka" had its own radar, which simplified the detection of air targets and their tracking until the opening of fire. With its appearance in the Arab forces, the Israelis’ favorite “shaving” flights at low altitudes, allowing them to reach targets under the control zone of heavy locators, had to be stopped.

"Cube and "Square". The Israeli Air Force moved higher, operating at altitudes of 3–7 km. But here the biggest trouble awaited them - the missiles of the Soviet-developed "Kub" military anti-aircraft complex, or rather, its simplified version offered for export, by analogy called "Square". The missiles produced by Soviet gunsmiths always turned out well. But Ardalion Rastov’s “Square” was an extraordinary remedy for its time. The missiles, mounted on a tracked chassis, had a short reaction time, allowing them to open fire almost on the move, good capabilities for detecting the enemy, and many other excellent qualities, allowing them to create an impenetrable defensive dome right in the field or on the highway.

Now the Egyptians could safely get out from under the old reliable air defense “umbrella” along the canal and try their luck in the offensive without fear of being subjected to unpunished destruction by Israeli aircraft.

In general, there were much more new products characterizing the military-technological parity with the United States achieved by Soviet science than can be mentioned in a condensed summary of the events of the October War.

Egyptian forces. The force assembled by the Allies for the offensive was larger than any that had previously existed in the region. To break through the “Bar-Lev line” the Egyptians could throw 310 thousand personnel army, 2400 tanks, including T-62. Artillery support was provided by 1200 barrels with a caliber of over 100 mm. Sadat’s army had dozens of Grad-type multiple launch rocket systems, 70 launchers of tactical missiles, which we call “Luna”; 30 missile systems, known to the world as Scuds, were intended for attacks on the most important objects of the enemy control system and enemy concentration areas. The strengthened air defense system relied on 360 anti-aircraft missile launchers and 2,750 artillery systems. The Air Force had 420 fighters. The basis of the fighter fleet was the MiG-21, tested in Vietnam. Many were able to strike in time against ground targets. However, this function mainly belonged to the SU-7 fighter-bombers, of which there were 130 units, and the Tu-16 and Il-28 bombers.

The implied landing operations forced the creation of a military transport group of the Air Force consisting of 70 aircraft. 80-100 helicopters, mostly made at the Mil design bureau (Mi-4, Mi-8), were intended for direct interaction with ground forces.

After full mobilization, the Egyptian armed forces numbered about 833 thousand people, 2 thousand tanks, 690 aircraft, 190 helicopters, 106 warships. 72 thousand military personnel and up to 700 tanks were directly involved in the offensive operation. The Syrian army consisted of 332 thousand personnel, 1,350 tanks, 351 combat aircraft and 26 warships.

Syrian forces. The Syrian armed forces deployed opposite Israel's "purple" position had almost the same composition. While inferior to the Egyptians in personnel by half, the Syrians had 70% of the Egyptian armored vehicles. A slightly stronger air defense contingent. Moreover, the troops of the Arab International were under Syrian control. Iraq provided a reinforced armored division. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, without formally getting involved in the brewing conflict, handed over a tank brigade to Damascus. The Moroccans shared a mechanized brigade. The Palestine Liberation Organization assigned several special forces units to the Golan to operate behind enemy lines.

Overall, the coalition achieved the 3:1 ratio needed for the offensive compared to the IDF. Moreover, to ensure this ratio, the Israelis still had to mobilize, which could have been late, since the Arabs were going to act faster than usual.

It cannot be said that IDF intelligence and the Mossad had absolutely no information about the dangerous concentration of the enemy against Israeli positions. American tracking satellites noted the regrouping of coalition troops and notified Tel Aviv about it. However, no precautions were taken. Israel was afraid that the world community would perceive the mobilization as the opening of another round of aggression, and the sanctions, already painful, would become tougher. For the same reason, the possibility of a preemptive air strike was not even considered. If the 1967 scenario were repeated, the Americans would hardly be able to soften the position of the UN and the Soviet Union.

Golda Meir, who led the country, and the overwhelming majority of the Israeli leadership believed that the Arabs were intimidated beyond measure, and were only showing a “grin”, without serious plans to start a new war. The Americans advised us to wait, because they themselves had not completely extricated themselves from the “Vietnamese meat grinder.” As a result of the above, fortified positions were occupied by ordinary garrisons, and the combat readiness of the state and army remained at the usual level.

33. The first days of the October War: Arab successes

Israeli intelligence was late. The high command of the Israeli army and the military-political leadership of the country had no information about the “possibility of a general war.” Only at 4.30 on October 6, 1977, the intelligence department at the General Staff reported that the information just received “gives reason to assert: the enemy will begin an operation on two fronts at 18.00.” It was the sluggishness of the intelligence agencies, as a specially created investigative commission later noted, that caused “additional difficulties in bringing regular troops at the fronts to combat readiness, especially in the canal zone.”

The number and weapons of the Israeli army. The Israeli armed forces at the start of the war numbered 415 thousand people, 1,700 tanks, 690 aircraft, 84 helicopters and 57 warships. On the Southern Front (Sinai Peninsula), the Israelis concentrated 5 brigades, creating a layered defense 30–50 km deep. On the line of confrontation with Syria (Northern Front) there were 6 brigades defending a 75-kilometer line with a depth of 12–20 km.

Dayan and Sharon smile: “And this time everything worked out.” But Sharon's bandage speaks for itself

June 6 14.00. When, on October 5, human intelligence received reports of a possible Egyptian offensive on the afternoon of the 6th, an emergency meeting of the government was held, which did not decide what to do. The instructions sent to the troops ordered countermeasures to begin no earlier than 4 pm the next day.

The Arabs struck 2 hours earlier. The Egyptians took into account even such a small thing as the impact of the sun, which was setting and blinding the Israeli soldiers. Having started at 2 o’clock in the afternoon, the Arabs had enough daylight to break through the “Barlev Line” and gain a foothold on a new line; and the whole night to organize defense against enemy counterattacks, the estimated start time of which was the next morning. At night, without a detailed understanding of the situation, the IDF did not conduct active operations.

