Rationalism of modern philosophy, its formation and development. Main features of modern philosophy

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Federal Agency for Education

Pacific State Economic University

Department of History and Philosophy

Topic: “Rationalism in the philosophy of modern times: R. Descartes”

Student 121 Au Lazareva M.V.

Supervisor

Test work accepted for defense

_________________________________

"___"_________________ 2010

Vladivostok

Plan

Introduction

1 General characteristics of the era

2 Features of the philosophy of the New Age

3 Rationalism of modern philosophy

3.1 The concept of rationalism

3.2 Obviousness as a criterion of truth. "Cogito ergo sum"

3.3 Nature as an extended substance

3.4 Science according to Descartes

3.5 Method - a tool for building a “new world”

3.6 Ethical views of R. Descartes

Conclusion

Introduction

At the turn of the millennium, our dynamically developing civilization is experiencing another crisis of its sociocultural identity. Its fundamental value and ideological foundations are again called into question. The media are full of reports about totalitarian sects and collective psychoses. In the most advanced and “prosperous” countries of the world, more and more people are gravitating towards all kinds of religions and mystical quasi-religions. The intellectual elite was completely disillusioned with the capabilities of modern science in particular and the human mind in general. She lost all taste for understanding the world, having lost faith in man’s ability to bring under control the process and results of his conscious goal-setting activity.

In modern language, the cultural rating of philosophy and science is approaching zero. People no longer see how they can help in solving their own human problems - people’s lives are happy, their relationships are fair, in short, to bring to life the principle “happiness is free for everyone, and let no one leave offended.” Educated intellectuals and ordinary individuals stopped reading for the soul, out of internal need, preferring TV, video films or computer games. And when reading modern novels, the suspicion often arose that in modern people the left hemisphere is slowly but surely atrophying. Their actions are dictated by immediate momentary impulses on the “here and now” principle. They live at “zero degree”, guided by momentary desires, like the main character of A. Camus’s novel “The Stranger” Meursault. This attitude and way of behavior was born and constantly reproduced by the social everyday life of the 20th century and cultivated by the entire system of official propaganda.

Since the Decadence of the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, cognitive-instrumental pessimism has been intensifying and beginning to dominate in the spiritual culture of our civilization, undermining its very value and ideological foundations. People's interest in knowledge for the sake of truth in itself disappears. The hope that a person is able to rationally comprehend the world as a single whole in a single system of concepts has disappeared. The picture of the world is split into separate fragments. Official propaganda encourages and cultivates the so-called. “clip”, i.e., fragmented perception of reality and its many problems. This is facilitated by the collapse of all major worldviews, which became quite clear by the end of the 20th century. This applies, first of all, to Marxism in its classical form, in which it is embodied in the body of texts left by its bearded founding fathers.

In the 1950s, the nominalistic tradition of Anglo-Saxon empiricism with its fragmented worldview began to dominate among the intellectual elite of the West. The “metaphysical” bias of French and German culture was compromised in the first half of the last century and pushed to the margins of public consciousness. In recent times, this tendency has been expressed in the implantation of postmodernism, which deliberately cultivates a mixture of styles and a fundamental refusal to search for truth. All intellectual creativity becomes a game, mixing different styles in a single playing space. This game does not oblige you to anything and does not lead to anything in principle. All existential human problems are thus completely removed from the competence of the rational and given over to various religions, quasi-religions and myths. The entire previous period of development of thought is treated as an era of modernity that did not live up to the hopes placed on it. Since all rational worldview constructions turned out to be untenable, and socio-philosophical thought reached a dead end, this leads to the conclusion about the fundamental failure of the human mind and the inability of scientific and technological progress to solve human problems. Criticism of modern reality acts as a self-criticism of new European rationality. Thinkers at the turn of the millennium formulate (each in their own way) modern problems and ways to solve them. And there is nothing new here - this has happened at all times and in all cultures. But at the same time, they oppose themselves to new European rationalism, as a certain (Cartesian) type of rationality. And they link the future desired state of humanity with the transition to some other type of rationality. And each of the critics represents this hypothetical “new rationality” in the image and likeness of his own limitations. In the most radical version, criticism of modern civilization with all its ugliness turns into criticism of the human mind in principle, and deliverance from all social disasters is conceived as deliverance from reason itself.

What actually is the rationalism of the New Age? This is to be revealed in the topic of the test.

1 General characteristics of the modern era

Chronologically, the New Time begins with the 17th century, when the features of the emerging bourgeois society became quite visible. The “novelty” of this era lies in the liberation of economic, political and spiritual life from the shackles of European feudalism. As for philosophy, in modern times two people stand at its origins - the Englishman Francis Bacon and the Frenchman Rene Descartes. From the very beginning, the science of modern times has been focused on the active “examination” of the secrets of nature and the practical use of its results. Science should serve the public good, and not just glorify the wisdom of the creator, thinkers of the New Age believed.

The main features of modern science were: firstly, modern science, based on experience and experiment; secondly, it is inseparable from mathematics, since it expresses natural connections in nature with the help of numbers; thirdly, this science is focused on practical benefits. It is in modern times that science becomes a productive force of society, since through engineering activities its discoveries are purposefully introduced into production. And over time, it becomes the driving force behind the renewal of military equipment.

Naturally, in these new conditions, most philosophers already proceed from the independence of reason in relation to faith, and science in relation to religion. And their interests move to the field of theory of knowledge, logic and methodology of science. But in solving this problem, the philosophy of the New Age from the very beginning followed two paths - the path of empiricism and rationalism.

Modern philosophers showed great interest in socio-political problems. They not only tried to explain the essence of being and knowledge, the role of man in the world, but also looked for the reasons for the emergence of society and the state, and put forward projects for the optimal organization of actually existing states.

2 Features of the philosophy of the New Age

The main feature of the philosophy of the 17th and 17th centuries is its fundamental focus on the knowability of the world, no matter what conditions the very path to achieving truth is stipulated. At the same time, a person was considered as a special subject of cognition, cleared of his personal characteristics and acting as a constructive thinking principle.

The role of reason (the mind of the cognizing subject) in classical philosophy is so high that reality (as something independent of man) and its construction by the mind coincide, and cases of misunderstanding of the actual state of affairs are the result of deception or ignorance. Therefore, philosophical reflection is a special reflection, a type of systematic thinking, the cognitive space of which is not limited by anything. Even with the most varied specifications and filling it with specific philosophical material, it acts as a special reflection of the thinker on the ultimate foundations of the structure of the world, the place of man in it, on knowledge and its boundaries, on the moral, value, rational guidelines of human activity.

Accordingly, this idea of ​​philosophy led to the fact that we are presented with comprehensive philosophical systems that include literally everything that can be subjected to rational philosophical research.

And, finally, an essential feature of classical philosophy is its educational pathos, which is not justified by the philosopher’s subjective desire to teach, but proceeds from the fact that, putting forward this or that system of rational, ethical or aesthetic norms, the thinker speaks on behalf of reason, with the help of which he reached the highest degree of truth. If we try to identify the key words that briefly characterize classical philosophy, then they, of course, should be Reason and Enlightenment.

3 Rationalism of modern philosophy

3.1 The concept of rationalism

Rationalism is a holistic epistemological concept that opposes empiricism and sensationalism, proclaiming reason as the main form and source of knowledge. In this form, rationalism is formed in modern philosophy, mainly under the influence of the development of mathematics and natural science, although its origins can be found already in the works of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. A characteristic feature of the rationalism of this era was the sharp opposition of reason to experience and feelings and the subsequent denial of the latter the possibility of obtaining unconditionally reliable (i.e., objective, universal and necessary) knowledge. Without rejecting in principle the role of experience and sensory knowledge as mechanisms for connecting the mind with the world, supporters of rationalism at the same time were convinced that only reason is the source of scientific knowledge, serving at the same time as a criterion of its truth. At the same time, reason itself (or rationality) was interpreted by them as a special, universal, general and necessary logical system, given in the form of certain rules that determine our ability to understand the world and create reliable knowledge. This ability itself was presented to most rationalists as innate; As for untrue knowledge, from the standpoint of such a strategy, they arise only due to the susceptibility of the human soul to influence from its emotional and volitional principles, which, in the form of the “passions” of this soul, distort the truth in favor of feelings and goals and objectives incorrectly formulated by the will .

Throughout all these centuries, the development of philosophy was inextricably linked with the course of the Scientific Revolution, accompanying, stimulating and supporting it and receiving from it in return an impulse for change. Indeed, philosophy took on a completely new guise and acquired a new complexion, crossing the threshold of the third great era in the history of Western thought. Throughout almost the entire classical era, philosophy, even being influenced by religion and science, still occupied a fairly independent position, defining and largely dictating the worldview of the entire culture. With the advent of the medieval period, this primacy status passed to the Christian religion, and philosophy took a subordinate position, acting as a link between faith and reason. With the beginning of modern times, philosophy began to establish itself as a completely independent force in intellectual life. More precisely, philosophy began to free itself from the shackles of religion in order to enter into a new union with science. The seventeenth century is often called the “age of science.” The authority of science, recognized by most philosophers of the new era, differs very significantly from the authority of the church, for it is intellectual in nature, and not governmental. No punishment falls on the heads of those who reject the authority of science; no considerations of benefit influence those who accept it. He conquers minds solely with his inherent appeal to reason. Scientific knowledge about the world was valued very highly, which is confirmed by the content and even form of philosophy. Philosophy, participating in the development of scientific knowledge and often ahead of it, sought to become a “great restoration of the sciences,” to use the title of the works of F. Bacon.

The focus of the new philosophy is the theory of knowledge, the development of methods of true knowledge for all sciences. If special “private” sciences discover the laws of nature, then philosophy is called upon to discover the laws of thinking that operate in all areas of knowledge. This is done by such famous thinkers as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, John Locke, Benedict Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (17th century). They are looking for the laws of reason, the possibilities of which seem limitless. However, the mind in real life is “foggy”, “darkened” by certain false ideas and concepts - “idols” (Bacon). The idea of ​​“pure reason” arises, that is, free from “idols”, which penetrates into the essence of phenomena. They are actively looking for the true, main method of knowledge, which will lead to the eternal, complete, absolute truth, recognized by all people. The basis of the new method is considered to be sensory experience, putting forward the idea of ​​​​the super-significance of empirical inductive knowledge (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke), or intelligence, which provides logical, deductive-mathematical knowledge that is not reducible to human experience (Descartes, Malebranche, Spi- but for).

