Russian-Japanese war of power. Beginning of the war

Introduction

Causes of the war

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

When entering the war with the Russian Empire, Japan pursued several geopolitical goals at once, the main of which, of course, were obtaining emergency rights to the Korean Peninsula, which was then in Russia’s sphere of influence. 1895, at the initiative of St. Petersburg, Germany, France and Russia forced Japan to reconsider the Treaty of Shimonoseki imposed on China and return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. The Japanese government was extremely irritated by this act and began to prepare for revenge. In 1897, Russia joined the imperialist division of China, receiving a 25-year lease of the Kwantung Peninsula with the city of Port Arthur and obtaining Beijing's consent to the construction of a railway that would connect Port Arthur with the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Port Arthur, which became the base for the main forces of the Russian fleet, had an extremely important position on the Yellow Sea: from here the fleet could constantly keep under attack the Korean and Pechili Gulfs, that is, the most important sea routes of the Japanese armies in the event of their landing in Manchuria. Taking part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China, Russian troops occupied all of Manchuria to the Liaodong Peninsula. From all the above facts, it is clearly visible that it was the active Russian expansion in this region that provoked Japan, which considered these territories as its sphere of influence.

1. Causes of the war

The Russo-Japanese War began on February 8, 1904 with an attack by the Japanese fleet on a ship of the First Pacific Squadron in the Port Arthur roadstead. Japan and Russia, even before the outbreak of hostilities, had been balancing on the brink of war and peace for a long time. There are many reasons for this. Back in 1891, Russia began a new course in foreign policy. This course is mainly associated with the name of Prime Minister Witte. The essence of this course was to obtain additional resources for the industrialization of the country through the development of the Far East. After the accession to the throne of Emperor Nicholas II (1894), Witte began to modernize the country according to the European model. This implied, in addition to industrialization, the creation of colonial sales markets. It is difficult to say when the first plans for a colony in northern China appeared. During the reign of Emperor Alexander III (1881-1894) there were no such plans. Although construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway began in 1891, it was intended for the development of the interior regions of the country. Therefore, the desire to occupy Manchuria can only be explained by Witte’s plans to create a “model” European country. In March 1898, Russia forced China to sign a lease agreement on the Kwantung Peninsula with the port of Port Arthur (Lüshun). This agreement occurred against the backdrop of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1896-1898, during which the peninsula was occupied by Japan. But European countries that considered China a sphere of their interests (England, Germany, Russia) forced Japan to abandon the occupied territories. In June 1900, the Boxer Rebellion began in China and was directed against foreign colonialists. In response, the governments of England, Germany, Russia and Japan sent their troops into the country and brutally suppressed the uprising. At the same time, Russia occupied Manchuria; in addition, in 1902, Russian entrepreneurs took concessions from the Korean government for gold mining on the Yalu River. In 1903, the concessions came into the possession of State Secretary Bezobrazov. A joint stock company was formed, the members of which were representatives of the imperial family. Therefore, Russian troops were sent to Korea to guard the concessions.

Japan, which emerged from foreign political isolation in 1867 as a result of the visit of an American warship under the command of Commodore Perry, was forced to open its ports to foreign ships. From this moment the countdown of the so-called Meiji era begins. Japan took the path of industrialization and scientific and technological progress. Quite quickly, the country joined the struggle for the status of a regional leader and for colonial markets. The influence of the Japanese in Korea began to grow. In 1896, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The Chinese army and navy were armed with modern weapons made in Germany and England, but due to better combat training and command organization, Japan won a brilliant victory. It can be said that China bought weapons, and Japan adopted the technological achievements, tactics and strategy of European countries. But thanks to the conspiracy of the great countries, Japan lost most of the results of her victory. A powerful militaristic and revanchist movement arises in the country. There are calls to take over Korea, Northern China and Russia in the Urals. Relations with Russia, which until 1898 were friendly and mutually beneficial, begin to turn into openly hostile. The Japanese government makes large orders for England to build an ocean fleet and Germany for the rearmament of the army. Instructors from European countries and the United States are appearing in the country's armed forces.

In addition to the objective factors that caused the confrontation, there were factors caused by foreign influence. It must be remembered that the great powers were fighting over China, so a war between two potential competitors was beneficial to all parties concerned. As a result, Japan received significant support and preferential loans for the purchase of weapons. Feeling powerful patrons behind them, the Japanese boldly escalated the conflict.

At this time, Japan was not perceived as a serious threat in Russia. During the visit of Russian Defense Minister Kuropatkin to Japan in May 1903 and his inspection trip at the same time to the Far East, completely biased conclusions were made about Japan's combat power and Russia's defense capability. The Emperor's viceroy in the Far East, Admiral Alekseev, who was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, was completely unsuitable in his abilities for the position he held. He managed to overlook the Japanese preparations for war and strategically positioned the army and navy incorrectly. Thanks to Bezobrazov’s activities, Russia’s policy in the Far East turned into a policy of power, which Russia did not have in the Far East at that time. The Russian ground forces in Manchuria numbered only 80,000 thousand soldiers and officers. The First Pacific Squadron included 7 squadron battleships, 9 cruisers of various classes, 19 destroyers and small ships and the bases of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet consisted of 6 most modern squadron battleships and 2 obsolete ones, 11 armored cruisers, practically no inferior battleships, 14 light cruisers and 40 destroyers and auxiliary vessels. The Japanese ground army consisted of 150,000 soldiers and officers, and after the announcement of mobilization it increased to 850,000 people. In addition, the army was united with the metropolis only by the single-track Trans-Siberian Railway, along which trains ran for twenty days, which excluded the rapid growth and normal supply of the Russian army. Regions of the Russian Empire such as Sakhalin and Kamchatka were not covered by troops at all. The Japanese had much better intelligence; they knew almost everything about the composition and deployment of the Russian army and navy.