5 minutes after the 14th day, more than 200 Egyptian attack aircraft fell on Israeli firing positions, headquarters and ammunition supply points. The most important targets in the depths of the defense were hit by missiles, disrupting the complex defense management system. At the same time, a fiery tornado hit the positions on the Barlev Shaft, reminiscent of heavy-duty artillery attacks from the times of the last world war. The Israeli coast was hit by everything that could be fired, Grad rockets howling in flight, heavy artillery, tank guns, and mortars from infantry units. 20 minutes after the start of the raid, the fire from long-range weapons was transferred deeper. Dust hung over the rampart, raised by numerous explosions. It became a little quieter. At this moment, the Egyptian assault units were loading onto the boats. At the same time, the canal was forced to cross in several places.

Second wave. Behind the fast-moving vehicles of the first wave, the second wave began to load onto pontoons and boats. But the Israelis were no longer interested in her. Hundreds of Egyptian soldiers were climbing the rampart. Special crews were waiting for an order to dump tons of flammable mixture into the water and set the canal on fire, but no orders were received. The responsible headquarters were destroyed by Sadat's artillerymen and pilots. The oil remained in the tanks.

The first technical means transported to the Asian coast were powerful water cannons, used in the Soviet Union to erode rock in mines. The trunks of the hoses were lowered into the canal, and tight jets of water hit the unfortunate shaft, making extensive passages for the tanks, which were not slow in appearing. Among the first armored vehicles delivered to the Sinai coast, some had special bulldozer blades. With their help, Israelis sitting in trenches were buried alive in their trenches.

Bitter Lake. At 14.40 the Egyptians were on the rampart along its entire hundred-kilometer width. South of Gorky Lake, which is included in the canal system, events developed even faster. The three brigades defending the position had no chance to withstand the attacks of two Egyptian armies, which had 100 thousand people and 850 tanks in the first echelon. The IDF soldiers quickly realized this and, having cleared the bank of the canal, began to retreat in disarray to the second line of fortifications.

An hour after the start of the operation, Egyptian sappers began establishing pontoon crossings across the canal and Bitter Lake. There was no resistance. In the north, the Egyptian 2nd Army captured a series of bridgeheads with a total width of about 20–25 km, penetrating 3–4 km deep into the IDF defenses. The Southern 3rd Army worked no worse.

With the onset of darkness, troops and equipment poured onto the Asian coast, and the “Barlev Line” ceased to exist. The Egyptians dug in to meet the enemy's inevitable morning counterattacks, creating a fire system rich in military air defense and anti-tank defense systems.

Black day of the IDF. Tel Aviv was in the turmoil that is typical for a country under surprise attack. In the confusion, conflicting orders were given to the troops and instructions during the mobilization process. The clearest among them was the order to the tank brigades in the Sinai to throw the Egyptians into the waters of the canal. The strength of two brigades with three hundred tanks was clearly not enough for this. But either Dayan lost his sense of reality for a while, or he relied on Hel Haavnr, or he simply decided to sacrifice the tankers, and the order came into force. October 7th became a black date for the IDF.

Two tank brigades went to certain death. The 190th brigade that attacked the southern group of Egyptians was completely destroyed. More than a hundred American tanks remained burning in front of the positions of the 31st Army. The headquarters and brigade commander were captured. Previously, the Egyptians did not come across IDF generals. The fate of the second was not much preferable. After the attack, half the original number of tanks rolled back. When Ariel Sharon stood at the head of the crisis front, he could only wait for additional forces to arrive, hoping that they would not be late.

Israeli Air Force and its losses. Hel Haavir did not live up to expectations. Israel was rightfully proud of its aviation. The Egyptians were afraid of her, the Soviet specialists treated her with respect. The material of the Jewish Air Force was of American and French origin. It was based on the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, Mirage III fighters, and the widely advertised F-4 and Phantom fighter-bombers. The aircraft of the latter type had good performance, although it is unclear why the Americans declared them “unbreakable.” They rained down in Vietnam no worse than others, both from missiles and as a result of battles with Vietnamese MiG-21s. Israel had about 150 Phantoms and used them very skillfully.

The flight crew was distinguished by the highest skill. The Israelis consider it unsurpassed. One way or another, they taught their pilots hard. Sometimes the downed enemy pilots turned out to be not aces, but just students of flight schools with the rank of cadets. For them, the destruction of Arab aircraft or ground targets was only an exam with the results confirmed by the instructors entered into the grade book. Hel Haavir always acted persistently and in an organized manner. Sometimes 20–30 aircraft were allocated to destroy important targets, of which 2–3 were attack aircraft, and the rest only supported their actions. Such groups often managed to punch holes in enemy air defenses and, through these corridors, destroy targets of interest in the shortest possible time.

The command always acted in an original way; there were no routine operations at all. The Arabs had to deal with tactical innovations every time. There were, however, weaknesses. In case of losses, aviation operations were suspended for 2-3 days until their causes were clarified. In principle, this approach is correct, since it helps save people and cars. But there are situations when it is impossible to leave troops without air support, but this has been done. And excessive sensitivity to losses in the air resulted in large casualties on the ground.

For all the brilliant capabilities of the Israeli Air Force, in 1973 they were not doing well. During the first three days of fighting, losses amounted to more than 80 vehicles. Israeli aces loved air combat; they were able to shoot down less-trained Arab pilots in their “non-independent” machines. But in the October War other problems had to be solved. With the help of aviation, which did not seize air supremacy, they tried to “patch holes” in the ground fronts. It ended badly. The order to storm the positions of the Egyptian tank divisions pushed Hel Haavir into contact with the Egyptian “squares”.

"Squares" in action. The rocket of this Soviet complex had exceptional capabilities. Firstly, it was faster than its predecessors, both in reaction and in trajectory. Secondly, its search system was not interfered with by Israeli jammers. Thirdly, she was always with the troops on the march, in positions, in the near rear. The operation of its radar was not detected by the head of anti-docking missiles, and so on and so forth. Finally, the missile’s trajectory itself caused confusion for the enemy.