Due to a number of historical circumstances, empiricism in modern times received its primary development in England. It became a continuation of medieval nominalism, which had a predominant influence in this country. Representatives of modern empiricism, as always, proceeded from the fact that the basis and source of all our knowledge about the world is experience. The word “empiria” itself translated from Greek means “experience”. But since experience can be external and internal, intellectual and mystical, it should be clarified that in empiricism experience is understood primarily as external experience that we receive through the senses. Sometimes this position in the theory of knowledge is designated by the term “sensualism” from the Latin sensus, which means feeling. If we proceed from the fact that feelings are the main witnesses and guarantors of the reliability of our knowledge about the world, then it will be natural to be convinced of the existence of this external world, even before our appearance and participation in its fate. However, not all modern empiricists were materialists. The history of English empiricism has shown that, based on sensory experience, one can come not only to materialism, but also to skepticism, as well as to what is called subjective idealism.

The founder of empiricism, which always had its adherents in Great Britain, was the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Like most thinkers of his era, Bacon, considering the task of philosophy to create a new method of scientific knowledge, rethinks the subject and tasks of science, as it was understood in the Middle Ages. The purpose of scientific knowledge is to benefit the human race; Unlike those who saw science as an end in itself, Bacon emphasizes that science serves life and practice and only in this does it find its justification. The common goal of all sciences is to increase man's power over nature. Those who had a contemplative attitude toward nature tended, as a rule, to see in science the path to a more in-depth and intellectually enlightened contemplation of nature. This approach was typical of antiquity. Bacon sharply condemns this understanding of science. Science is a means, not an end in itself; its mission is to understand the causal relationship of natural phenomena in order to use these phenomena for the benefit of people. “...We are talking,” said Bacon, referring to the purpose of science, “not only about contemplative good, but truly about human wealth and happiness and about all kinds of power in practice... So, two human aspirations - for knowledge and power -wu - truly coincide in one and the same thing...” Bacon owns the famous aphorism: “Knowledge is power,” which reflected the practical orientation of the new science.

Thanks to experience, praised by Bacon as the true path to knowledge, the perception of sensory reality, that which we generally call material, sensory, or which appears in complete contrast to the inner religious and metaphysical life of the average has become the goal and essential object of the spirit. centuries, when the spirit, beyond nature and real, sensory reality, was immersed, on the one hand, in the contemplation of the divine essence, as in mysticism, and on the other, in the study of abstract definitions of essence in general, as in similar plastic metaphysics. The spirit, which is only that and in such a form as what and what its object is, has now itself become sensory and material. Just as a person, having left school, where he was fenced off from life by the power of strict rules and laws, now, realizing and feeling his independence, rushes headlong into life, so the human spirit, having left the gymnasium of the Middle Ages, freed from the discipline of the church and formal essence of the old metaphysics, having entered the university of modern times, deprived of everything unattainable and supersensible, as if overcome by a frenzy of sensuality, plunged into materialism and lost himself.

This devastation of the spirit is revealed, first of all, in the form of the system of empiricism and materialism of Hobbes, who wanted the impossible, namely to express and establish empiricism as a philosophy, but, in spite of everything, is, in the opinion of L. Feuerbach, “one of the most interesting smart and witty materialists of the new time."

Hobbes's empiricism is by no means absolute, but finite, limited empiricism, for it everywhere turns certain phenomena into absolute essence. Just as Hobbes’s philosophy, or, more correctly, materialism, has as its content and object nothing primary, unconditional and absolute, nothing self-determining and moving, so his philosophy, or system (if only these words are applicable to Hobbes), is not a system , but a thinking machine; his thinking is a pure mechanism, just as externally and as loosely connected as a machine, the parts of which, despite their connection, remain an inanimate heterogeneous compound, devoid of unity.

Developing T. Hobbes' ideas about the connection between language and thinking, J. Locke put forward the concept of semiotics as a general theory of signs and their role in cognition. He had a huge influence not only on the subsequent development of philosophy, but also, outlining the dialectic of the innate and the social, largely determined the further development of pedagogy and psychology. At the center of Locke's philosophical interests is the problem of the source of knowledge, the structure of experience, and the construction of abstractions.

2. Rationalism of modern philosophy

If F. Bacon developed mainly a method of empirical, experimental study of nature, and T. Hobbes somewhat expanded Bacon’s empiricism at the expense of mathematics, then the French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), on the contrary, put reason in the first place, reducing the role of experience in simple practical testing of intelligence data. The criterion of truth for him is the cognizing mind and, in connection with this, the methodological installation “never accept as true anything that I have not clearly recognized as such...” In relation to science, a strict and rational method is needed that allows it to be built according to a single plan, which will allow man to exercise his dominance over nature through scientific achievements. The new method of thinking is based on Reason, which allows the thinker to draw his famous conclusion: “I think, therefore I exist.” Accordingly, from this follows the position of the supremacy of the rational, intelligible way of knowing the world over the sensory way and the interpretation of truth as a special subjective and self-aware process of thinking. Descartes builds a theory of truth, which is based on a subject-object interpretation of the process of cognition, in which the object is opposed not just by a person, a person, but by an epistemological subject as a special, subjective reality. The process of cognition must be based on reliable axiomatics. Philosophy should act as the most reliable science. Consequently, it must also have the most reliable scientific method, acting as a kind of “universal mathematics”.

Descartes formulated the main provisions of his method in four rules.

● First, never accept anything as true that I would not recognize as such obviously, i.e. carefully avoid haste and prejudice, and include in my judgments only what appears to my mind so clearly and distinctly that it can in no way give rise to doubt.

● The second is to divide each of the difficulties I consider into as many parts as necessary to better solve them.

● The third is to arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the simplest and easily recognisable objects, and ascend little by little, as if by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing for the existence of order even among those that do not precede each other in the natural course of things .

● And finally, fourthly, make lists everywhere so complete and reviews so comprehensive that you can be sure that nothing is missed.

When applying this method, a deductive chain of judgments is built. If at least one link is omitted in this chain, the chain breaks. To prevent this from happening, it is advisable from time to time to sequentially list all the links of deduction - to compose what is called an enumeration. The fourth rule involves enumeration.

But although the deduction that Descartes is talking about is not Aristotelian syllogistic, it, like any deduction, is an inference from the general. From here Descartes comes to the conclusion that man, as already said, has innate ideas that are originally inherent in the mind. Moreover, these innate ideas, according to Descartes, manifest themselves primarily in mathematics. These are what are called its axioms, for example, that only one straight line can be drawn through two points, or that two quantities equal to a third are equal to each other. But in order to bring these ideas to clear consciousness, according to Descartes, reflection and doubt are necessary. Here we should again recall the place of doubt in Descartes’ teaching, which for him plays a positive, constructive role, that is, it serves to cut off false ideas and come to true ideas. Moreover, the very foundations of human knowledge—the existence of the world and the knowing subject itself—should be questioned. “I doubt,” says Descartes, “therefore I think, and if I think, then I exist.” The very fact of doubt cannot be questioned, because otherwise we will come to dogmatism. But the final authority, which should finally confirm the authenticity of the existence of the world and myself, according to Descartes, is God. Descartes' philosophy, despite all its rationalism, cannot do without this theological makeweight. And here he essentially does not leave the circle of scholastic ontological proof of the existence of God, which is based on the fact that we have the idea of ​​an all-perfect being, whose perfection far surpasses ourselves.

Descartes' philosophy led to the completion or near completion of the dualism of mind and matter, which was begun by Plato and developed largely for religious reasons by Christian philosophy. Apart from the curious writings on the pineal gland left by Descartes' followers, the Cartesian system depicts two parallel but independent worlds: the world of mind and the world of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other. That the mind does not move the body was a new idea, expressed explicitly by Geulinx, and implicitly by Descartes. This had the advantage of being able to say that the body does not move the mind.

Descartes' teaching was developed by the Dutch philosopher Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677), who opposed the principle of monism to Descartes' dualism. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza denies the existence of innate ideas, recognizing that humans have an innate ability to acquire knowledge. Human exploration of the world begins with a sensory, limited, and therefore unclear representation of things. Sensory knowledge usually leads to subjective associations and to vague and one-sided ideas, “universals.” Among the “bad” ones, Spinoza considers the concepts of color, smell, taste, heat, cold, emptiness, beauty, ugliness, good and evil, order and chaos, God as a person, etc. All these are subjective creations, the results of the transformation of sensations into properties.

Sensory ideas are the result of contacts of the human body with surrounding objects; they contain not only the nature of external bodies, but also the nature of the human body itself. This is what brings “vagueness” into sensory ideas. In addition, the connection of images obtained on the basis of sensory knowledge is more or less accidental. In this regard, in the Ethics, Spinoza says that most philosophical disagreements arise “either because people express their thoughts incorrectly, or because they misinterpret others.”

The second level of knowledge is rational knowledge. Rational-reasonable and, above all, mathematical-geometric knowledge is devoid, according to Spinoza, of any elements of subjectivism (unlike sensory knowledge). If the activity of representation, the first type of knowledge, is subject to random associations, then the activity of the mind is carried out according to the strict laws of logical consequence. Rational knowledge allows us to give deeper knowledge about things, about their internal, hidden content. “A thing is then comprehended when it is assimilated apart from words and images,” for “invisible things and those that are objects only of the spirit can be seen with no other eyes than through evidence.”

But orientation towards logical conclusion and deductive chains presupposes the recognition of certain initial positions as truths. Spinoza speaks of intuition as knowledge of the third kind. Intuition gives us these starting points. The basic position that underlies all rational knowledge is the idea of ​​substance. Intuitive knowledge makes it possible to understand the essence of things.

The German philosopher G. Leibniz (1646-1716) contrasted Spinoza's doctrine of a single substance, the modes of which are all individual things and beings, with the doctrine of the plurality of substances. Thus, Leibniz tried to carry out in the rationalistic metaphysics of the 17th century a nominalistic idea of ​​the reality of the individual, going back to Aristotle. Leibniz deliberately contrasted the pluralism of substances with the pantheistic monism of Spinoza. Independently existing substances received the name monads from Leibniz . According to Leibniz, the monad is simple, that is, it does not consist of parts, and therefore is indivisible. But this means that the monad cannot be something material and substantial, cannot be extended, because everything material, being extended, is divisible to infinity. It is not extension, but activity that constitutes the essence of each monad. But what does this activity consist of? As Leibniz explains, it represents precisely that which cannot be explained by mechanical causes: firstly, representation or perception, and secondly, desire. The representation is ideal, and therefore it cannot be derived either from the analysis of extension or from the combination of physical atoms, for it is not a product of the interaction of mechanical elements. It remains to admit it as the initial, primary, simple reality, as the main property of simple substances. The activity of monads, according to Leibniz, is expressed in a continuous change of internal states, which we can observe when contemplating the life of our own soul.