In 1902, a diplomatic war began, where both countries put forward conditions that were impossible to fulfill. The smell of war was in the air.

2.Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905

During 1903, negotiations were held between both states, at which the Japanese side offered Russia to carry out a mutually beneficial exchange: Russia would recognize Korea as a sphere of interest for Japan, and in exchange it would receive freedom of action in Manchuria. However, Russia did not want to give up its Korean ambitions.

The Japanese decided to break off the negotiations. On February 4, 1904, in the presence of Emperor Meiji, a meeting of senior statesmen was held, at which it was decided to start a war. Only the Secretary of the Privy Council, Ito Hirobumi, spoke out against it, but the decision was made by an absolute majority of votes. Just a month before many were talking about an imminent and even inevitable war, Nicholas II did not believe in it. The main argument: “They won’t dare.” However, Japan dared.

February, naval attache Yoshida cut the telegraph line north of Seoul. On February 6, the Japanese envoy in St. Petersburg, Chicken, announced the severance of diplomatic relations, but due to a damaged telegraph line, Russian diplomats and military personnel in Korea and Manchuria did not find out about this in time. Even after receiving this message, the governor in the Far East, General Alekseev, did not consider it necessary to inform Port Arthur and forbade publication of the news in newspapers, citing a reluctance to “disturb society.”

On February 9, the Russian fleet was first blocked and then destroyed by Japanese naval forces in Chimulpo Bay and on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. Despite ample evidence that war was approaching, the attack took the Russian fleet by surprise. After the defeat of the Russian fleet, Japanese troops began unhindered landings in Manchuria and Korea. Some time before, the Korean court asked Russia to send two thousand soldiers to Korea. Ironically, Japanese troops arrived instead of Russian soldiers.

War was officially declared only the day after the attack; newspapers reported this already on February 11.

The Meiji Decree declaring war noted: Russia is going to annex Manchuria, although it has promised to withdraw its troops from there, it poses a threat to Korea and to the entire Far East. There was a lot of truth in this statement, but this does not change the fact that it was Japan that first attacked Russia. Trying to whitewash itself in the eyes of the world community, the Japanese government considered that the war began on the day of the announcement of the severance of diplomatic relations. From this point of view, it turns out that the attack on Port Arthur cannot be considered treacherous. But to be fair, it should be noted that the formal rules of war (its advance declaration and notification of neutral states) were adopted only in 1907, at the Second Peace Conference in The Hague. Already on February 12, the Russian representative Baron Rosen left Japan.

This was the second time in a decade that Japan had been the first to declare war. Even after Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia, few in the Russian government believed that it would dare to attack the European superpower. The opinions of politicians and military experts with a sober mind, who noted that due to the weakness of Russia in the Far East, Japan should make decisive concessions, were ignored.

The war began with terrible defeats for the Russian army both on land and at sea. After the naval battles in Chimulpo Bay and the Tsushima Battle, the Russian Pacific Marine Fleet ceased to exist as an organized force. On land, the war was not conducted so successfully by the Japanese. Despite some successes in the battles of Liaoyang (August 1904) and Mukden (February 1905), the Japanese army suffered significant losses in killed and wounded. The fierce defense of Port Arthur by Russian troops had a great influence on the course of the war; approximately half of the losses of the Japanese army occurred in the battles to capture the fortress. On January 2, 1905, Port Arthur capitulated.

However, despite all the victories, the immediate future seemed very vague to the Japanese command. It clearly understood: the industrial, human and resource potential of Russia, if assessed from a long-term perspective, was much higher. Japan's statesmen, who were most distinguished by their sober mind, understood from the very beginning of the war that the country could only withstand one year of hostilities. The country was not ready for a long war. Neither materially nor psychologically, the Japanese had no historical experience of waging long wars. Japan was the first to start a war, and the first to seek peace. Russia Japan Manchuria Korea

At the request of Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, American President Theodore Roosevelt initiated peace negotiations. Preparing the ground for his initiative, Roosevelt in Berlin focused on the Russian danger, and in London on the Japanese one, adding that if not for the position of the United States and England, Germany and France would have already intervened on Russia’s side. Berlin supported him as a mediator, fearing claims to this role from England and France.

In June 1905, the Japanese government agreed to negotiations, although public opinion met this decision with hostility.

Although Russian patriots demanded war to a victorious end, the war was not popular in the country. There were many cases of mass surrender. Russia has not won a single great battle. The revolutionary movement undermined the strength of the empire. Therefore, the voices of supporters of a speedy conclusion of peace became increasingly louder among the Russian elite. On June 12, Russia responded positively to the American president’s proposal, but was slow in terms of the practical implementation of the negotiating idea. The final argument in favor of an early conclusion of peace was the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin. Most researchers believe that Roosevelt pushed Japan to take this step in order to make Russia more willing to negotiate.

Advance elements of the 13th Division landed on the island on July 7. There were almost no regular troops on Sakhalin; the convicts had to be armed. Despite the promise to write off a year of imprisonment for each month of participation in the defense, the vigilantes seemed to number in the hundreds. There was no single leadership; initially the focus was on guerrilla warfare.

Sakhalin was captured by Japanese troops in just a few days. Among the defenders of the island, 800 people died, about 4.5 thousand were captured. The Japanese army lost 39 soldiers.

Peace negotiations were to take place in the small American city of Portsmouth. A huge crowd saw off the Japanese delegation, led by Japanese Foreign Minister Baron Komura YUTAR Yusammi, at the port of Yokohama. Ordinary Japanese were confident that he would be able to extract huge concessions from Russia. But Komura himself knew that this was not so. Already anticipating the reaction of the people to the outcome of the upcoming negotiations, Komura quietly said: “When I return, these people will turn into a rebellious crowd and will greet me with clods of dirt or shooting. Therefore, now it is better to enjoy their cries of “Banzai!”