When the old “telegraph poles” were launched in the order of the enemy air group, an experienced pilot saw in which echelon of the formation the fire was being conducted. The attacked group began an anti-missile maneuver, which often made it possible to avoid being hit, and the remaining aircraft went on about their business. By the way, the American Hawk air defense system supplied to Israel operated in the same way. It was also possible to escape from its missiles, which even such veterans of the jet age as the Il-28 did with success. You just had to be careful and monitor the dust that was thrown up by the engines of the launching rocket, and urgently begin an evasive maneuver.

The Kvadrat rocket behaved differently. She soared upward and, only having risen above the enemy, chose a target and dived at it. It was impossible to determine who exactly was the intended victim. The pilots' nerves could not stand it and everyone began to evade, disrupting the combat mission. The Arabs even recounted a case in which a pair of pilots ejected, abandoning two aircraft, unable to determine what kind of death awaited them. When meeting with such an enemy, the Israelis made an attempt to move lower, to heights where the missile systems' guidance radars were blinded. But this attempt came at a cost. The Kvadrat radars turned out to be extremely insightful and were well oriented in the ground layer.

Shock role of "Shilok". But the main role near the ground was played by the Shilkas; their fire excluded attacks in low-level flight. High-altitude flights were also excluded. In the first days of the October War, battles took place in an area covered by stationary complexes from across the canal, precisely designed to combat high-flying targets. In such conditions, any action would cost a lot of blood, boiling down to the exchange of ground targets for aircraft. This was not liked in Israel. But there was no way to stop operations in the air, and Hel Haavir lost in battle, according to conservative Israeli estimates, more than 140 vehicles, almost a third of its strength. At the same time, it was not possible to stop the Egyptians and Syrians. The main credit for the carnage committed by the Arabs in the air belonged to the Soviet Kvadrat air defense system, called by Israeli pilots “the best Arab ace.”

The IDF failed to consolidate the front in the first three days of the offensive with a crossing. I had to act differently from what I was taught. There was no trace of either quantitative or qualitative superiority on the ground or in the air. The traditional system of continuous and firm leadership of troops has collapsed. Their actions have lost their dynamism. The game was played everywhere according to Arab rules. The only thing that was avoided was the complete destruction of the forces in Sinai. The IDF troops, who slipped out from under the attacks and took advantage of the pause needed by the Egyptians to develop the occupied bridgeheads, were able to breathe and regroup.

The Egyptians made their first mistake already on October 8: without an enemy in front of them, their troops stagnate on the bridgehead, missing the moment to urgently solve the assigned tasks of reaching the line of the Mitla and Giddi mountain passes. However, the reasons for this delay lay not in a misunderstanding of the situation by Egyptian military specialists, but in the political difficulties that he faced. An order came from Cairo to stand and wait.

The fight for the Golan. The Syrian strike, coordinated with the Egyptians, was also successful. Having started at the same time as the Egyptians, the Syrians had almost captured the Golan by October 7, bypassing the enemy fortified point near the city of El Quneitra from the north and south. The first strip of the Purple Line was broken. But it was not possible to develop this success. Tel Aviv considered that the loss of the Golan was more important than the Sinai, and it was to restore the purple border on October 9-10 that newly formed IDF brigades and surviving air forces were sent. As a result, the initial impulse of the Syrians faded. They failed to take either the Golan or the Jordanian crossings. By the evening of the 10th, the IDF brigades returned to the Purple Line. Fresh units of the armies of Iraq and Jordan, hastily transferred to the sector, were unable to activate the front by launching a new offensive; on the contrary, they were pushed back several kilometers from their previous positions. The only assets worth mentioning on the Northern Front are the relatively high Israeli losses and the fact that the Arab formations retained their integrity and organization, while in 1967 the Syrian army was demoralized by the first setbacks and fell apart.

But from a strategic point of view, the Golan front section fulfilled its task, attracting the reserves of the first stage of Israeli mobilization, as a result of which there was a shortage of Israeli forces in the Sinai.

34. “Judgment Day”, or “Well of Badr”

The behavior of the Israeli government in the first days of the war. The Tel Aviv authorities behaved unusually. Having started mobilization, the government was in no hurry to explain to the people what was happening. The government appeal came only on the third day of the war, October 9. The tone of the message was not cheerful. Tel Aviv admitted high losses, leaving the “Barlev position.” At the same time, the war received the Israeli name Yom Kippur, since on the day it began in Israel, a public holiday of the same name was celebrated, the name of which is translated into Russian as “Judgment Day.” The Arabs called the war their own, calling it “Operation Badr,” after the code name for the plan to cross the canal. Badr was the name of a settlement near Mecca, taken by the Prophet Muhammad in October 623 on his way to the capital of Islam.

US help. The stunned Israeli leadership apparently considered the situation hopeless in the early days of Badr. This is proven by the order to remove nuclear charges from storage facilities in the Negev desert and transport them to the airfields of Hel Haavira. However, before deciding to be reckless, Golda Meir appealed for help to her main partner. The ambassador in Washington was tasked with ensuring the rapid delivery of military materials that were in short supply and exerting political pressure on the hostile coalition.

Taufik. Military landing operation on the Sinai Peninsula

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, being a Jew himself, could not refuse help to his fellow tribesmen, especially since assistance to Israel was a common practice of the United States. A loan of $2.2 billion was hastily allocated to the distressed ally for the purchase of equipment and weapons. An air bridge began to operate, through which military cargo was transported from Europe to Israel. The first plane arrived on October 12, and subsequently dozens of them arrived every day, transporting a total of 128 combat aircraft, 150 tanks, 2 thousand ATGMs, and a lot of light weapons and ammunition.

The US warns Sadat. The diplomatic pedals were also pressed. Kissinger called Sadat and warned that the United States would not tolerate a Soviet victory and would stop at nothing to prevent it. Apparently, this conversation had decisive consequences for the “unnecessary” stop of the Egyptian offensive. Obviously, Sadat agreed not to advance deeper into the Sinai, thereby setting up his Syrian ally, allowing the Israelis to put pressure on the northern sector without sending reserves to the south. There is every reason to believe that it was American blackmail that saved Israel from serious defeat. However, it would be better for the Americans not to do this due to the unexpected consequences of the brutal pressure exerted on the Arabs. But more on that later.