3. Basic socio-political concepts of modern philosophy

The seventeenth - eighteenth centuries are an era of outstanding achievements of philosophy, science and culture in Western Europe. New times open a new era in the historical development of European economics and law. There is an urgent need for territorially large states that have the ability to ensure the functioning of not only internal, but also international relations (economic, political, cultural, etc.).

The ideological and intellectual spirit of the era under consideration, as is known, was concentrated around the idea of ​​the universal. This also applies to jurisprudence, so intellectual products such as universal law and civil philosophy are naturally perceived as a doctrine about the state and the nature of law. Philosophy, rather than Roman law, began to be recognized as the basis of universal law.

Under the influence of the factors indicated above, as well as the philosophy of rationalism of the New Age, legal doctrines made the development of natural law their main subject. The doctrine of natural law receives a new coloring. Firstly, it freed itself from theological interpretations. Secondly, natural law at this time is not confused with popular law. They begin to see in it the totality of those ideal norms that should serve as a prototype for any legislation. This new direction in jurisprudence took shape in the school of natural law, which dominated jurisprudence throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.

Significant importance in Hobbes's teaching is attached to the fundamental opposition of the state of nature to the state (civil state). Hobbes assumes that “nature created men equal in physical and mental abilities.” This equality of men, meaning their equal opportunities to harm each other, combined with the three main causes of war rooted in human nature (competition, mistrust, love of glory) leads, according to Hobbes, to the fact that the state of nature turns out to be general continuous war. “From here it is obvious,” he writes, “that as long as people live without a common power that keeps them all in fear, they are in that state called war, and precisely in a state of war of all against all.” Thus, Hobbes proceeds from the thesis that the laws of human behavior are as strict and necessary as those natural forces that make a stone fall to the ground. To better understand his idea of ​​the natural laws of human social behavior - not of an individual, but of the human race, “artificial man,” which is the state. It is reason, according to Hobbes, that plays the most important role in the establishment of the state through a social contract, in the discussion and acceptance of which all individuals of society must participate. The state and civil society are the highest values ​​of human society, capable of leading humanity out of the barbaric state of war of all against all.

Only in a civil state does a person become a truly moral being, which he cannot be in a natural state. “Outside the state - the rule of passions, war, fear, poverty, abomination, loneliness, barbarity, ignorance, savagery; in the state - the rule of reason, peace, security, wealth, decorum, mutual assistance, sophistication, science, goodwill.” The state must ensure the safety of the people. “But by ensuring security we mean not only ensuring the security of bare existence, but also ensuring for every person all the benefits of life acquired by lawful labor, safe and harmless to the state.” Hobbes says that with the state comes private property and money (“the blood of the state”).

Hobbes is a supporter of strong neutralized power and an opponent of its division. Sharing power would only weaken it. What form of the state will be - democracy, aristocracy or monarchy - is not so important if in the state everyone is equally subject to the laws. Hobbes demands unconditional obedience to the government. Even if the government is despotic, it is still better than anarchy.

In general, Hobbes's philosophy of law and state is anti-personal in nature. Interpreting the law as an order of the sovereign, Hobbes contrasts it with law in such a way that the law summarizes only the lack of freedom, lack of rights and duties of subjects in relation to the sovereign, freedom and full power of the sovereign in relation to subjects. Hobbes's philosophical and legal concept lacks the ideals of legal law, the understanding of law and the state as forms of freedom in a civilized civil state.

If Aristotle separated ethics from politics, then Hobbes took the next step in this direction and began to separate politics from law.

The ideas of emerging liberalism found their consistent justification and defense in the philosophical and legal teachings of John Locke (1632-1704).

In Locke's teachings, the ideas of natural law and the contractual origin of the state are interpreted in the spirit of the affirmation of inalienable rights and freedoms of the individual, the separation of powers and the legal organization of state power, the rule of law in social and political life.

In the natural (pre-state) state, according to Locke, natural law, the law of nature, prevails. This state in his interpretation differs significantly from the Hobbesian picture of the war of all against all. The law of nature, being an expression of the rationality of human nature, “demands peace and security for all mankind.” And a person, in accordance with the requirements of reason, also in the state of nature, pursuing his own interests and defending his own - his life, freedom and property - strives not to harm another.

In the spirit of the traditional natural legal requirement to “give to each his own, his own, his own,” Locke designates the totality of basic human rights as the right of property (i.e., the right to one’s own, one’s own). Thus, he notes that every person, according to the law of nature, has the right to defend “his property, i.e. your life, liberty and property."

According to Locke, since selfish and common interests coincide only in the final analysis, it is important that people, as far as possible, be guided by their ultimate interests. In other words, people should be reasonable. Prudence is the only virtue that needs to be preached, since every sin against virtue is a lack of prudence. An emphasis on prudence is a characteristic feature of liberalism. This is due to the rise of capitalism as the prudent became rich while the unprudent became or remained poor. This is also connected with certain forms of Protestant piety: virtue with an eye to heaven is psychologically very similar to frugality with an eye to a commercial bank.

The belief in harmony between private and public interests is a characteristic feature of liberalism, and has long outlived the theological foundation on which it rested in Locke.

Bibliography

1. Danilyan O.G. and others. Philosophy of Law: Textbook / Ed. Doctor of Law, Prof. O.G. Danilyana. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - 416 p.

2. Ilyin V.V. History of philosophy: Textbook for universities / V.V. Ilyin. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2005. - 732 p.

3. Mareev S.N., Mareeva E.V. History of philosophy (general course): Textbook / S.N. Mareev, E.V. Mareeva. - M.: Academic Project, 2004. - 880 p.

4. Nersesyants V.S. Philosophy of law: Textbook for universities / V.S. Nersesyants. - M.: Norma, 2004. - 656 p.

5. Panasyuk V.Yu. History of foreign philosophy: Textbook / V.Yu. Panasyuk. http://www.philosophy.ru

6. Russell B. History of Western Philosophy / B. Russell. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2002. Electronic version: http://www.i-u.ru

7. Spirkin A.G. Philosophy: Textbook / A.G. Spirkin. - M.: Gardariki, 2002. - 736 p.

To fully familiarize yourself with the test, download the file!

Liked? Click on the button below. To you not difficult, and for us Nice).

To download for free Test work at maximum speed, register or log in to the site.

Important! All submitted Tests for free downloading are intended for drawing up a plan or basis for your own scientific works.

Friends! You have a unique opportunity to help students just like you! If our site helped you find the job you need, then you certainly understand how the job you add can make the work of others easier.

If the Test work, in your opinion, is of poor quality, or you have already seen this work, please let us know.

Science is the focus of the main philosophical movements of the 17th – 18th centuries. and serves as the foundation on which in the 19th century. a philosophy of science is being built. The main areas of philosophy of this time are ontology and epistemology. Ontology(from the Greek ontos - existing and logos - word, concept, doctrine) - “the doctrine of being as such, of what truly exists, a section of philosophy that studies the fundamental principles of being, the most general essences and categories of existence” [Dobrokhotov A.L./ / FES, p. 458]. Epistemology(or epistemology) - translated from Greek - theory of knowledge - a branch of philosophy in which problems are studied knowledge of being, what exists, problems of the nature of knowledge and its possibilities, the relationship of knowledge to reality. These two areas of philosophy are often combined into the concept of metaphysics, which we will often encounter. Metaphysics(Greek letters - after physics) - the science of supersensible principles and principles of being. This concept appears in connection with the systematization of Aristotle's works. “Aristotle built a classification of sciences in which the first place in meaning and value is occupied by the science of being as such and of the first principles and causes of all things, which he called “first philosophy”... In contrast to “second philosophy” or physics, “first philosophy” (later called metaphysics) considers being independently of the specific combination of matter and form... Metaphysics, according to Aristotle, is the most valuable of the sciences, existing not as a means, but as the goal of human life and a source of pleasure. Ancient metaphysics was a model of metaphysics in general... Modern metaphysics... made nature the object of its research... Formally remaining the “queen of sciences,” metaphysics was influenced by natural science, which achieved outstanding success during this period... and to a certain extent merged with it. The main feature of the metaphysics of modern times is its focus on issues of epistemology (i.e., the theory of knowledge - A.L.), turning it into the metaphysics of knowledge (in antiquity and the Middle Ages it was the metaphysics of being) [Dobrokhotov A.L. // FES, With. 362].

In modern philosophy, epistemology distinguishes two opposing main directions - rationalism and empiricism, and in ontology - organicism and mechanism. In the worldview of natural scientists of the 17th-20th centuries. Empiricism and mechanism predominate. Although at the beginning and end of the 20th century. There is an increasing interest in rationalism and organicism.

Rationalists(R. Descartes, G. Leibniz, B. Spinoza) believe that the starting point for the construction of scientific knowledge is ideas of reason. Empiricists(F. Bacon, J. Locke, J. Berkeley, D. Diderot and J. La Mettrie, D. Hume) believe that the starting point for the construction of scientific knowledge is experience.

Organicists(G. Leibniz, B. Spinoza) consider nature as a whole and its elements as living organisms in which the whole determines the properties of its parts. This holistic position (from the word whole - whole). Mechanics(R. Descartes and others) believe that nature consists of machines-mechanisms of varying complexity. An example of a machine-mechanism is a mechanical watch. Moreover, in accordance with the atomistic picture of the world, these machines-mechanisms consist of individual parts-elements, the combination of which determines the properties of the whole. This is the position elementalism.

The opposition between rationalism and empiricism is most easily understood by comparing the positions of R. Descartes, G. Leibniz, B. Spinoza, on the one hand, and F. Bacon, J. Locke, J. Berkeley, D. Diderot and J. La Mettrie, on the other. This is where we will start.