The Portsmouth Conference began on August 9, 1905. Negotiations proceeded at a rapid pace. Nobody wanted to fight. Both sides have demonstrated a penchant for compromise. The level of the Russian delegation was higher - it was headed by the Emperor’s Secretary of State and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire S.Yu. Witte. Although a truce was not formally declared, hostilities ceased during the negotiations

Few people in the public expected that Witte, and with him the whole of Russia, would be able to achieve a “favorable” peace. And only experts understood: yes, Japan won, but it was no less drained of blood than Russia. Since Japan waged a predominantly offensive war, its casualties were heavier than in Russia (50,000 killed in Russia and 86,000 in Japan). The hospitals were filled with the wounded and sick. The ranks of soldiers continued to mow beriberi. A quarter of the Japanese losses at Port Arthur were caused by this particular disease. The army began to call up reservists in the next year of conscription. In total, during the war, 1 million 125 thousand people were mobilized - 2 percent of the population. The soldiers were tired, morale was falling, prices and taxes were rising in the metropolis, and external debt was increasing.

Roosevelt considered it beneficial for America that neither side would gain a decisive advantage as a result of the signing of the peace treaty. And then, after the end of the war, both countries will continue the confrontation, and American interests in Asia will not be in danger - there is no "yellow" or "Slavic" one. The Japanese victory had already dealt the first blow to American interests. Convinced that Western states could be resisted, the Chinese "embarrassed" and began to boycott American goods.

The sympathies of American society leaned in favor of Russia. Not even so much for Russia itself, but in favor of Witte himself. Komura was short, sickly and ugly. In Japan he was nicknamed "mouse". Gloomy and closed to communication, Komura was not perceived by most Americans. These impressions were superimposed on anti-Japanese sentiments, which were quite common among ordinary "Americans". More than 100 thousand Japanese emigrants were already living in America at that time. Most believed that by accepting low wages, the Japanese were leaving them without jobs. Trade unions demanded that the Japanese be expelled from the country.

In this sense, the choice of America as a place for negotiations was, perhaps, not the most pleasant for the Japanese delegation. However, anti-Japanese emotions had no influence on the actual course of the negotiations. Ordinary Americans did not yet know that America had already concluded a secret agreement with Japan: Roosevelt recognized the Japanese protectorate over Korea, and Japan agreed to America's control of the Philippines.

Witte tried to adapt to the Americans. He shook hands with attendants, spoke courtesies to journalists, flirted with the anti-Russian Jewish community and tried not to show that Russia needed peace. He argued that in this war there is no winner, and if there is no winner, then there is no loser. As a result, he "save face" and rejected some of Komura's demands. So Russia refused to pay the indemnity. Witte also rejected the demand to transfer Russian warships interned in neutral waters to Japan, which was contrary to international law. He also did not agree to the reduction of the Russian military fleet in the Pacific Ocean. For the Russian state consciousness, this was an unheard of condition that could not be fulfilled. However, Japanese diplomats were well aware that Russia would never agree to these conditions, and put forward them only in order to later, by refusing them, demonstrate the flexibility of their position.

The peace agreement between Japan and Russia was signed on August 23, 1905 and consisted of 15 articles. Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests on the condition that Russian subjects enjoy the same privileges as subjects of other foreign states.

Both states agreed to completely and simultaneously evacuate all military formations that were in Manchuria and return it to Chinese control. The Russian government has stated that it is waiving special rights and preferences in Manchuria that are incompatible with the principle of equal rights.

Russia ceded in favor of Japan its rights to lease Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as all rights, benefits and concessions associated with this lease. Russia also gave Japan the railway that connected Chang Chun and Port Arthur, as well as all the coal mines that belonged to this road.

Komura also managed to achieve a territorial concession: Japan received part of the already occupied Sakhalin. Of course, Sakhalin was not of great importance then, neither geopolitical nor economic, but as another symbol of space, expanding, it was not superfluous at all. The border was established along the 50th parallel. Sakhalin was officially declared a demilitarized zone and both states agreed not to build any military installations on it. The La Perouse and Tatar straits were declared a free navigation zone.

In essence, Japan's leaders got everything they sought. Finally, they wanted recognition of their "special" interests in Korea and partly in China. Everything else can be considered as an optional application. The instructions that Komura received before the start of negotiations talked about the “optionality” of indemnity and annexations of Sakhalin. Komura was bluffing when he demanded the entire island at the beginning of the negotiations. Having received half of it, he achieved unconditional success. Japan beat Russia not only on the battlefield, but also in the diplomatic game. In the future, Witte spoke about the treaty in Portsmouth as his personal success (he received the title of count for this), but in reality there was no success. Yamagata Aritomo claimed that Witte's tongue was worth 100 thousand soldiers. However, Komura managed to talk him down. But he did not receive any title.

In November 1905, a Japanese-Korean agreement was concluded to establish a protectorate over Korea. The palace where the negotiations took place was surrounded by Japanese soldiers just in case. The text of the agreement belonged to Ito Hirobumi. He was considered an opponent of this war, but this did not prevent him from being among those who took advantage of its fruits with the greatest success. According to the terms of the agreement, Korea did not have the right, without the consent of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to conclude international treaties. Ito Hirobumi was appointed Governor General of Korea. The dreams of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Saigo Takamori finally came true: Korea was finally punished for not recognizing itself as a vassal of Japan for several centuries.