Israel is stepping up. In mid-October, the Egyptian army still stood motionless in the Sinai, having advanced barely 15–20 km along the sands of the peninsula. IDF counterattacks continued to be unsuccessful, but American threats or promises held the Arabs tighter than the battered brigades. This continued until October 15, when the time came to admit that the struggle had changed its character. On this day, the Egyptian frontal attack in the south on the Israeli positions at the Mitla Pass finally fizzled out. The Southern 3rd Army advanced sluggishly and waited for the IDF to make the mountain ridge area impregnable. This was followed by a pair of attacks that cost Egypt 300 tanks knocked out by enemy ATGMs. The offensive stalled. At that moment, front commander Sharon had accumulated enough funds for a counterattack; 9 tank brigades moved to the positions of the 2nd Army. The success was insignificant, but the Arabs were pushed back from the northeastern shore of Gorky Lake. The cost of this attack was very high, but the effect was not small. Sharon was an extraordinary commander, calculating what the enemy was waiting for and doing the opposite. He quickly realized that the most non-trivial move would be to force the Gorky Reservoir. The Egyptian leadership was fully aware of the titanic work involved in crossing a water barrier, and believed that at the moment Israel did not have the strength to do this. It was a fatal mistake.

Sharon's "floating tanks" Among other equipment, the Soviet Union sent the Arabs PT-76 tanks, which have the rare ability to swim. In 1967, the Egyptians abandoned dozens of such vehicles in the Sinai positions and wrote them off, replacing them with new ones. The frugal Jews carefully collected these and other tanks, repaired them if necessary, and included them in their brigades. There was so much captured equipment that IDF suppliers had already asked Moscow about the possibility of selling spare parts. It is clear that they were refused. But Soviet cars were very reliable, and many of them did not need repair for years. It was precisely this batch of Soviet vehicles that Sharon sent at night across Bitter Lake.

Seven tanks and eight armored personnel carriers, also Soviet-made, completed the task, reaching the undefended western bank. Behind the vanguard, reinforcements moved to the rear of Egypt using improvised means. By the morning of October 17, several battalions of IDF fighters were concentrated on the bridgehead. Sappers arrived and set up a crossing across the northern end of the lake. Substantial Israeli forces began to accumulate in the Egyptian rear. During the day, several groups of Arab infantry tried to drive the enemy off the bridgehead on the west bank, but, coming under fire from tank guns, retreated.

Sadat's mistakes. Then things got weird. Sadat began to guard the enemy crossing more than his eyes. Egyptian aviation was ordered not to touch it. Then it got worse. The commander of the 182nd Egyptian Parachute Brigade, dropped in the area of ​​enemy pontoons, managed to make his way to the bridge, believing that he was saving the situation. With natural pride, he reported to Cairo that he was ready to blow up the bridge. But he received an unexpected strict order not to do anything and to get away from there altogether. Perhaps Sadat was afraid of breaking the IDF and incurring Washington's wrath.

However, as is clear from the available information, he promised Kissinger only not to finish off Israel as a state, and there was no talk about individual brigades. So, perhaps, the Egyptian president, who was well versed in military affairs, wanted to draw as many enemy forces as possible to the west bank and either destroy them, cutting them off from his own, or turn the bridgehead into a camp of prisoners of war unable to escape. If this was the plan, then the Egyptian greatly underestimated the enemy. Sharon was in his element and made his usual adventurous decisions. Having repulsed attacks from the north, two coastal brigades turned south and rushed towards the city of Suez. They quickly passed through the rear of the 3rd Army, blocking it on the bridgehead between Sinai and the canal.

Victory turned into disaster. The 3rd Army was trapped, with no hope of getting back through the canal. For some reason, no attempts were made to break through to the north along the Bitter Lakes, and the army began to melt away under pressure from Mitla and air strikes. It became obvious that the revenge had failed. The Egyptians could still fight and fought, but the initiative and success passed to the IDF. From the stabilized Northern sector, additional forces moved against Egypt. It was the turn of another superpower, the USSR, to worry.

35. The role of the USA and the USSR in the conflict and its results

Military losses of the parties and their compensation. All participants in the war suffered significant losses. During the week of fighting, for example, about 300 Arab and about 100 Israeli planes and helicopters were destroyed. Israel lost more than a third of its tanks, and the Arab side lost about 2 thousand armored vehicles. Some types of ammunition only had reserves for a few days. As already mentioned, in this situation, after an urgent call for help, the United States began a massive transfer of weapons to Israel. The USSR did the same, providing the necessary support to Egypt and Syria. Four days after the outbreak of hostilities, Soviet An-12 and Ap-22 aircraft began making regular flights to Damascus and Cairo. In a short time, about 900 sorties were made. On board the aircraft were the necessary ammunition and military equipment. The bulk of the cargo was shipped by sea, so they began to arrive at their destination only towards the end of the war.

Naval groups of superpowers in the area of ​​military operations. The USSR deployed significant naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean - from 96 to 120 units, including 34 surface combat ships and 23 nuclear and diesel submarines. They were on high alert. This was done in order to prevent possible attempts to disrupt Soviet military supplies (only once did the Israelis manage to sink a Soviet cargo ship with boats). In the West, the strengthening of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was seen as a sign that it could be used to support Soviet regular troops if they were sent to a conflict area. This possibility, in principle, was not excluded.

It should be noted that during the war, the composition of the US 6th Mediterranean Fleet increased to 140 units. It included 6–8 nuclear submarines, 4 aircraft carriers, 20 helicopter carriers, 10–12 amphibious ships, 20 cruisers, 40 destroyers and frigates, several dozen auxiliary ships, etc.

Often, Soviet and American ships sailed side by side, which gave rise to the expression “dog wedding on the water.”

USSR measures to save Egypt. At that moment, when a direct path to Cairo opened in front of the Israeli tank columns, panic began in the country. A. Sadat, maintaining constant contact with the Soviet embassy, ​​repeated at every opportunity that “the Americans are deceivers,” they “cheated” him. In the end, he turned to the USSR and the USA with a request to jointly or separately send military contingents to Egypt to stop the Israeli advance. Moscow went to meet Sadat halfway. It was stated that if the Americans refuse to take joint action, then “we will act on our own.”