Rationalist R. Descartes(1596-1650) the basis for correct thinking (cognition) is the “principle of evidence” (or “reliability”), which consists in the fact that knowledge that claims to be reliable must be obvious, i.e. immediately reliable, clear and distinct: “Never accept as true anything that I do not clearly know to be so... include in my judgments only what appears to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that it does not give me any reason to doubt them ” [Fav. prod., p. 272] – this is the fundamental rationalistic principle of Descartes. Starting with the simple and obvious is the first rule of the Cartesian method. Further, from it, by deduction, numerous consequences are obtained that make up theoretical scientific statements (second rule), while acting in such a way that not a single link is missed (third rule).

Another fundamental position of Descartes is the doctrine of two substances - the thinking spiritual and the extended material. The concept of substance is considered one of the fundamental ones by the rationalists considered here. Descartes defines substance as something that can exist on its own, without needing anything other than God who created it.

IN spiritual substance along with the means for implementing deduction (the second rule), it also contains “ innate ideas", ensuring the fulfillment of the first rule. “An immaterial substance (i.e., a thinking spiritual one - A.L.) has within itself, according to Descartes, ideas about certain things. These ideas are inherent in it initially, and not acquired through experience, and therefore they began to be called innate, although Descartes himself more often says that they were put into us by the Creator. First of all, these include the idea of ​​God as an all-perfect being, then the ideas of numbers and figures, as well as some general concepts, such as the well-known axiom: “if you add equal quantities to equal quantities, then the resulting results will be equal to each other,” or position: “out of nothing nothing comes.” These are eternal truths “abiding in our soul and called a general concept or axiom...” [Gaidenko., p. 122]. Reason leads to such ideas, which Descartes considers “innate,” intellectual intuition”.

Material substance serves as the basis for Descartes mechanistic interpretation of nature - his important contribution to the formation of modern physics. In Descartes, “the spiritual principle is completely taken beyond the boundaries of nature, which thereby turns into a system of machines, an object for the human mind” [Gaidenko, p. 121, 134]. The human body, according to Descartes, is “a machine which, having been created by the hands of God, is incomparably better constructed and has movements more amazing than any of the machines invented by people.” Descartes reduces all changes in nature to the movement of parts of a material substance (its main characteristics are extension, figure and movement): “I... use this word (nature) to designate matter itself... All properties that are clearly distinguishable in matter come down solely to that it is crushable and mobile in its parts and, therefore, capable of various arrangements, which... can result from the movement of its parts... All the differences in forms found in matter depend on local motion (i.e. movement-displacement - A.L. )” [Fav. prod., p. 197, 476]. For Descartes, “matter lost its previous status - something indefinite... and received a new definition: it became a dense, unchanging, stable principle..., i.e. lost the beginning of form and life that it possessed in Aristotle... In antiquity, matter was thought of as opportunity, which by her own, without a form defining it, there is nothing" For Descartes, "matter in itself is already one, which means that it is not just a possibility, but is reality, which even bears the name substances, i.e. that which can exist on its own." “At the same time... everything that is unchangeable in matter (i.e., nature) comes from God, for He is the beginning of constancy, and everything that changes comes from matter itself" [Gaidenko, pp. 126, 128].

The identification of matter and space leads to the merging of physics and geometry. As a result, the science of nature appears to Descartes as a deductive system similar to Euclidean geometry.

Along with the rethinking of the concept of matter, Descartes also reconsidered the essence of mathematics. Plato, continuing the Pythagorean tradition, considers mathematics to be a meaningful science; numbers and figures for him have an ontological meaning, these are the divine primary elements of the universe. This tradition continued into the Middle Ages. Descartes, in contrast, “is convinced that mathematics is a formal science, that its rules and concepts are creations of the intellect that have no reality outside of it, and therefore mathematics does not care at all what to “count”: numbers, stars, sounds etc…. Mathematics in the hands of Descartes becomes a formal-rational method with the help of which one can “calculate” any reality, establishing measure and order in it with the help of our intellect... This new mathematics... is tool... This required, firstly, a revision of the foundations of ancient mathematics..., and secondly, a revision of old physics... The principle of motion is introduced into mathematics (using the concept of function - A.L.), and from nature... the principle of life and soul is expelled, without which neither the Platonists nor the Peripatetics (followers of Aristotle - A.L.) could imagine nature. Both of these processes... constitute the content of Descartes’ “universal science”... Descartes calls the mathematics he created universal precisely because it abstracts from all those meaningful definitions that underlay ancient and, in many ways, medieval mathematics” [Gaidenko, p. 141-142, 144]. That. happens in Descartes desacralization antique mathematicians, turning it into an intellectual tool.

Another prominent representative of rationalism was G. Leibniz(1646-1716), whose position was in many respects alternative to that of Descartes. Like Descartes, he made significant contributions to physics and was a great mathematician. If Descartes in physics introduced the concept of momentum (“dead force”), and in mathematics he was the creator of analytical geometry, then Leibniz in physics introduced the concept of kinetic energy (the double value of which he called “living force”), and in mathematics he was the creator of differential and integral calculus. But still, the basis of his concept was not mathematics, but logic. For him, mathematics “is a special case of the application of logic..., the axioms of mathematics are not primary, but have their foundations in the original logical axioms” [Gaidenko, p. 261].

Logic was also the basis of his metaphysics, which he placed above mathematics: “There are three degrees of concepts, or ideas: ordinary, mathematical and metaphysical concepts” [Leibniz, vol. 2, p. 211]. That. metaphysics contains the deepest truths “Although all particular phenomena can be explained mathematically and mechanically by those who understand them,” says Leibniz, “nevertheless the general principles of bodily nature and mechanics themselves are more metaphysical than geometric in nature” [Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 144]. The very fundamental concept of substance is derived by Leibniz “from logical categories subject and predicate. Some words can be either subjects or predicates, for example I can say “the sky is blue” “blue is a color”. Other words, of which proper names provide the most obvious examples, are never predicates, but only subjects or one of the terms of a relation. Such words are intended to mean substance"[Russell, p. 549]. From the same logical definition it follows that such individual substances, which Leibniz called monads, there must be a lot.

Moreover, “every “individual substance,” according to Leibniz, must be expressed by such a “complete concept” that from it one can “derive all the predicates of the subject to which it is attached” [Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 132]. Such a concept “expresses, albeit vaguely, everything that happens in the universe, past, present and future” [Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 133]. “Taking into account the concept that I have of every true judgment, I have found that every predicate, necessary or contingent, relating to the past, present or future, is contained in the concept of the subject, and I ask nothing more” ... “the individual concept of each person concludes once and for all everything that happens to him” [Russell, p. 549-550]. This is the essence of the analyticity of Leibniz’s truths and the determinism (logical nature) of his system.

Logic underlies another important distinction for Leibniz: “truth of reason” and “truth of fact.” More important for Leibniz, of course, are “ truths of reason“or “eternal truths” are “intuitive-deductive truths that are completely independent of the diverse changes that are constantly ascertained in experience” [Sokolov, p. 378 - 379]. They allow one to think possible and consistent. This analytical truths. “Those concepts that... can be reduced to identical statements, or, in other words, which are completely analytical, Leibniz considers to be created by the mind itself - the closest thing to such concepts... is, according to Leibniz, the concept of number.” “Leibniz considers the law of identity to be the highest law of logic and, accordingly, the highest principle of true knowledge” [Gaidenko, p. 264 – 265, 268-269].

« Truths of fact" - these are truths that are formed in experience. A lot of them. “In contrast to rational or eternal truths as necessary truths, ... they are always more or less accidental. Nevertheless, a scientific understanding of experience is possible. It is based on law of sufficient reason... According to this law, everything that exists and happens takes place for some reason, on some basis... The law of sufficient reason, without which there is no experimental natural science, became Leibniz’s logical basis principle of causality, causality" [Sokolov, p. 378-9].

Leibniz also includes Descartes’ starting point “I think, therefore I exist” as truths of fact. He did not consider such a truth to be fundamentally different from other truths of fact. “Leibniz rejects the principle of immediate certainty put forward by Descartes as the basis of scientific knowledge... Not so much subjective obviousness, how much logical proof guarantees the objective truth of our judgments” [Gaidenko, p. 259-260].

Another important feature of Leibniz’s concept, atypical for the 17th-18th centuries, but which aroused keen interest in the 20th century, is anti-mechanism. “Descartes wants to deduce the living from the nonliving, to explain the organism based on the laws of mechanics, on the contrary, Leibniz - if we talk about his metaphysics - strives to explain even the nonliving, based on the living” [Gaidenko, p. 292]. This anti-mechanism was associated with Leibniz's interest in biology. He was contemporary with a series of discoveries in it related to the use of a microscope: the discovery of cells and sperm, and also that living things (flies, etc.) arise not from dirt, but from living cells. Moreover, the concept of preformationism that arose at that time, which argued that the primary cell contains on a reduced scale the entire structure (form) of the future organism, was close to Lebniz and was consonant with his view that the correct definition of the subject contains all its predicates. Therefore, Leibniz endows monad-substances with the qualities of activity inherent in animals and humans. “The monad is characterized by dynamism... for “substance is a being capable of action” [Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 404]. “Leibniz not only wants to return life and creativity to nature. He is trying to show that not only a plant or an animal, but also a mineral and a metal have independent life” [Gaidenko, p. 281]. Leibniz calls the animal a “natural machine” (the distinctive feature of which is that in every smallest part it remains a “natural machine”), the creator of which is not man, but God. Another feature of the living is that “souls act according to the laws of final causes, through aspirations, ends and means. Bodies act according to the laws of active (producing) causes, or movements” [Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 427]. To solve the problem of the relationship between soul and body, Leibniz introduces the “principle of pre-established harmony,” according to which, although each of the unique monads, having no “windows,” “develops cognitive activity inherent only to it. At the same time, there is the greatest consistency in the results of this activity of all countless monads... God once and for all coordinated the physical with the spiritual (subordinating the first to the second)” [Sokolov, p. 391 - 392] (i.e., monads relate to each other, like clocks running synchronously, independently of each other).