Assessing the results of the conference as a whole, they should be recognized as quite realistic for both Japan and Russia - they coincided with the results of the war. Ten years ago, after the victorious war with China, a coalition of European states did not recognize Japan’s encroachment on the role of Far Eastern hegemon. Now everything was different: they accepted Japan into their closed club, which determined the fate of countries and peoples. Striving for parity with the West and literally winning this equality, Japan took another decisive step away from the will of its ancestors, who lived only in the interests of their archipelago. As the subsequent events of the brutal 20th century showed, this departure from the traditional way of thinking led the country to disaster.

Conclusion

So, the end of the Russo-Japanese War did not bring the expected results of one of the parties. The Japanese, despite a series of brilliant victories on land and sea, did not get what they had hoped for. Of course, Japan became a regional leader in the Far East, received great military power, but the main goals of the war were not fulfilled. Japan failed to capture all of Manchuria, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. It was also not possible to obtain reparations from Russia. The financial and human costs of this war turned out to be unbearable for the Japanese budget, only loans from Western countries allowed Japan to hold out for so long. Peace had to be agreed, if only because otherwise the country would have gone bankrupt. In addition, Russia has not been completely ousted from China, both militarily and economically. The only gain was that, at the cost of enormous effort, Japan managed to create its own colonial empire. Above, the Japanese leadership clearly understands that despite the brilliant victories, the army and navy have many shortcomings, and the victories are caused not so much by the qualities of the Japanese army, but by luck and Russia's unpreparedness for war. This war led to a huge development of militarism.

For Russia, the outcome of the war was a shock. A huge empire suffered a crushing defeat from a small Asian state. During the war, most of the navy perished, and the army suffered heavy losses. In essence, Russia has lost its superpower status. In addition, the war caused an economic crisis and, as a consequence, revolution. The loss of the southern half of Sakhalin Island was insulting. Although the results of the defeats were more moral than practical, the revolution and financial crisis caused by it carried a danger to the very existence of the empire. In addition, it was necessary to rebuild the fleet almost from scratch. This is evidenced by the following figures: out of 22 new types of battleships, 6 remained in service, and 15 cruisers were also lost. Completely lost (with the exception of three cruisers and several destroyers), the Baltic Fleet suffered huge losses. The war showed all the insecurity of the Far East, and its weak connection with the metropolis. All these factors significantly weakened Russia's role in the international arena.

At the moment, historians have quite clearly identified the reasons for Russia's defeat in this war. In many ways, the defeat was determined by subjective factors. But at the end of the war, its result became a disgrace for the great empire.

Western countries benefited most from the war, although it was not possible to oust Russia and Japan from China. On the contrary, in 1912 these countries signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression and the division of spheres of influence in China.

The Russo-Japanese War reached its full conclusion only in 1945, when the Soviet army and navy captured Port Arthur, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and Japan was reduced to a minor power.

Bibliography

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Alexander Mikhailovich. Memoirs of the Grand Duke - M.: Zakharov, 2004. - 440 p.

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Meshcheryakov A.N. Emperor Meiji and his Japan - M.: Natalis: Rippol Classic, 2006 - 736 p.

Molodyakov V.E. Goto-shimpo and Japanese colonial policy. - M.: AIRO - XXI, 2005. - 440 p.

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The economic rise of Russia, the construction of railways, and the expansive policy of developing the provinces led to the strengthening of Russia's position in the Far East. The tsarist government had the opportunity to extend its influence to Korea and China. For this purpose, the tsarist government in 1898 leased the Liaodong Peninsula from China for a period of 25 years.

In 1900, Russia, together with other great powers, took part in suppressing the uprising in China and sent its troops into Manchuria under the pretext of ensuring the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway. China was given a condition - the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories in exchange for the concession of Manchuria. However, the international situation was unfavorable, and Russia was forced to withdraw its troops without satisfying the claims. Dissatisfied with the growth of Russian influence in the Far East, supported by England and the United States, Japan entered into the struggle for a leading role in Southeast Asia. Both powers were preparing for a military conflict.

The balance of power in the Pacific region was not in favor of Tsarist Russia. It was significantly inferior in the number of ground forces (a group of 98 thousand soldiers was concentrated in the Port Arthur area against the 150 thousand Japanese army). Japan was significantly superior to Russia in military technology (the Japanese Navy had twice as many cruisers and three times the number of destroyers than the Russian fleet). The theater of military operations was located at a considerable distance from the center of Russia, which made it difficult to supply ammunition and food. The situation was aggravated by the low capacity of the railways. Despite this, the tsarist government continued its aggressive policy in the Far East. In a desire to distract the people from social problems, the government decided to raise the prestige of the autocracy with a “victorious war.”

On January 27, 1904, without declaring war, Japanese troops attacked the Russian squadron stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead.

As a result, several Russian warships were damaged. The Russian cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets were blocked in the Korean port of Chemulpo. The crews were offered surrender. Rejecting this proposal, the Russian sailors took the ships to the outer roadstead and took on the Japanese squadron.

Despite heroic resistance, they failed to break through to Port Arthur. The surviving sailors sank the ships without surrendering to the enemy.

The defense of Port Arthur was tragic. On March 31, 1904, while withdrawing the squadron to the outer roadstead, the flagship cruiser Petropavlovsk was blown up by a mine, killing the outstanding military leader and organizer of the defense of Port Arthur, Admiral S.O. Makarov. The command of the ground forces did not take the proper actions and allowed Port Arthur to be encircled. Cut off from the rest of the army, the 50,000-strong garrison repelled six massive attacks by Japanese troops from August to December 1904.

Port Arthur fell at the end of December 1904. The loss of the main base of Russian troops predetermined the outcome of the war. The Russian army suffered a major defeat at Mukden. In October 1904, the second Pacific squadron came to the aid of besieged Port Arthur. Near Fr. Tsushima in the Sea of ​​Japan, she was met and defeated by the Japanese Navy.