The General Staff urgently began working on the option of landing a “demonstrative landing” of Soviet marines in Port Said. But the paradox was that there were no marines in the 5th squadron - the marine regiment was just preparing in Sevastopol for transfer to the Mediterranean Sea. Then the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered the formation of a company (platoon) of volunteer paratroopers from among the crew on each ship of the 1st and 2nd rank and the preparation of ships and craft for landing personnel. Only at the last moment was this order canceled.

Kissinger's visit. From October 20 to 22, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in Moscow. As a result of intensive negotiations, a draft resolution on the Middle East issue was developed, which was adopted by the UN Security Council. It provided for an immediate ceasefire and all military operations, with troops stopping at their positions on October 22. The parties were asked to begin negotiations with the goal of withdrawing Israeli troops from all territories occupied since 1967. Egypt and Syria supported the resolution. Israel continued its offensive.

On October 24, the Soviet leadership warned “of the most severe consequences” that await Israel in the event of its “aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria.” L.I. is right there. Brezhnev sent an urgent telegram to R. Nixon, in which he assured the American side that if it was passive in resolving the crisis, the USSR would be forced to “urgently consider taking the necessary unilateral steps.”

On the same day, the Soviet Union declared increased combat readiness for seven airborne divisions. Through diplomatic channels, Moscow made it clear that it would not allow Egypt to be defeated.

Atomic alarm in the USA. After the call from the Kremlin, the world was in a complete frenzy. On October 25, US strategic nuclear assets were ordered to be on high alert. The atomic alarm showed how bad things were in America. The Vietnam syndrome made the Americans nervous, and they, fearing that the Soviets would finish the Arab affairs, and having found no other way to make it clear that the United States was not satisfied with such an outcome, pointed “an atomic Colt at the world’s temple.” Fortunately, the hysteria passed quickly. Kissinger now “grabbed by the whip” the Israelis who wanted to deal with the blocked Egyptian army. Tel Aviv was told that the Americans did not need either the 3rd Army or the Third World War. And if Israel continues to insist on continuing the fighting, let it blame itself.

Ceasefire. Finally, Tel Aviv decided that the wrath of the superpowers was dangerous. By the evening of October 25, the fire stopped on all fronts. The last shots were fired by the Syrians. Their leader Assad, who managed to stop the attack on Damascus on October 13, tried in the final hours of the conflict, using the approaching Allied troops, to break into the Golan again. But the general truce put an end to these experiments.

Losses. Data on the losses of the parties in this conflict, which affect the prestige of the superpowers and characterize the intensity of the confrontation between the parties, vary from book to book more than about the victims of any other regional war. When the results began to be summed up, it turned out that during 19 days of fighting, the sides lost about 20 thousand people killed, wounded and missing, almost 2,700 tanks, 18 warships, more than 330 aircraft and much other military equipment. At the same time, “their” air defense systems, as a result of various errors and misunderstandings, shot down 58 Egyptian and 11 Syrian aircraft.

Israel lost 3,500–4,000 people killed and twice as many wounded. Aircraft lost from 106 to 253, tanks and other armored vehicles from 900 to 1200 units. Other losses were of the same magnitude.

The coalition lost 7,600-20,000 soldiers and officers with almost the same number of wounded, which, by the way, is quite rare; usually this sad ratio is estimated at 1:3 in favor of the survivors. Therefore, the smallest number of deaths could be taken as truth. Armored vehicle losses amounted to 1,200–1,700 units. 250–460 aircraft and helicopters were lost.

Characterizing the actions of the parties, they can be called an example of active defense for the Israelis and evidence of mastery of modern offensive methods in relation to Egypt. The main result of the fighting was the phenomenon of convergence in the numerical orders of losses. Before 1973, their comparison was not so favorable for the Arabs.

Arab oil embargo. However, when the guns fell silent, the main events had just begun. The Americans would really be better off allowing the Arabs to return their illegally seized lands. Enraged by the impudence of the Americans, the Arab world, which was literally snatched away from the victory gained in battle, found a way to take revenge on the West both for telephone calls and for the latest ATGMs transferred to the IDF. October 1973 ended with the decision of the Arab oil exporting states to stop supplying this product to a number of countries, in particular the United States and its European allies. Thus ended the era of cheap oil on which Western industry grew. When the embargo on supplies was lifted, prices for the “black blood of civilization” were inflated, and the level rose 4, then 7 or more times. To understand the meaning of this action, you need to think carefully about what oil meant for developed countries.

Figuratively speaking, every glass of milk in America is heavily mixed with oil. Cows are milked using electrical appliances, otherwise the small farm team will not have time to serve all the cows. And electricity was mainly generated at thermal power plants, where, as a rule, oil is burned. (Then they built nuclear power plants and increased the number of dams on rivers precisely as a result of rising prices for hydrocarbon fuels.) But then, in 1974, this had yet to be done, and milk was “extracted” from oil. Next, the milk had to be poured into cans and taken to the factory, where it was packaged. This is done on a truck, in the engine of which a petroleum product such as gasoline is burned. But that's not all. Milk must be thermally treated, otherwise it will sour. The high temperatures for this process also depend on electricity, i.e. oil.

Energy crisis of the 1970s. The milk example is nonsense. Other products, especially those produced by industry, depend on “earth oil” to an even greater extent. And once oil became more expensive, all prices immediately increased. The final industrial product became unaffordable for the buyer. The whole complex of consequences of the rise in oil prices was called the energy crisis of the 70s, which led to a lot of problems and painfully rapid changes in the economic structures of the West and Japan. Only one industrialized country benefited quickly from the price situation. It was called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Being a major oil producer, the USSR not only provided its own economy with the most important energy resource, but also began exporting oil, making many countries in Europe dependent on its energy resources. Whether it was good or bad is not the point. The main thing is that it was.

The geopolitical enemy of the Soviet Union was not in the best shape. The lost war in Vietnam, the crisis, the emerging turning point in the Middle East. All this led to the fact that active America switched to a more or less blind defense on the fronts of the Cold War, leaving the initiative to the Soviet Union.

The meaning of war. On a regional scale, the October War showed Israel that the Arabs could make the next conflict their last; their increased combat prowess meant that the Israelis could be defeated. The national complex is a thing of the past. The Arab world has realized its strength, military and resource. This was understood in Tel Aviv and Washington, where they decided to abandon the use of force and move to a policy of compromise, at least until the coalition could be split.