The same qualities of logicism and organicism characterize the concept of another major representative of rationalism of the 17th century. - an older contemporary of Leibniz B. Spinoza(1632-77). Unlike the pluralist Leibniz with his infinite number of monad-substances, Spinoza was a monist - he had one substance - God, coinciding with nature (the position of pantheism), and Cartesian thinking and extension acted as two attributes of God-substance accessible to man (the substance he defined as that which contains its cause within itself - causa sui). He combined this monism with “an organically holistic interpretation of nature in a generalized form expressed by the famous formula” [Sokolov, p. 343] “all nature constitutes one individual, the parts of which, i.e. all bodies change in infinitely many ways without any change in the individual as a whole” [Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 419] (embodied in God-substance-nature). Those. something changes inside the whole, but the whole remains itself (similar to how various physiological processes occur inside an organism (even a sleeping one).

The model of logic for Spinoza was the axiomatic method, as it is presented in Euclid’s geometry (axioms, theorems, corollaries, etc.), and on this model he built his central work - “Ethics”. The place of Leibniz's pre-established harmony is taken by the position that “the order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things” [Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 417] – a variant of the thesis about the identity of thinking and being.

Spinoza's rationalistic methodology consists in constantly distinguishing between two varieties of ideas: “ideas arising in representation, or imagination, which are always associated with the activity of the senses, and ideas that express the essence of human understanding, regardless of them. Sensory ideas are always vague, but human ideas souls, or crazy, are always clear. Without them, no reliable knowledge is possible, the example of which is provided by mathematics” [Sokolov, p. 333].

The third kind of knowledge he had was intuition, which “being completely insensible,... is inextricably linked... with the reasoning mind” [Sokolov, p. 337]. Intuition in Spinoza, like in Descartes, supplies general concepts that are given to the mind directly, intuitively, and, unlike artificial abstractions derived from experience (“universals”), “express the true properties of things.” “Definitions of the concepts of intuition, i.e. general concepts are, according to Spinoza, analytical judgments, in which the predicate reveals the characteristics of the subject. Since truth in such judgments follows from the content of the subject and predicate, it is completely independent of the empirical generalization characteristic of universals. The identification of general concepts expressed by analytical judgments, concepts expressing the essence of things, saves us from any subjectivism (i.e. Spinoza and Leibniz are quite close in the way they avoid the Cartesian interpretation of intuition as largely subjective evidence - A.L.) ... Moreover , such concepts and judgments provide immanent(inherent - A.L.) truth criterion» [Sokolov, p. 338], for, he says, “just as light reveals both itself and the surrounding darkness, so truth is the measure of itself and lies” [Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 440].

If R. Descartes is the founder of modern rationalism, who sees the foundations of science in reason and, as a rule, considers mathematics to be a model of science, then F. Bacon(1561 – 1626) and J. Locke (1632 – 1704) are the founders empiricism opposed to rationalism.

Bacon, like the ancient philosophers and Descartes, admits that “the senses inevitably deceive,” but if the rationalists propose to turn directly to the “light of reason” to overcome this deception, then Bacon proposes using experience for this purpose, based on the fact that “The subtlety of experiences far exceeds the subtlety of the feelings themselves.” “Although the senses quite often deceive and mislead,” says Bacon, “yet, in conjunction with the active activity of man, they can give us quite sufficient knowledge; and this is achieved... thanks to experiments capable of reducing objects inaccessible to our senses to sensory objects..." [Bacon, vol. 1, p. 76, 299]. This reliance of knowledge on experience is the essence of empiricism.

In his Organon, Bacon declared that a new science should proceed from experience, and not from speculation, but this “luminous” experience must then be appropriately processed in order to obtain general ideas (“axioms”), from which many consequences can be drawn, including new “fruitful” experiences, i.e. such that can be usefully applied by people in everyday life: “For although we strive most of all to practice the effective part of the sciences,” says Bacon, “yet we wait for the time of harvest... For we know well what correctly found axioms entail whole strings of practical applications and show them not one by one, but in a whole mass” [Bacon, T. 1, p. 79]. The central idea of ​​Baconian empiricism is very well conveyed by Bacon’s metaphor of the bee: “Those who studied science were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like an ant, only collect and are content with what they collect. Rationalists, like spiders, produce fabric from themselves. The bee chooses the middle method: it extracts material from garden and wildflowers, but arranges and changes them according to its ability. The real work of philosophy is no different from this” [Bacon, vol. 2, p. 58], which consists of “the art of pointing.” “This art of pointing... can either lead from experiments to experiments, or from experiments to axioms, which in turn themselves point the way to new experiments. We will call the first part scientific experience..., the second – the interpretation of nature, or the New Organon...” [Bacon, vol. 1, p. 299]. The essence of the latter was the method of interpretation or guidance, i.e. induction or, as it came to be called later, “empirical induction.”

The logical method of induction as an ascent from the individual to the general was introduced by Aristotle in his “Organon”. However, before F. Bacon, induction, firstly, was understood as complete induction, when it is possible to review all cases without exception. Secondly, incomplete induction was known as a conclusion based on the observation of only those facts that confirmed the statement being proven. Bacon contrasted this “induction by enumeration” with “true induction.” In the latter, along with taking into account the phenomena confirming the proven position (reduced in the “Presence Table”), the cases contradicting the proven position (reduced in the “Absence Table”) were taken into account, which were considered as the main element of the method. This fact-finding presupposes active intervention into the process of observation, eliminating some and creating other conditions is the path leading to experiment. Bacon pointed to the “dissection and anatomization of the world” as a way to advance toward “luminous experiences.”

Collecting all cases into three types of tables - “presence”, “absence” and “comparison” - is the preparatory stage of the inductive inference itself. As a result, the scientist must obtain a positive conclusion establishing the presence general property in all cases indicated in the tables. This final creative act is not formalized in any way (and depends on the skill of the scientist). So, using the example of heat, Bacon collected facts in the first table from “sun rays, especially in summer and at noon” (1), to “strong and acute cold, bringing a burning sensation” (27). In the second table, for example, he leads “to the first positive example - the first negative, or subordinate example: the rays of the moon, stars and comets do not turn out to be warm to the touch.” In the third table he begins with “solid and tangible bodies,” which are not “warm by nature,” and ends with incandescent bodies, “much hotter than some kinds of flame.” “The task and purpose of these tables,” he says, “we call presenting examples to the mind. And after the presentation, induction itself must come into action,” the basis of which is exception, i.e. rejection of “simple natures,” examples of which for him are “light and brilliance,” “expanding and contracting movement,” etc. However, induction “is not suspended until it is affirmed in the positive.” Bacon's example of the latter for the “form” or “nature” of heat is: “In all examples and from each of them it is clear that nature, of which heat is a special case, is movement. This is most evident in flames, which is always moving and in boiling liquids, which are also always moving... This is also revealed in the fact that every body is destroyed or... noticeably changed by any fire or strong and violent heat...” And finally, the result (preliminary): “On the basis of this first harvest of fruits, the form, or true definition of heat (that which relates to the Universe (i.e. objectively - A.L.), and not just to the feeling), consists in the following...: heat is a movement of propagation, hindered and occurring in small parts. But this is a spread of a special type: spreading around itself, it, however, deviates somewhat upward...” [Bacon, vol. 2, p. 92-122].

Of course, reducing Bacon's system to the method of empirical induction is a very narrow view. However, the canon of historical and philosophical interpretation of Baconian thought formed by Voltaire, Hegel, Mill and a number of other philosophers of the 18th – 19th centuries has also been “narrowed”. [CAD, p. 11-13]. The Method proposed by Bacon is only an element of his broad plan, which consisted of building a new type of scientific organization and this plan “influenced the initiators of the four most important Academies of the 17th-18th centuries: London, Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg and stood at the origins of the most important organizational scientific -educational programs” - writes a modern researcher of F. Bacon’s work D.L. Saprykin [Sapr, p. 20]. However, we are interested here mainly only in his program empiricism and inductivism . As for what he developed method of empirical induction, which was one of the central elements of his methodology, it was seriously returned to only in the positivism of the 19th – 20th centuries, where it became the basis of inductivism. “For the scientific and philosophical atmosphere of Europe in the 17th century. the greatest role was played by the general - critical, empirical and practical - tendency of Baconian methodology" [Sokolov, p. 227]. Moreover, after his death, the development of rationalistic methodology initially led to a significant “oblivion of his methodological principles.” Then, with the development of Enlightenment philosophy, it again gained popularity. experimental-empirical pathos Bacon [Sokolov, p. 227]. D. Hume considered him “the father of experimental physics” [Hume, vol. 1, p. 660]. Science, according to F. Bacon, is based on experience - a thesis that forms the basis of empiricism, which is dominant in modern philosophy of science.

F. Bacon is the father of the empirical trend in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) of the New Age, but in general - in terms of the style of argumentation and presentation - Bacon belongs to the Renaissance. The central figure of empiricism belonging to the philosophy of modern times is John Locke (1632-1704).

Locke's theory of knowledge, continuing the tradition of English empiricism of F. Bacon, opposes Descartes. Locke believed that there are no innate ideas and principles and that “all general principles, without exception, only appear to us as such, but in reality they hide experience, more or less unconsciously accumulated.” He justified the absence of “innate ideas” by the fact that even universal principles of knowledge, including the logical laws of identity and contradiction, cannot be considered innate, because they cannot “be found in children, idiots, savages and uneducated people” /vol. 1, p. 97, 113/

According to Locke, the human soul at the very beginning of its life is “white paper without any signs or ideas” [Locke, vol. 1, p. 128]. This “blank sheet” is filled with simple ideas obtained from experience: “On experience is the basis of all our knowledge, from it ultimately it comes ...,” states Locke. - Our observation, aimed either at the external objects we sense, or the internal actions of our mind, which we ourselves perceive and about which we ourselves think, supplies our mind with all the material of thinking. Here are two sources of knowledge, where all the ideas we have come from... Naming the first source feeling, I call the second one reflection"– says Locke [Locke, p.154].

Locke's teaching is often called sensationalism. But “the fundamental epistemological term “sensualism” applies mainly - if not exclusively - to (that) most important variety of experience,” which Locke called external experience and to which Locke “always has chronological primacy.” Since he “emphasized the importance of internal experience, which is in complex interaction with external experience, his position is more correctly defined as empirical” [Sokolov, p. 410, 411].

Locke divides knowledge into intuitive(self-evident truths), demonstrative(obtained through deduction, such as the principles of mathematics) and sensitive(the existence of individual things). Experience is the source of “simple ideas,” including the qualities of bodies, which he divides into “primary” (those, the source of which he considers the bodies themselves) - extension, figure, density, movement, and “secondary” (those in which properties are mixed sense organs) - color, sound, smell, taste.