In August 1905, in Portsmund, Russia and Japan signed an agreement according to which the southern part of the island was ceded to Japan. Sakhalin and Port Arthur. The Japanese were given the right to freely fish in Russian territorial waters. Russia and Japan pledged to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. Korea was recognized as a sphere of Japanese interests.

The Russo-Japanese War placed a heavy economic burden on the shoulders of the people. War expenses amounted to 3 billion rubles from external loans. Russia lost 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The defeat showed the weakness of tsarist Russia and increased dissatisfaction in society with the existing system of power, bringing the beginning closer.

An important source of imperialist contradictions at the beginning of the 20th century. came the Far East. Already in the last years of the 19th century, after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the struggle of powers for influence in China, as well as in Korea, intensified.

Immediately after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the ruling circles of Japan began to prepare for a new war, this time against Russia, hoping to oust it from Manchuria (Northeast China) and Korea and at the same time seize Russian territories in the Far East, in particular Sakhalin.

On the other hand, among the ruling circles of Tsarist Russia, the desire for expansion in Northern China and Korea intensified. For this purpose, with the participation of French capital, the Russian-Chinese Bank was created in 1895, in the board of which the Tsarist Ministry of Finance played a decisive role. At the same time, it was decided to begin construction of a section of the Siberian Railway that would pass through Chinese territory. The initiator of this project, Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte, believed that Russia's receipt of a concession for the construction of this road would open up wide opportunities for economic penetration and strengthening of Russia's political influence throughout Northern China.

After lengthy negotiations, the tsarist government obtained China's consent to grant a concession. At the insistence of the Chinese side, the concession was formally transferred not to the Russian government, but to the Russian-Chinese Bank, which, in order to implement it, created the “Society of the Chinese Eastern Railway”. The signing of the concession agreement (September 8, 1896) opened a new stage in the Far Eastern policy of tsarism and in the development of contradictions between Russia and Japan, which also sought to seize the North-Eastern provinces of China.

The situation was complicated by the fact that Russian-Japanese rivalry had also intensified in Korea by this time. According to the agreement signed in Seoul on May 14, 1896, Japan and Russia received the right to maintain their troops in Korea, and the agreement signed in Moscow on June 9 of the same year recognized mutually equal rights in this country for both powers. By founding the Russian-Korean Bank and sending military instructors and a financial adviser to Seoul, the tsarist government at first actually acquired greater political influence in Korea than Japan. But soon Japan, relying on the support of England, began to oust Russia. The tsarist government was forced to recognize Japan's predominant economic interests in Korea, close the Russian-Korean Bank and recall its financial adviser to the Korean king. “We have clearly given Korea under the dominant influence of Japan,” is how Witte assessed the situation.

After Germany captured Jiaozhou and the struggle for the division of China intensified between the main capitalist powers, the tsarist government occupied Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dalian), and in March 1898 achieved the conclusion of an agreement with China on the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula, the occupation of the leased territory by Russian troops and granting a concession for the construction of a branch from the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur and Dalniy. In turn, the ruling circles of Japan accelerated preparations for a new, broader expansion, hoping to complete these preparations before Russia completed the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. “War became inevitable,” General Kuropatkin later wrote, “but we did not realize this and did not adequately prepare for it.”

The popular uprising of the Yihetuan and imperialist intervention in China further aggravated the contradictions between the powers, in particular between Russia and Japan. European powers, as well as the United States of America, played a significant role in the growth of the Russian-Japanese conflict. In preparation for the war with Russia, the Japanese government sought allies and sought to isolate Russia in the international arena. England, Russia's long-time rival not only in China, but also in the Near and Middle East, became such an ally.

In January 1902, an agreement on the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed, directed primarily against Russia. Thanks to the alliance with England, Japan could begin to implement its aggressive plans in the Far East, confident that neither France nor Germany would interfere in its conflict with Russia. On the other hand, England had the opportunity, with the help of Japan, to inflict a serious blow on Russia and, in addition, to a certain extent strengthen its influence in Europe in the fight against a new rival - Germany.

The ruling circles of the United States of America also hoped, with the help of Japan, to weaken Russia's influence in the Far East and strengthen their own influence in China (in particular, Manchuria) and Korea. To this end, the American imperialists were prepared to provide Japan with far-reaching support. In turn, Germany, seeking to undermine or weaken the alliance between France and Russia, as well as to free its hands in Europe and create more favorable conditions for its penetration into the Middle East, secretly pushed both Russia and Japan to war against each other. Thus, the planned war against Russia corresponded to the interests of not only Japanese, but also British, American and German imperialism.

The tsarist government, convinced that the international situation was developing unfavorably for Russia, decided to sign an agreement with China (April 8, 1902), according to which the Chinese government received the opportunity to restore its power in Manchuria, “as it was before the occupation of the designated area by Russian troops " The tsarist government even pledged to withdraw its troops from there within a year and a half. However, under the influence of court and military circles, the most typical representative of which was the clever businessman Bezobrazov, an aggressive, adventurist course prevailed in the Far Eastern policy of tsarism. The Bezobrazov clique sought concessions in Korea and insisted that the tsarist government keep Manchuria in its hands at any cost. The war with Japan was also supported by that part of the ruling circles that saw in this war a means of preventing the revolution that was brewing in Russia.