It remains only to determine why these changes became possible. It's simple: they were carried out by Russian weapons, which brilliantly proved their capabilities. The world concluded that the disparity of military power was replaced by parity. That in such conditions, completely devoid of a hint of a military victory for one of the parties, in a global confrontation a major war would be madness. Life has become calmer, for everyone. And many in the world since then could confidently say the phrase: “Glory to Russian weapons!”

36. The final withdrawal of the USSR from Egypt. Camp David

The weakening of Soviet influence in the Middle East. The October War seemed to signify the success of Soviet policy in the Middle East. Another Arab-Israeli military confrontation ended in a draw. The Soviet Union demonstrated its military power by concentrating its naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea, thereby providing both maritime communications to Syria and Egypt and the necessary counterbalance to likely American intervention in the conflict. At the same time, the capabilities of Soviet military transport aviation in organizing air bridges to Egypt and Syria became visible. Finally, there was political will and a willingness to take risks in the name of protecting their “allies.”

At the same time, immediately after the war, the process of rapidly ousting the USSR from active positions in the Middle East began. This was facilitated by both objective and subjective factors. The first, in our opinion, should include the general economic decline of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s excessive enthusiasm for ideological guidelines in foreign policy. Many important decisions were made without sufficient justification, usually to spite the Americans.

Direct support for the Arabs in the 1973 war was to a certain extent dictated by the desire to “take revenge” on Washington for its involvement in the overthrow of the government of S. Allende in Chile in September 1973. Moreover, Soviet military supplies to the region did not at all contribute to the economic growth of Arab countries; on the contrary, they led to their impoverishment, to the formation of a high degree of belligerence and intransigence of the ruling elites, especially those following the path of socialist orientation.

(Remember: in the mid-1980s, the USSR provided weapons to more than 40 developing countries.) In the first half of the 1970s. over 90% of weapons were sent to Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, North and South Yemen, as well as Vietnam, Ethiopia, India and Cuba. At the same time, with rare exceptions, outdated models of military equipment were supplied. Only in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya were sold “sophisticated” weapons that could be maintained in working order and used only with the help of Soviet specialists.

Egypt's rapprochement with Israel and the United States. In the system of subjective factors, the policy of Sadat stood out, which began to transform Egypt from an ally and the main support base of the USSR in the Arab East into a country hostile to the Soviet Union and open to the broadest cooperation with the United States. Soviet diplomacy began to be pushed aside from participation in the Middle East settlement process, which gradually took on the character of bilateral (“separate”) agreements between Egypt and Israel through the mediation of Washington.

On January 18, 1974, Egyptian representatives, in the presence of the American delegation, signed an agreement on the disengagement of troops with the Israelis at the 101st kilometer of the Cairo-Suez highway. Israel withdrew its troops 32 km from the Suez Canal. On May 31, a similar agreement, but with the mediation of the USSR and the USA, was signed between Israel and Syria. Part of the Golan Heights with Quneitra was returned to Syria on the terms of demilitarization and the deployment of UN troops here, which were planned to include Soviet officers as military observers.

In 1976, Egypt began receiving the first American C-130 military transport aircraft, then combat aircraft and other weapons. As payment for changing the foreign policy course, Egypt received financial assistance from the United States, the Arabian oil monarchies and Western European countries. During the same period, Sadat announced the rupture of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Within a month, all Soviet military services had left the country. The port of Alexandria was finally closed. The repair infrastructure built by the USSR was transferred to the Americans.

Problems of the Middle East settlement. Since the beginning of 1977, the efforts of the USSR and the USA to convene the Geneva Conference on a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East have intensified significantly. At the same time, activity intensified in another direction: Egypt and Israel were establishing direct contacts, and things were moving towards a separate bilateral deal.

The presence of an enemy made it possible to stay on the throne despite internal difficulties;

The state of constant hostility provided a chance to receive gratuitous assistance from abroad;

The creation of a Palestinian state in the “Egyptian” Gaza Strip and on the “Jordanian” West Bank of the Jordan River could only happen in the event of “peace” in the region, and by and large, the Arabs were against such a state. A. Sadat, having taken a course towards market reforms (the “open door” policy), immediately found himself in a rather difficult situation. Multiple and rapid increases in prices led to massive spontaneous demonstrations, pogroms, and looting. In totalitarian Arab regimes, this is the “last and decisive” step. Another half step - and the regime will be swept away. The treaty with the USSR was broken, the Americans advocated a “comprehensive” peace, and a number of Arab countries took a rather cool position towards Cairo. A way out was needed, and as soon as possible. Only two things could save Sadat: war or the return of Sinai.

It is significant that top secret contacts between Egypt and Israel were kept under complete control, both in Moscow and in Washington. Experienced specialists with good knowledge of Arabic and reliable connections worked in the KGB residencies in the Middle East. In a matter of hours, they could obtain the necessary information and transfer it to Andropov, and then to Brezhnev. In addition, three Soviet ships were constantly cruising in the Mediterranean Sea - “Kavkaz”, “Crimea” and “Yuri Gagarin” with the necessary electronic equipment, which “recorded” all radio and telephone conversations in the territory of Egypt, Israel and other countries that are here were deciphered by military intelligence specialists - the GRU.

Separate contacts between Egypt and Israel. In September 1977, the first “constructive” meeting between the secret envoys of Egypt and Israel took place in Morocco. It clarified a lot for the Israeli side. It turned out that Sadat had no particular interest in creating a Palestinian state; he was experiencing strong pressure from both the local population and neighboring Arab countries; he finally changed his political orientation from East to West. In a word: there was a common platform that gave the Israeli Prime Minister M. Begin a “chance” to get the Middle East process off the ground.