“The mind, being completely passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, performs certain operations of its own, by which others are built from its simple ideas as the material and foundation for the rest. To complex ideas - products of the mind - he includes “ideas that we designate with the words “duty”, “intoxication”, “lie”..., the idea of ​​hypocrisy,... the idea of ​​sacrilege.” Actions in which the mind exercises its powers in relation to its simple ideas...: 1) compound several simple ideas into one complex one... (for example, “the murder of an old (young or some other) person” - A.L.); 2) mixing two ideas... and comparison them with each other so as to view them at once, but not combine them into one; this is how the mind acquires all its ideas relations; 3) separation of ideas from all other ideas that accompany them in their real reality; this action is called abstraction, and by its aid all general ideas in the mind are formed.” “Experience shows us,” says Locke, “that the mind is completely passive in regard to its simple ideas, and receives them all from the existence and influence of things..., without itself being able to form a single idea. But..., having once stocked up with simple ideas (obtained from sensation or reflection - A.L.), he can put them into various compounds and thus create many different complex ideas, without examining whether they exist in such a combination in nature" /t .1, p. 338-9/. An example of a complex idea that does not exist in nature is the idea of ​​a centaur. An example of a vague complex idea for him is the concept of substance, so important for rationalists: “Our idea, to which we give the general name “substance”, is only a supposed, but unknown carrier, of those qualities that we consider to exist... Speaking of any kind of substances , we say that it is something having such and such qualities as the body is something having extension, shape and capable of movement; there is spirit something capable of thinking... Our idea, or concept, of matter is nothing more than the concept of something one in which there exist those numerous sensory qualities that influence our senses... Our concept of the substance of the spirit will be as clear as the concept of the body, if we assume a substance in which there exist thinking, knowledge, doubt, force of movement, etc.; one substance (not knowing what it is) we assume substrate(i.e. the bearer - A.L.) of simple ideas that we receive from the outside, another (to the same extent without knowing what it is) substrate those actions that we experience within ourselves... Whatever the hidden and abstract nature substances in general, all our ideas separate, different types of substances only combinations of simple ideas... the idea of ​​any substance - gold, horse, iron, man ... - is only the idea of ​​those sensory qualities that he believes to be integral to the substance, adding the assumption of a substrate, as if supporting these qualities, or simple ideas, which, according to his observations, exist united with each other” [Locke, vol. 1, p. 347-349].

Thus, Locke equates the substances of “matter”, “spirit” and such “empirical” substances as “horse”, “stone” and asserts the impossibility of drawing a reliable conclusion about their existence or non-existence. His successors, J. Berkeley and the French materialists of the Enlightenment, take a clearer and more unambiguous position regarding the existence of matter and spirit.

The essence of the idealistic version of sensationalism J. Berkeley(1685-1753) consists in identifying the properties of things with the sensations of these properties, which are declared to belong to the spirit: “Everyone will agree that neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist outside our soul,” says Berkeley. - And it is no less obvious to me that the various sensations or ideas imprinted in sensuality, no matter how mixed or combined they may be with each other (that is, no matter what objects they form), cannot exist otherwise than in the spirit that perceives them.”“Next to this infinite variety of ideas or objects of knowledge,” he says, “there is also something that cognizes or perceives them and produces various actions, such as desires, imagination, memories. This knowing active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself. By these words I do not designate one of my ideas, but a thing quite different from them, in which they exist, or, which is the same thing, by which they are perceived, since the existence of an idea consists in its perceptibility"[AMF, p. 513]. “In fact, object and sensation are one and the same...” says Berkeley [Berkeley, p. 173].

At the same time, he interprets sensations as internal experiences of the spirit, and things as combinations of sensations or ideas. “Berkeley recognized the existence only of spiritual being, which he divided into “ideas” and “souls.” “Ideas” - the subjective qualities we perceive - are passive, involuntary; the content of our sensations and perceptions is completely independent of us. On the contrary, “souls” are active, active, and can be a cause. All “ideas” exist, according to Berkeley, only in the soul (both thoughts and passions, and various sensations). “Ideas” cannot be copies or similarities of external things: an “idea” can only be similar to an “idea”” [FES, p. 51]. Accordingly, the laws of nature are called “those fixed rules and certain methods by which the spirit on which we depend generates or excites in us ideas of sensation” [Berkeley, p. 184].

Berkeley, which is typical of the English tradition, does not want to break away from everyday consciousness and deny the existence of things when they are “turned away.” Because for Berkeley, to exist means to be perceived by the spirit [Berkeley, p. 172], then the continuity of the existence of things must be ensured by the continuity of their perception, which he does: “When it is said that bodies do not exist outside the spirit,” says Berkeley, “then the latter should be understood not as this or that individual spirit, but as the whole a totality of spirits (generally speaking, including God - A.L.). Therefore, from the above principles it does not follow that bodies are instantly destroyed and created again, or do not exist at all during the intervals of time between our perceptions of them” [Berkeley, p. 192-193]. Thus, only the spirit really exists [Berkeley, p. 327-328], and the primary qualities, which claimed independent objective existence and were associated with the existence of matter, are just as subjective as the secondary ones, and matter is a useless concept for both philosophy and science.

In contrast to Berkeley, the French materialists J. Lametrie(1709-51) and D. Diderot(1713-84) a materialistic interpretation of the soul is given, i.e. matter is declared to be the only substance. “The soul is a term devoid of content,” La Mettrie asserts, “behind which lies no definite idea... We know only matter in bodies... We must make the bold conclusion that man is a machine and that in the Universe there is only one substance, changing in various ways » [AMF, p. 615, 620, 617]. This substance is matter (which La Mettrie endows with the “ability to feel”). “It is impossible to suppose anything that exists outside the material Universe; one should never make such assumptions, because no conclusions can be drawn from it... I am a physicist and chemist; I take bodies as they are in nature, and not in my head,” echoes La Mettrie Diderot [AMP, p. 662, 664].

This matter is determined through external experience. “Although we have no idea of ​​the essence of matter, we cannot refuse it recognition of the properties discovered by our senses,” says La Mettrie [AMP, p. 619]. “Our feelings are the keys that are struck by the nature around us and which often strike themselves; this, in my opinion, is all that happens in a piano organized like you and me,” says Diderot [AMP, p. 655-656].

In terms of the theory of knowledge itself, La Mettrie looked at cognition as a process “which should begin with the sensory perception of the realities being studied, their further experimental research and end with a rational generalization of the identified facts, which in turn should be subject to empirical verification” [Kuznetsov, p. . 251]. Diderot also held a similar point of view, who considered observation, reflection and experiment to be “the three main means of studying nature”: “Observation collects facts; thinking combines them; experience verifies the results of combinations” [Diderot, p. 98]. Those. the primary source of knowledge is feelings - the central thesis of sensationalism, but the mind takes an active part in the process of cognition.

The French enlighteners are the natural predecessors of positivism. They already have that combination of a negative and disdainful attitude towards metaphysics with admiration for the new science - natural science, which will become the basis of positivism. “Let us take the staff of experience in our hands and leave alone the history of all the fruitless quests of philosophers,” says D’Alembert, referring to what La Mettrie called “the useless works of great geniuses: all these Descartes, Malebranches, Leibniz and Wolffs ...”. Only scientists recognize La Mettrie's right to judge, while Descartes for him is “a genius who charts the paths in which he himself got lost” [AMP, p. 611, 618, 620].

Positivism, which will be the focus of our attention somewhat below, is a natural continuation of the empiricist tradition of the 18th century. Being a natural product of the Enlightenment, he also absorbs the English idealistic tradition of Berkeley and Hume.

Hume requires special consideration. From his analysis and criticism of empiricism, on the one hand, the critical philosophy of I. Kant, discussed in the next chapter, grows, on the other hand, the problem of causality formulated by him became a challenge to empiricism and positivism of the 19th – 20th centuries. and an incentive to create new concepts. Under the influence of Hume’s ideas, says I.S. Narsky in the article “Hume,” - most of the positivist teachings of the 19th–20th centuries developed.” [FES, p. 813-814].

Theory of knowledge D. Yuma(1711-1776) “formed as a result of his processing of Berkeley’s subjective idealism... Hume left theoretically open the question of whether there are material objects that cause our impressions (although in everyday practice he did not doubt their existence). Hume considered direct impressions of external experience (sensations) to be primary perceptions, and sensory images of memory (“ideas”) and impressions of internal experience (affects, desires, passions) to be secondary. He interpreted the formation of complex ideas as psychological associations of simple ideas with each other” [FES, p. 813-814].

One of the main differences between his concept and Locke's is the assertion that the analysis of sensory experience should begin not with sensations, as Locke thought, but with “impressions” or “perceptions.” "Under the term impression I mean all our more vivid perceptions, when we hear, see, touch, love, hate, wish, want,” says Hume. Therefore, for him, “the starting point for the theory of knowledge is human experience, which already has impressions, unknown how they were received. “Mind never has in front of him any things other than perceptions..." (says Hume -). The mechanism of further development of sensory experience based on impressions is described by Hume as follows. First, some impression arises causing one to experience heat, cold, thirst, hunger, pleasure, suffering . Then the mind makes a copy of this initial impression and forms an idea. An idea, therefore, is defined by Hume as a “less living perception.” In Locke, Hume says, the idea was identified with all perceptions. Meanwhile, an idea can remain even when the impression of which it is a copy disappears... A copy is again taken from these secondary impressions - new ideas arise. Then a kind of “chain reaction” of ideas and impressions continues..." [ZRV, vol. 2, p. 214]. As a result, experience, in which “impressions and ideas are intimately fused,” is ascribed a “complex sensory-rational structure.” This view of experience is picked up and developed by Kant.

But the most important point for us in his epistemology is the doctrine of causality. The peculiarity of causality - one of the seven relations he identifies - is that, having neither intuitive nor deductive reliability, “only causality gives rise to such a connection, thanks to which we derive from the existence or action of any one object the certainty that it was followed or preceded by another existence or action” [Hume, vol. 1, p. 130]. Analyzing this relationship, Hume comes to the conclusion that there is reason to talk only about “relations adjacency(in space – A.L.) and precedence(in time – A.L.)”, and not about cause and effect. “The motion of one body in a collision is considered to be the cause of the motion of the other body. Examining these objects with the greatest attention, we see only that one body approaches another and that the movement of the first body precedes the movement of the second... Reason can never convince us that the existence of one object (cause - A.L.) always concludes in oneself the existence of another (consequences - A.L.); therefore, when we pass from the impression of one object to the idea of ​​another, or to the belief in this other, it impels us to this not reason, but habit, or the principle of association" [Hume, vol. 1, p. 133, 153]. That is, according to Hume, there are no other grounds other than psychological habit and faith for the principle of causality, which before Hume was considered as necessary as logical connections [Russell, p. 615].