Another group, led by Witte, was also a supporter of expansion in the Far East, but believed that at the moment it was necessary to act primarily by economic methods. Knowing that Russia was not prepared for war, Witte wanted to delay it. In the end, the policy of tsarism was won by the course of military adventure. Exposing the Far Eastern policy of Russian tsarism, Lenin wrote: “Who benefits from this policy? It benefits a handful of capitalist bigwigs who conduct trade with China, a handful of manufacturers producing goods for the Asian market, a handful of contractors who are now making a lot of money on urgent military orders... This policy is beneficial to a handful of nobles who occupy high positions in the civil and military service. They need a policy of adventure, because in it they can curry favor, make a career, and glorify themselves with “exploits.” Our government does not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the entire people to the interests of this handful of capitalists and bureaucratic scoundrels.”

The ruling circles of Japan were well informed about Russia's unpreparedness for war in the Far East. Covering up their true, aggressive goals with all sorts of diplomatic tricks in negotiations with Russia, the Japanese militarists led the way to war.

On the night of February 9, 1904, a Japanese squadron under the command of Admiral Togo treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Russian fleet stationed in Port Arthur. It was not until February 10, 1904 that Japan formally declared war on Russia. Thus began the Russo-Japanese War, which was of an imperialist nature both on the part of Japan and on the part of Tsarist Russia.

By launching active operations at sea and weakening the Russian naval forces with unexpected attacks, the Japanese command secured favorable conditions for the transfer and deployment of the main ground forces on the Asian mainland. Simultaneously with the attack on Port Arthur, the Japanese command launched landing operations in Korea. The Russian cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets", located in the Korean port of Chemulpo, were sunk by Russian sailors after a heroic unequal struggle. On April 13, 1904, near Port Arthur, the Russian battleship "Petropavlovsk" was blown up by a mine and sank, on which was the newly appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet, an outstanding naval commander, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov (his friend, the wonderful artist V. V. Vereshchagin). At the end of April, having concentrated large forces in the north of Korea, the Japanese army defeated Russian troops on the Yalu River and invaded Manchuria. At the same time, large Japanese forces (two armies) landed on the Liaodong Peninsula, north of Port Arthur, and besieged the fortress.

The sudden attack of Japan forced Russia to start a war in conditions when the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and large structures in Port Arthur had not yet been completed. The course and results of the war were affected by Russia's military and economic backwardness.

At the beginning of September 1904, the tsarist army suffered a major setback at Liaoyang. Both sides suffered significant losses. The besieged Port Arthur defended itself for a long time and stubbornly. However, on January 2, 1905, the commander of the fortress, General Stessel, surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese.

The fall of Port Arthur received wide international response. In progressive circles around the world it was regarded as a severe defeat for Russian tsarism. V.I. Lenin wrote about the fall of Port Arthur: “It was not the Russian people, but the autocracy that came to a shameful defeat. The Russian people benefited from the defeat of the autocracy. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism.”

In March 1905, the last major land battle took place near Mukden (Shenyang). The main forces were brought into battle. The Japanese command sought to implement its plan of enveloping the Russian army from the flanks. This plan failed. However, the commander of the Russian army, General Kuropatkin, ordered the troops to retreat. The retreat was carried out in an atmosphere of disorganization and panic. The Battle of Mukden was a major setback for the tsarist army. On May 27-28, 1905, a new military disaster, difficult for Tsarist Russia, occurred: a Russian squadron under the command of Rozhdestvensky, which arrived in the Far East from the Baltic Sea, was destroyed in the Tsushima Strait.

Despite its military successes, Japan was under extreme stress; its financial and human reserves were running low. Under these conditions, as the Japanese imperialists understood, prolongation of the war became extremely undesirable and even dangerous. By the summer of 1905, the international situation had also changed. The ruling circles of England and the United States, which had themselves previously instigated the war between Japan and Russia, now wanted to end it as quickly as possible. England intended to concentrate its forces against its German rival. In addition, in view of the rise of the national movement in India, she sought to introduce new conditions into the alliance treaty with Japan, providing for Japan's participation in the protection of British colonies in East Asia.

The United States of America hoped that the mutual weakening of Russia and Japan would create greater opportunities for American expansion in the Far East. In negotiations with the Japanese government, they declared themselves an unofficial participant in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and expressed their willingness to recognize the seizure of Korea by Japan, provided that Japan guaranteed the United States the inviolability of the Philippines they had captured. In March 1905, the American government put forward a proposal to buy out the railways in Manchuria and place them under “international control,” in which American monopolies would play a major role. Later, powerful groups of American finance capital, involved in financing Japan during the war, laid claim to the right to operate the South Manchurian Railway.

On June 8, 1905, United States President Theodore Roosevelt proposed peace negotiations between Russia and Japan. The tsarist government willingly took advantage of Roosevelt's offer, as it needed peace to strengthen the fight against the unfolding revolution.

Russo-Japanese peace negotiations began in Portsmouth (USA) in August 1905. With the support of the United States and England, the Japanese delegation made enormous demands in Portsmouth. In particular, Japan expected to receive military indemnity from Russia and part of Russian territory - Sakhalin Island. The negotiators' focus was on these two basic Japanese demands. As for Manchuria and Korea, tsarism from the very beginning agreed to recognize the dominant position of Japan in the southern part of Manchuria and actually renounced all claims to Korea.

Faced with opposition from the Russian Commissioner Witte on the issue of Sakhalin and indemnity, the Japanese Commissioner Komura threatened to break off the negotiations. T. Roosevelt, acting as a “mediator,” began to put pressure on Russia, trying to extract concessions from it in favor of Japan. The governments of Germany and France acted behind the scenes in the same direction. When the Tsarist government rejected Japanese demands for territorial concessions and indemnities, the Japanese government invited Komura to sign a peace treaty. However, without knowing this, the Tsar at the last moment agreed to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Island and pay the cost of keeping Russian prisoners of war in Japan.