In July, the head of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad, General G. Hofi, placed in front of Begin a thick dossier containing materials of a “fantastic” conspiracy: the Libyan leader Colonel M. Gaddafi was preparing the ground for the overthrow of Sadat. A few days later, without consultation with the Americans (prior to this, such materials were transferred only to the CIA), this dossier was handed over to the chief of Egyptian intelligence on neutral territory. It contained specific names, telephone numbers, locations of warehouses with ammunition and weapons of the conspirators, codes and communication channels that directly led to the Libyan capital. Already the first checks showed that the Israelis handed over a reliable document. For Sadat this was a real find. Mass arrests immediately began across the country. On July 21, Egyptian troops invaded Libyan territory, and bombers attacked a number of Libyan cities where bases and strongholds of “anti-Egyptian elements” were located. On the same day, Begin declared in the Knesset that he would take no action in Sinai while Egypt was busy suppressing the plot.

It seemed that the Israeli leadership took decisive measures to save the life of its recent enemy. Sadat could not believe that Moscow and Washington did not know about the conspiracy. Why didn't they report it? The Russians are with Gaddafi - that's for sure! Why were the Americans silent? Maybe it’s really only worth conducting a dialogue with the Israelis on the issues of Sinai and the entire Middle East settlement? Soon Sadat turned to the Moroccan king with a request to organize a meeting with the Israeli prime minister.

This eve of Camp David was, perhaps, one of those episodes of the Cold War, “when two mighty superpowers rested their heads in confrontation, and behind their backs, small countries deftly managed their affairs.” Moscow partially guessed what the behind-the-scenes games in the Middle East could lead to, but Washington never figured out the true intentions of Egypt and Israel.

Soviet-American statement. On October 1, 1977, the USSR and the USA signed a statement on the Middle East, in which the parties set the date for convening the Geneva Conference (December) and for the first time (at the insistence of Moscow) included a clause on the rights of Palestinians in such a significant bilateral document. Sadat immediately supported the statement, calling it “masterful,” which gave rise to A.A. Gromyko to conclude that the job is done: Israel and the United States have finally managed to quarrel, the scandal will continue in America for a long time, and a wall has been erected on the path to a separate settlement. Although the document is weak, he stated, it still ruined the “game” for the Americans: “their hands are now tied.”

As for the Israelis, they took the Soviet-American statement with hostility, calling it “completely unacceptable.” Already on October 4, M. Dayan convinced J. Carter that the goal of the joint efforts of the United States and Israel should be an agreement with Egypt, and not a comprehensive Middle East settlement. “If you remove one wheel from a car, it won’t move,” the Israeli minister convinced the American president. “If Egypt is out of conflict, there will be no more war.” J. Carter had a hard time agreeing. Everything fell into place within a few days. Sadat confidentially confirmed that he was in solidarity with Dayan. There have been reports from Moscow that they are against the agreement with the United States.

Camp David Accords and their consequences. Carter chose Begin and Sadat. On September 17, 1978, Israel and Egypt, with the participation of the United States, signed the Camp David Accords. On March 26 of the following year, a peace treaty was concluded between the two countries in Washington. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula began, which ended in April 1982. The Soviet Union was assigned the role of observer and critic in this entire process.

Having lost Egypt, the Soviet Union, of course, noticeably weakened its political influence in the Middle East, however, it would be wrong to talk about its complete withdrawal from the region. Military-political cooperation continued with Syria, Libya, Iraq, and two Yemeni states.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq captured the state of Kuwait in 3 hours, introducing a 120,000-strong occupation army, 70% equipped with Soviet weapons and military equipment. At that time, there were at least 4 thousand Soviet military specialists in the Iraqi army, without whose help, in the opinion of the American military, Iraq could not have captured Kuwait.

However, almost all the Middle Eastern countries with which military-political cooperation continued could no longer be called countries of “socialist orientation,” and hence the main goal of supporting these countries began to be to counter American interests in the region as part of the general policy of confrontation between the two superpowers carried out in those years.

37. Soviet military in Yemen: 1960-1980s.

Military presence in North Yemen. Becoming an ally of Egypt in the early 1960s. The Soviet Union was drawn into the civil war in Yemen. There, in 1962, an anti-monarchist coup similar to the Egyptian coup of 1952 took place, and the Yemen Arab Republic was proclaimed. Almost immediately, a civil war began in the country between republicans and monarchists. Egypt helped carry out the coup d'etat, and it also began to actively support the Republicans, sending its troops to Yemen, dragging the Soviet Union into this matter. The monarchists were supported by Saudi Arabia and Great Britain.

By 1963, there were already 547 Soviet military specialists in Yemen. Subsequently (until 1991), 4,300 Soviet military advisers and specialists visited here through the USSR Ministry of Defense. Officers predominated - 3,300 people, but there were also conscripts (over 200), as well as civilian workers and employees. Their transfer was carried out along the route: Krivoy Rog (heavy transport aircraft were based here) - Simferopol - Ankara (capital of Turkey) - Nicosia (capital of Cyprus) - Cairo. From here the contingent flew to Yemen on the same planes (to the capital - the city of Sana'a).

For safety reasons, all flights from Cairo were carried out only at night. The typical load of an An-12 aircraft ranged from 4 to 12 tons of ammunition or 60–70 personnel (Egyptians). The planes had Egyptian Air Force markings. Pilots in the air were prohibited from making any radio contact. Soviet losses in this campaign were: 1 adviser in Yemen and 8 crew members of one of the aircraft, which crashed during takeoff.

Military assistance to South Yemen. In the summer of 1967, Egypt withdrew its troops from North Yemen. Following this, the British also left South Yemen. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was proclaimed. Soviet military personnel were immediately sent to the new country. Until 1991, their total number was 5245, and there were also few conscripts - 213, and civilian employees - almost 1500.

Captain 1st Rank (then Rear Admiral) B. Nechitailo, who arrived in the PDRY in 1976 as an adviser to the commander of the local fleet, recalls that the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Fleet Admiral N. Sergeev, admonished him: “You will be there like this If you work actively, as in the Union, I will kick you out of there. Your task is to stay in Yemen as long as possible. And if you do everything there quickly, then why do I need you there.”

He was also made to understand that if he gave the Yemenis any advice that revealed Soviet military secrets, he would be immediately recalled to the Union, expelled from the party and fired from the Navy. The same will follow if he does something not in favor of the USSR.

Therefore, the advisers cared primarily about Soviet interests. A naval base was actually built with a maneuverable base for the Soviet fleet. From 1976 to 1979, it received 123 Soviet warships. After minor reconstruction of the airfields, it was possible to equip Soviet military aviation, which by that time had been “requested” from Somalia.