Questions:

1. What is science? When does it occur?

2. The main stages of the philosophy of science?

3. What are the main principles of rationalism and empiricism?

4. Basic concepts and principles of the theory of knowledge of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza? Commonalities and differences?

5. Empiricism and inductivism of F. Bacon?

6. Basic concepts and principles of the theory of knowledge of Locke, Berkeley, La Mettrie and Diderot? Commonalities and differences?

7. What is the essence of D. Hume’s criticism of empiricism?

3. Anthology of world philosophy in 4 volumes. (Any edition)

Used Books:

1. AMF: Anthology of world philosophy in 4 volumes. M., Mysl, 1969-72.

2.Berkeley D. Essays. M, 1978

3. Bacon F. Works in 2 vols. T.2. M.: Nauka, 1972

4. Galileo Galilei. Selected works. T.I, II. M.: Nauka, 1964.

5. Gaidenko P.P. History of modern European philosophy in its connection with science. M., 2000.

6. Diderot D. Selected philosophical works. M., 1941.

7. ZRV: History of philosophy: West – Russia – East. In 4 books. M., 1999.

8. Kondakov N.I. Logical dictionary-reference book. M., 1975.

9. Kuznetsov V.N., Meerovsky B.V., Gryaznov A.F. Western European philosophy of the 18th century. M., 1986.

10. Locke D. Works in 3 vols., M., 1985.

11. Russell B. History of Western Philosophy. Novosibirsk, 1999.

12. Sokolov V.V. European philosophy of the XV-XVII centuries. M., 1984.

13. Spinoza B. Favorite prod. In 2 vols., M., 1957

14. Hume D. Works in 2 vols., M., 1996.

15. FES: Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. M., 1983

Notes:

Being is a complex philosophical category [Dobrokhotov A.L. Category of being in classical Western European philosophy. Moscow State University, 1986], which, to a first approximation for the period under consideration, can be identified with nature, the outside world.

Descartes gives 21 rules in “Rules for the Guidance of the Mind,” but these three main ones are enough for us here.

“Space or internal place... differs from the bodily substance contained in this space only in our thinking. And indeed, the extension in length, width and depth, which constitutes space, also constitutes the body” [Elect. prod., p. 469-70].

In addition, he was the founder of the Berlin and St. Petersburg Academies of Sciences.

“He worked a lot on mathematical logic and achieved great results, which would have been of very great importance if he had published them... But he refrained from publishing them because he found evidence that the Aristotelian theory of syllogism was in some respects incorrect; respect for Aristotle did not allow him to believe this, and he mistakenly believed that he himself was mistaken. Despite this, all his life he cherished the hope of discovering a kind of generalized mathematics, which he called „C characteristica Universalis"with the help of which thinking could be replaced by calculus" [Russell, p. 549]. Unlike Descartes, Galileo and the atomists, he was a moderate critic of scholasticism, based on Aristotelian logic, which he highly respected (like Descartes, he received a philosophical education within the framework of the school (scholastic) medieval tradition).

This approach was implemented in the “Principles of Mathematics” by B. Russell and A. Whitehead (see section 1.5).

Subject and predicate are the main elements of judgment - “a form of thought in which something is affirmed or denied regarding objects and phenomena, their properties, connections and relationships and which has the property of expressing either truth or falsehood... That part of the judgment that reflects the subject of thought is called the subject judgments..., and that part of the judgment that reflects what is affirmed (or denied) about the subject of thought is called the predicate of the judgment” [Kondakov, p. 574].

But such pure knowledge “is not possible for the human spirit to realize, since it is always burdened with sensuality and most of its truths are accidental truths of fact. God is the only extra-natural substance, devoid of any bodily shell and, therefore, sensory knowledge” [Sokolov, p. 382]. “Only the highest Reason, from which nothing escapes, is capable of clearly understanding all infinity, all foundations and all consequences” [Leibniz, vol. 2, p. 57].

Analytical judgments are those judgments whose truth is established through purely logical analysis, in contrast to synthetic judgments, the truth of which is justified by referring to external information.

“Leibniz sees the main drawback of mathematical axioms, in particular Euclidean ones, in the fact that they rely not only on reason, but also on imagination, i.e. are not purely analytical proposals, which means they cannot claim genuine reliability” [Gaidenkoenko, p. 265].

In medieval scholasticism, the main reason was considered to be the goal one - movement is determined by the goal towards which a thing strives. So, according to Aristotle, all things in the earthly world have their own place to which they strive. This type of cause is expelled from the mechanics of the New Age, where the main cause is the active one, determined by external influence.

“All the benefit and practical effectiveness lies in the middle axioms” [Bacon, vol. 2, p. 32].

As we see, this result is very different from the molecular theory of heat, despite the mention of the movement of “very small particles.”

“Spinoza spoke negatively about Bacon’s inductive method, believing that with its help we can find out certain random signs of things, but we will not be able to establish a single reliable, necessary truth” [Sokolov, p. 334].

At the same time, he reduces complex ideas to three categories: 1) modes (simple and mixed) - “do not have the prerequisites for independent existence... These are the ideas denoted by the words “tangle”, “gratitude”, “murder”, etc.”; 2) substances (individual and collective) - “represent various individual things that exist independently” such as “ideas of lead” or “ideas of man”; 3) the relationship “which consists of considering and comparing one idea with another” /vol.1, pp.214-15/.

True, Hume raises habit and faith to a special height: “faith is something more than a simple idea: it is a special way of forming an idea... there is a living idea... This act of our mind... I conclude by induction, which seems to me very convincing, that opinion , or faith, is nothing more than an idea that differs from fiction not in nature... but by method, to whom we represent it” [Hume, vol. 1, p. 153]. “All opinions and concepts about things to which we have been accustomed since childhood take root so deeply that all our reason and experience are not able to eradicate them, and the influence of this habit not only approaches the influence of a constant and inseparable connection of causes and effects, but and in many cases surpasses it."

INTRODUCTION

The new era, which began in the 17th century, became the era of the establishment and gradual victory in Western Europe of capitalism as a new method of production, an era of rapid development of science and technology. Under the influence of such exact sciences as mechanics and mathematics, mechanism became established in philosophy. Within the framework of this type of worldview, nature was viewed as a huge mechanism, and man as an proactive and active worker.

The main theme of modern philosophy was the theme of knowledge. Two major movements emerged: empiricism and rationalism, which differently interpreted the sources and nature of human knowledge. Frolov I.T. and others. Introduction to philosophy: Proc. manual for universities / - 3rd ed., revised. and additional - M.: Respublikayu-2012.-P.215.

Supporters of empiricism (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke) argued that the main source of reliable knowledge about the world is human sensations and experience. Supporters of empiricism called for relying in everything on the data of experience and human practice.

Proponents of rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) believed that the main source of reliable knowledge is knowledge. The founder of rationalism is Descartes, the author of the expression “question everything.” He believed that in everything one should rely not on faith, but on reliable conclusions and not accept anything as the final truth. Descartes' views have not lost their relevance to this day. It is all the more interesting to study his philosophy, try to understand his worldview and, if possible, apply all this in our everyday life.

In ideological terms, the advent of the New Age was prepared by the creative activity, first of all, of the philosophers and educators of the Renaissance. And let us add: the turbulent processes of progressive changes in the political, economic, cultural, scientific and entire sphere of spiritual life of the New Age were based, first of all, on the state and level of development of philosophy of that time.

Philosophy not only was the ideological basis of the progressive changes of the New Age, but also preceded these changes. The new time has come first in the spiritual sphere of philosophy, and only then in reality.

The purpose of this work is to study the ideology and thoughts of the great modern philosopher Rene Descartes.

The main task of the work is to understand the specifics of Descartes' philosophy, to determine what its rationality is and how it can be applied in modern life.

RATIONALISM OF NEW TIMES

Prerequisites for the development of new philosophical movements

The philosophy of the New Age covers the period of the 17th - first half of the 19th century and is divided into several stages: the Enlightenment of the 17th - early 18th centuries, discussed in this textbook, and German classical philosophy of the 18th - first half of the 19th century. At this time, humanity stepped into a new period of its history, marked by a powerful civilizational breakthrough. Over the course of three centuries, the economic, political, and general cultural forms of human existence have changed. In the economy, manufacturing and the associated division of industrial labor have become widespread; More and more people began to use machines. In the political sphere, new ideas about human rights and freedoms, about the rule of law, began to be developed, and methods for putting these ideas into practice began to be developed. In the cultural sphere, scientific knowledge began to come to the fore. Outstanding discoveries were made in natural science and mathematics that prepared the way for the scientific and technological revolution. Philosophy was at the forefront of all these changes. She foreshadowed, stimulated and generalized them.

The seventeenth century is often called the “age of science.” Losev A.F. History of philosophy in summary. - M.: Mysl, 1989. -P.126. Scientific knowledge about the world was valued very highly, which is confirmed by the content and even form of philosophy. Philosophy, participating in the development of scientific knowledge and often ahead of it, sought to become a “great restoration of the sciences,” to use the title of the works of F. Bacon, “discourse on method,” to use here the title of one of Descartes’ works. Philosophers, like R. Descartes, B. Pascal, G. Leibniz, were sometimes themselves pioneers in mathematics and natural science. At the same time, they did not try to make philosophy, which had actually ceased to be the handmaiden of theology, into the handmaiden of the natural sciences. On the contrary, they assigned a special place to philosophy, as Plato and Aristotle also wanted. Philosophy was supposed to fulfill the role of the broadest teaching, synthesizing knowledge about the natural world, about man as a part of nature and his special “nature”, essence, about society, about the human spirit and, of course, about God as the primary essence, the primary cause and prime mover of everything that exists. In other words, the processes of philosophizing were thought of as “metaphysical reflections,” to again use the title of Descartes’ work. That is why the philosophers of the 17th century. are called “metaphysicians”. To this, however, it must be added that their metaphysics (the doctrine of the principles of all being, the essence of the world, the absolute, unconditional and supersensible; in addition, the term “metaphysics” is used to designate a method and way of thinking opposite to dialectics) was not a simple continuation traditional metaphysics, but became its innovative processing. Thus, innovation is the most important distinguishing feature of modern philosophy in comparison with scholasticism. But it should be especially emphasized that the first philosophers of the modern era were students of neo-scholastics. However, with all the strength of their minds and souls they sought to revise, test the truth and strength of the inherited knowledge. The criticism of “idols” by F. Bacon and the method of doubt by R. Descartes in this sense are not just intellectual inventions, but features of the eras: old knowledge was revised, strong rational foundations were found for a new title. Losev A.F. History of philosophy in summary. - M.: Mysl, 1989. -P.131.