On September 5, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. He transferred part of Chinese territory into the hands of Japan - the so-called Kwantung leased area with Port Arthur and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japan received half of Sakhalin Island (south of the 50th parallel), as well as fishing rights in Russian territorial waters. A Japanese protectorate was actually established over Korea.

The defeat of Tsarist Russia in the war with Japan had a serious impact on the balance of power of the imperialist powers not only in the Far East, but also in Europe. At the same time, it accelerated the development of revolutionary events in Russia.

The main reason for the war is the clash of interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East. Both powers sought dominance in China and Korea. In 1896, Russia began construction of the Chinese-Eastern Railway, which passed through the territory of Manchuria. In 1898, Witte agreed to lease the Liaodong Peninsula from China for 25 years. The Port Arthur naval base began to be built here. In 1900, Russian troops entered Manchuria.

Russia's advance towards the borders of Korea alarmed Japan. A clash between the two countries was becoming inevitable. Japan began to prepare for war. The tsarist government underestimated the enemy. The Russian army in the Far East numbered 98 thousand soldiers against the 150 thousand Japanese army. The transportation of reserves was difficult due to the low capacity of the Siberian railway. The fortification of Vladivostok and Port Arthur was not completed. The Pacific squadron was inferior to the Japanese fleet. While Japan was helped by the largest states, Russia remained almost isolated.

On both sides the war was unjustly aggressive. Russia and Japan entered into a struggle for the redivision of the world.

The Russo-Japanese War began on January 27, 1904, with the attack of the Japanese fleet on the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and the Korean port of Chemulpo. The first losses weakened the Russian fleet. The commander of the Pacific squadron, Admiral S.O. Makarov, began preparations for active operations at sea. Soon his battleship hit a mine and he died. The artist V.V. Vereshchagin died along with him. After that, the fleet switched to the defense of Port Arthur and abandoned offensive operations.

The commander of the ground forces, General A.N. Kuropatkin, chose defensive tactics. This put the Russian army at a disadvantage. Japanese troops landed in Korea and then in Manchuria. In May 1904, Port Arthur was cut off from the main army. At the end of August 1904, a battle took place near Liaoyang, which ended with the retreat of the Russians. Port Arthur was left to its own devices. In September-October 1904, the Russian army tried to go on the offensive, but was stopped after the battle near the Shakhe River.

Near Port Arthur, 50,000 Russians fettered the 200,000th Japanese army for almost 8 months. Only in December 1904 did General Stessel surrender the fortress to the enemy, although there were opportunities for further defense. The Port Arthur squadron was lost. The enemy fleet began to dominate the sea. The Japanese siege army was deployed against the main Russian forces.

In the decisive battle in February 1905 near Mukden, more than 660 thousand people participated on both sides. Russia suffered another defeat and retreated north.

In October 1904, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was sent to the Far East under the command of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. In May 1905, a naval battle took place near the Tsushima Islands. The Russian squadron was destroyed. Only four ships broke through to Vladivostok.

Despite the developments, the situation gradually changed. After the victory at Mushchvdazh and until the end of the war, the Japanese did not dare to undertake a new, "aggression. Japan has used up its reserves. Many military men predicted that by the autumn of 1905 a turning point would occur at the front. The continuation of the war was prevented by the first Russian revolution.

From the very first days, the war was unpopular in Russia and was perceived by the public as a senseless conflict. With the outbreak of the war, the economic situation became more difficult. As news of defeats and losses began to arrive, hatred of the war became almost universal.

Win the war in such the situation was impossible. Peace negotiations began, mediated by American President T. Roosevelt. In August 1905, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed. The Russian delegation at the negotiations was headed by S.Yu. Witte. He managed to achieve relatively mild peace terms. Russia lost the southern part of Sakhalin Island, recognized Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence, returned Manchuria to China, transferred to Japan the right to lease the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur, and paid the cost of maintaining Russian prisoners.

The reasons for the defeat were the unpopularity of the war, underestimation of the enemy, the remoteness of the theater of operations, the weakness of the Pacific Fleet, the inept leadership of the army, and the unfavorable international situation. The first Russian revolution had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war.

In February 1945, a conference was held in Yalta, at which representatives of the countries that were part of Great Britain and the United States were present and managed to obtain consent from the Soviet Union to take direct part in the war with Japan. In exchange for this, they promised him to return the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, lost during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.

Termination of the peace treaty

At the time the decision was made in Yalta, the so-called Neutrality Pact was in force between Japan and the Soviet Union, which was concluded back in 1941 and was supposed to be valid for 5 years. But already in April 1945, the USSR announced that it was terminating the agreement unilaterally. The Russo-Japanese War (1945), the reasons for which were that the Land of the Rising Sun in recent years had acted on the side of Germany and also fought against the allies of the USSR, became almost inevitable.

Such a sudden statement literally plunged the Japanese leadership into complete confusion. And this is understandable, because its position was very critical - the Allied forces inflicted significant damage on it in the Pacific Ocean, and industrial centers and cities were subjected to almost continuous bombing. The government of this country understood perfectly well that it was almost impossible to achieve victory in such conditions. But still, it still hoped that it would be able to somehow wear down and achieve more favorable conditions for the surrender of its troops.

The United States, in turn, did not expect victory to be easy. An example of this is the battles that took place over the island of Okinawa. About 77 thousand people fought here from Japan, and about 470 thousand soldiers from the United States. In the end, the island was taken by the Americans, but their losses were simply astounding - almost 50 thousand killed. According to him, if the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 had not begun, which will be briefly discussed in this article, the losses would have been much more serious and could have amounted to 1 million soldiers killed and wounded.

Announcement of the start of hostilities

On August 8, in Moscow, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR was presented with a document at exactly 5 p.m. It said that the Russian-Japanese War (1945) was actually starting the very next day. But since there is a significant time difference between the Far East and Moscow, it turned out that there was only 1 hour left before the start of the Soviet Army’s offensive.