Cooling. By the beginning of the 1980s. There was a cooling in Soviet-Yemeni military contacts. Local leaders began to voice complaints to Moscow regarding the quality and quantity of weapons and military equipment supplied to the country. The retaliatory steps were not always adequate. For example, the Soviet side refused to treat the son of the commander of the Yemeni fleet under the pretext that he (the father) underestimated the “mutually beneficial” military-political relations with the Soviet Union. The child was sent to England and soon got back on his feet, and this did not contribute to the improvement of the very relations that were so cared for.

By the mid-1980s, when Navy Commander-in-Chief S. Gorshkov visited the PDRY, the situation had changed somewhat. A new adviser was appointed - captain 1st rank A. Mironov, who differed from his predecessors in that he spoke Arabic. Until this time, no attention was paid to such a “little thing” as knowledge of the language. Things went smoothly: an agreement was reached on the construction of a maneuverable base for Soviet submarines in Aden, and a cooperation agreement was concluded for 30 years. Modern Soviet technology began to arrive in the country.

New civil war. But all these achievements were late: on January 13, 1986, a coup took place in the PDRY. The armed forces split. A real civil war began. Soviet advisers and specialists found themselves cut off not only from Moscow, but also from our representative offices in Aden.

They saved themselves as best they could. In particular, A. Mironov himself, with a group of advisers and several dozen Yemenis, in difficult conditions, managed to capture a pilot boat and go to sea at night. Our Marines were hot on their trail, but to no avail. A report on the tragic death of compatriots had already been prepared. They really were on the verge of death, but they came across a Soviet ship on the open sea.

Not all Soviet military and civilian specialists managed to get out of South Yemen. The fate of many of them is still unknown. They are listed as missing.

Forty years ago, on October 6, 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli war began. It also has other names, for example, the “Yom Kippur War.” On the eve of the 40th anniversary, the Israeli government declassified some of the documents relating to this short armed conflict between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Syria, on the other.

From the Internet you can find out that in terms of the number of tanks and the ferocity of the battles, the “Yom Kippur War” surpassed the tank battles of World War II, even one of the most massive clashes of armored forces on the Kursk Bulge. About the most effective tanker in the history of armored vehicles, Lieutenant Zvi Gringold, who destroyed up to 60 enemy tanks in a day and a half. Many books have been written about the Arab-Israeli war, but even more fables have been made up.

Due to the miscalculations of Israel's top political and military leadership, as publicly stated four months after the end of the war by the country's Prime Minister Golda Meir, Israel was nearly defeated, just six years after its fairly convincing victory in the Six Day War (June 1967). ). Israeli losses in the Yom Kippur War amounted to 2,656 people. More than 10 thousand wounded. There were no such large losses even during the War of Independence in 1948. Soon, Golda Meir was forced to resign as head of government; she was replaced by the Chief of the General Staff during the Six-Day War, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, 52-year-old Yitzhak Rabin.

The precondition for the attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel was an air battle in the skies over the border between Lebanon and Syria on September 13, 1973, when Israeli pilots shot down a dozen MIG-21 aircraft of the Syrian air force.

Syrian troops crossed the UN ceasefire line, the so-called Purple Line, established after the 1967 war and attacked fortifications on the Golan Heights in the Quneitra area with three infantry divisions, two tank divisions and a separate tank brigade. Each of the three infantry divisions had two hundred tanks. The Syrians were opposed by one infantry and one tank brigade of the Israeli army, as well as part of the units of the 7th tank brigade. The four battalions of the 188th Tank Brigade had up to a hundred tanks (mostly Centurions) and 44 105- and 155-mm self-propelled guns. The total number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights was 180-200 combat vehicles.

“Israel won in all Arab-Israeli wars, including the Yom Kippur war, because among them there were still many people who remembered how they took Berlin,” the president of the Institute told Pravda.Ru studying Israel and the Middle East Evgeniy Yanovich Satanovsky.

According to the Pravda.Ru expert, the Israeli armed forces emerged victorious from the confrontation with the Arab states because their army included “a quarter of our people.”

"It is impossible to compare two states where there is tank building and where it is absent. The question is the crews. No matter how long our guys trained their Arab colleagues, the result was still disastrous. With one exception. In Jordan, where in general everything was fine with armed forces, due to the fact that King Hussein was an extremely serious military pilot and treated his army accordingly. By the way, I note that there was also excellent aviation.

And the only war where Israel had to fight seriously was the battle with the Jordanians. But that was in 1967. By 1973, King Hussein had already lost everything, both the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and since then Jordan has not fought with Israel. The Jordanians had tank units trained by the British. As for the Israeli tank school, in principle, this is a Soviet tank school. Literally. Pilots, reconnaissance officers, tank crews, and artillerymen of Israel are graduates of the Soviet army who went through the Second World War. At that time, this school was certainly the best in the world."

It is still unknown how the events of the war 40 years ago would have turned out if the veterans of the Great Patriotic War who fought for Israel had been opposed by Soviet military advisers to the Arab armed forces.

“As such, there were no Soviet military advisers left in Syria and Egypt in 1973,” says Army General, President of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, Doctor of Military Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, who in He was the chief military adviser to the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1970-1971.-If they had stayed, the Arabs would have acted better.Two mistakes were made.

On the right side, when viewed from the side of the Soviet command, was the 3rd Army, on the left - the 2nd Army. The Israelis struck at the junction between them, in the area of ​​​​Bitter Lake. But the Egyptians decided that since there was a lake there, the tanks would not go there. This miscalculation brought the Egyptian army to the brink of defeat. Secondly, having captured a large bridgehead on the other side of the Suez Canal, the Israelis approached the second-echelon troops, who were deprived of the means to combat tanks, since almost all of their anti-tank weapons were transferred to the first echelon line."

“Pravda.Ru” asked its interlocutor to comment on the following passage, caught in the vastness of the RuNet: “The Israeli record for the range of tank fire in combat (not in exercises) was achieved during the operation in Lebanon. Then a target was hit at a distance of 5600 meters with a standard projectile from a tank's turret gun MAGAH 6 bet."