The USSR developed a plan consisting of three military operations: Kuril, Manchurian and South Sakhalin. They were all very important. But still, the Manchurian operation was the most large-scale and significant.

Strengths of the parties

On the territory of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, commanded by General Otozo Yamada, was opposed. It consisted of approximately 1 million people, more than 1 thousand tanks, about 6 thousand guns and 1.6 thousand aircraft.

At the time when the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 began, the forces of the USSR had a significant numerical superiority in manpower: only there were one and a half times more soldiers. As for equipment, the number of mortars and artillery exceeded similar enemy forces by 10 times. Our army had 5 and 3 times more tanks and aircraft, respectively, than the Japanese had the corresponding weapons. It should be noted that the superiority of the USSR over Japan in military equipment was not only in its numbers. The equipment at Russia's disposal was modern and more powerful than that of its enemy.

Enemy fortified areas

All participants in the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 understood perfectly well that sooner or later, it had to begin. That is why the Japanese created a significant number of well-fortified areas in advance. For example, you can take at least the Hailar region, where the left flank of the Transbaikal Front of the Soviet Army was located. Barrier structures in this area were built over more than 10 years. By the time the Russo-Japanese War began (August 1945), there were already 116 pillboxes, which were connected to each other by underground passages made of concrete, a well-developed trench system and a significant number of Japanese soldiers, whose numbers exceeded the divisional strength.

In order to suppress the resistance of the Hailar fortified area, the Soviet Army had to spend several days. In war conditions this is a short period of time, but during the same time the rest of the Transbaikal Front advanced forward by about 150 km. Considering the scale of the Russo-Japanese War (1945), the obstacle in the form of this fortified area turned out to be quite serious. Even when its garrison surrendered, the Japanese warriors continued to fight with fanatical courage.

In the reports of Soviet military leaders one can often see references to soldiers of the Kwantung Army. The documents said that the Japanese military specifically chained themselves to machine gun frames so as not to have the slightest opportunity to retreat.

Workaround maneuver

The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 and the actions of the Soviet Army were very successful from the very beginning. I would like to note one outstanding operation, which consisted of a 350-kilometer throw of the 6th Tank Army through the Khingan Range and the Gobi Desert. If you look at the mountains, they seem to be an insurmountable obstacle to the passage of technology. The passes that Soviet tanks had to go through were located at an altitude of about 2 thousand meters above sea level, and the slopes sometimes reached a steepness of 50⁰. That is why cars often had to drive in a zigzag.

In addition, the advancement of technology was further complicated by frequent heavy rains, accompanied by river floods and impassable mud. But, despite this, the tanks still moved forward, and already on August 11 they overcame the mountains and reached the Central Manchurian Plain, to the rear of the Kwantung Army. After such a large-scale transition, Soviet troops began to experience an acute shortage of fuel, so it was necessary to arrange additional delivery by air. With the help of transport aviation, it was possible to transport about 900 tons of tank fuel. As a result of this operation, more than 200 thousand Japanese soldiers were captured, as well as a huge amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

Defenders of the Acute Heights

The Japanese War of 1945 continued. In the sector of the 1st Far Eastern Front, Soviet troops encountered unprecedentedly fierce enemy resistance. The Japanese were well entrenched on the heights of Camel and Ostraya, which were among the fortifications of the Khotou fortified area. It must be said that the approaches to these heights were cut by many small rivers and were very swampy. In addition, there were wire fences and excavated scarps on their slopes. The Japanese soldiers had cut out the firing points in advance right into the granite rock, and the concrete caps protecting the bunkers reached a thickness of one and a half meters.

During the fighting, the Soviet command invited the defenders of Ostroy to surrender. A man from among the local residents was sent to the Japanese as an envoy, but he was treated extremely cruelly - the commander of the fortified area himself cut off his head. However, there was nothing surprising in this action. From the moment the Russo-Japanese War began (1945), the enemy, in principle, did not enter into any negotiations. When Soviet troops finally entered the fortification, they found only dead soldiers. It is worth noting that the defenders of the height were not only men, but also women who were armed with daggers and grenades.

Features of military operations

The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 had its own specific features. For example, in the battles for the city of Mudanjiang, the enemy used kamikaze saboteurs against units of the Soviet Army. These suicide bombers tied grenades around themselves and threw themselves under tanks or at soldiers. There was also a case when, on one section of the front, about two hundred “live mines” lay on the ground next to each other. But such suicidal actions did not last long. Soon, Soviet soldiers became more vigilant and managed to destroy the saboteur in advance before he got close and exploded next to equipment or people.

Surrender

The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 ended on August 15, when the country's Emperor Hirohito addressed his people by radio. He stated that the country had decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Conference and capitulate. At the same time, the emperor called on his nation to remain patient and unite all forces to build a new future for the country.

3 days after Hirohito’s address, a call from the command of the Kwantung Army to its soldiers was heard on the radio. It said that further resistance was pointless and there was already a decision to surrender. Since many Japanese units did not have contact with the main headquarters, their notification continued for several more days. But there were also cases when fanatical military personnel did not want to obey the order and lay down their arms. Therefore, their war continued until they died.

Consequences

It must be said that the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 was of truly enormous not only military but also political significance. managed to completely defeat the strongest Kwantung Army and end World War II. By the way, its official end is considered to be September 2, when the act of surrender of Japan was finally signed in Tokyo Bay right on board the US battleship Missouri.

As a result, the Soviet Union regained territories that had been lost back in 1905 - a group of islands and part of the South Kuril Islands. Also, according to the peace treaty signed in San Francisco, Japan renounced any claims to Sakhalin.