But philosophers of the XVII-XVIII centuries. They were interested not only in rational knowledge, but also in knowledge through the senses - they treated it with special attention, its reliability was proven by supporters of empiricism: Gassendi, Locke, and the French enlighteners. But Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, who are considered rationalists, also paid considerable attention to sensory experience (which, however, was critical), will and “passions of the soul,” affects, which, from their point of view, are subject and amenable to control sides of the mind.

In a word, the 17th and 18th centuries can rightly be considered centuries of rationalism. However, one should not attribute self-confident rationalism to the era of the New Time, since the philosophers of this time objectively considered the shortcomings and limitations of the human mind.Losev A.F. History of philosophy in summary. - M.: Mysl, 1989. -P.135..

Rationalism as the main feature of modern philosophy

The search for rationally substantiated and provable truths of philosophy, comparable to the truths of science, is another feature of the philosophy of the New Age. But the main difficulty was that philosophical truths, as it was later discovered, cannot be of an axiomatic nature and cannot be proven by methods accepted in mathematics. Descartes and Spinoza especially hoped for this (and seriously), trying not only to give their works the form of a scientific treatise, but also sought to conduct all reasoning using the “geometric”, axiomatic-deductive method (a method of constructing scientific theories in the form of systems of axioms and postulates , and rules of inference that allow one to obtain theorems and statements of a given theory through logical deduction; deduction is a logical operation consisting in the transition from the general to the particular). Subsequently, thinkers moved away from this method, but the desire to orient philosophy toward the exact sciences remained dominant throughout the entire modern era. It is not surprising that in the 19th and especially in the 20th centuries there was an opinion according to which the classical philosophy of the New Age exaggerated the importance of the scientific, rational, logical principle in human life and in philosophical thinking. And indeed, in the philosophy of the 17th - first half of the 19th centuries, that is, precisely the New Age (in Western terminology it is called “modern philosophy”), it was rationalistic. Here the word “rationalism” is used in a broad sense, uniting both “empiricism” (a philosophical doctrine and direction in the theory of knowledge that recognizes sensory experience as the only source of reliable knowledge), which elevates all knowledge to experience, and “rationalism” (a philosophical direction that recognizes reason as the basis cognition) in a narrower sense, seeking the foundations of both experience and non-experimental knowledge in rational principles.

Rationalism can be understood as confidence in the power and ability of the mind (especially the enlightened mind, guided by the correct method) to comprehend the secrets of nature, to know the world around us and man himself, with the help of common sense to solve practical life problems and ultimately build a society on reasonable principles. And be sure to comprehend God with the help of reason.

descartes innovation scientific method

European philosophy of modern times covers the 17th - 19th centuries. This is the time of transformation into independent scientific branches of physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, mechanics, and other search and research practices.

New European philosophy seeks the basis for an adequate methodological orientation either in sensory experience, empirical inductive knowledge (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke), or in the intellect, which provides logical deductive-mathematical knowledge (Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza).

The new era is also a belief in progress provided by reason, science and technology. Progress is thought of as an inevitable law of progressive development.

The English philosopher was at the origins of the methodology of experimental science of the New Age. Francis Bacon (1561-1626). He was a passionate supporter of scientific progress and an implacable enemy of scholasticism. The core of Baconian methodology is a gradual inductive generalization of facts observed in experience. However, the philosopher was far from a simplified understanding of this generalization and emphasized the need to rely on reason in the analysis of facts. Reason allows you to organize and plan observations and experiments in such a way as to hear the voice of nature itself and interpret what it says in the correct way. Bacon illustrates his position by comparing the activities of bees, collecting nectar from many flowers and processing it into honey, with the activities of a spider, weaving a web from itself (one-sided rationalism) and ants, collecting a variety of objects into one pile (one-sided empiricism). Bacon distinguished two types of experience: fruitful and luminous. He called experience fruitful, the purpose of which is immediate benefit; luminous is experience, which aims to understand the laws of phenomena and the properties of things.

In the study of nature, according to Bacon, we are often guided by false ideas and concepts, which he called idols. He identified four main types: idols of the clan, caves, squares and theaters.

The idols of the race are the prejudices of our mind, arising from the confusion of our own nature with the nature of things. Man is inclined to judge nature by analogy with his own properties. From here arise teleological (target - why? for what?) ideas about the world, other errors stemming from the imperfection of the human mind and human feelings and their susceptibility to the influence of various desires and drives.

The idols of the cave are delusions arising from the individual characteristics of each person (his upbringing, reading range, the authority of those he admires, likes, dislikes, etc.).

The idols of the square or market arise from semantic ambiguity and incorrect use of words. Idols that penetrate the mind with the help of words are of two kinds: they are either names of non-existent things (“fate”, “perpetual motion machine”, etc.), or they are names of things that exist, but confused and indefinite, inappropriately abstracted.

Idols of the theater - they move “into the souls of people from various tenets of philosophy, as well as from the perverse laws of evidence” due to their magnificent, downright theatrical performance. Bacon calls some philosophical systems fables and fairy tales, “intended to be acted on the stage, suitable for the creation of imaginary theatrical worlds.”

The eradication of all these idols is possible only along the path of experience and its scientific and inductive understanding. Bacon's ideal was an impartial mind, freed from all kinds of prejudices, open and attentive to experience. Having interpreted experience as the ultimate source of all our knowledge, Bacon thereby laid the foundations of empiricism - one of the leading philosophical traditions of modern European philosophy. Empiricism - a direction in the theory of knowledge that recognizes sensory experience as the only source of reliable knowledge.

Rationalism - a philosophical direction that recognizes reason as the basis of human knowledge and behavior, the source and criterion of the truth of all human aspirations in life.

The foundations of the rationalist tradition alternative to empiricism were laid by the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596-1650). From Descartes' point of view, it is not enough to have a good mind; it is much more important to use it well and correctly. In order to learn how to use the mind well, he developed his own method. It has four rules.

The first rule is the rule of obviousness. Evidence in the sense of clarity and distinctness is not only the starting point, but also the final point of knowledge. The mental action by which evidence is achieved is an intuitive action, an intellectual intuition.

The second rule is the rule of analysis. Breaking down the complex into the simple, “into elementary parts to the limits of the possible,” analysis with the light of reason banishes ambiguity and helps liberate the true from the chaff of lies.

The third rule is the rule of synthesis, which consists in “arranging your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the simplest and easily knowable objects, and ascending little by little, as if by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing for the existence of order even among those who are in in the natural course of things do not precede each other.”

Rule four is the rule of control. At this stage, the completeness of the analysis and the correctness of the synthesis are checked.

Descartes applies the rules of the method outlined in this way to philosophical knowledge itself, designed to discover obvious truths that form the foundation of the building of all science. To this end, Descartes methodologically questions all traditional methods of substantiating knowledge. He, in particular, refuses to recognize sensory experience as the basis of knowledge. Doubt is an act of thinking. Because I doubt, I think. The existence of my doubt proves the reality or existence of my thinking, and through this of myself.

All vague ideas are products of human subjectivity, and they are false. On the contrary, all clear ideas come from God, and therefore they are objectively true.

As a rationalist, Descartes insisted on the exclusive role of deduction in the process of knowledge. By deduction he understood reasoning based on completely reliable initial positions (axioms) and consisting of a chain of also reliable logical conclusions. The reliability of the axioms is perceived by reason intuitively, without any proof, with complete clarity and distinctness.

11. Empirical direction in modern philosophy The founder of the empirical (experimental) direction in philosophy is considered to be Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626), an English philosopher and politician (in 1620 - 1621 - Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, the second official in the country after the king). The essence of Francis Bacon's main philosophical idea - empiricism - is that the basis of knowledge is exclusively experience. The more experience (both theoretical and practical) humanity (and the individual) has accumulated, the closer it is to true knowledge. True knowledge, according to Bacon, cannot be an end in itself. The main tasks of knowledge and experience are to help a person achieve practical results in his activities, promote new inventions, economic development, and human dominance in nature. In this regard, Bacon put forward an aphorism that succinctly expressed his entire philosophical credo: “Knowledge is power.” Bacon put forward an innovative idea, according to which induction should become the main method of knowledge. Under by induction the philosopher understood the generalization of many particular phenomena and the receipt of general conclusions based on generalization (for example, if many individual metals melt, then all metals have the property of melting). Bacon contrasted the method of induction with the method of deduction proposed by Descartes, according to which true knowledge can be obtained based on reliable information using clear logical techniques. The advantage of Bacon's induction over Descartes' deduction is in expanding possibilities and intensifying the process of cognition. The disadvantage of induction is its unreliability, probabilistic nature (since if several things or phenomena have common characteristics, this does not mean that all things or phenomena from a given class have these characteristics; in each individual case there is a need for experimental verification, confirmation of induction ). Thus, the best way of knowledge, according to Bacon, is empiricism, based on induction (collection and generalization of facts, accumulation of experience) using rationalistic methods of understanding the inner essence of things and phenomena with the mind. The philosophy of F. Bacon had a huge impactonphilosophy modern times, English philosophy, the philosophy of subsequent eras: the beginning of the empirical (experimental) direction in philosophy was laid; epistemology (the science of knowledge) rose from a minor branch of philosophy to the level of ontology (the science of being) and became one of the two main sections of any philosophical system; a new goal of philosophy was defined - to help a person achieve practical results in his activities (thus Bacon indirectly laid the foundations for the future philosophy of American progmatism); the first attempt was made to classify the sciences; an impulse was given to anti-scholastic, bourgeois philosophy in both England and Europe as a whole. Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), who became a student and successor of the philosophical tradition of F. Bacon: resolutely rejected theological scholastic philosophy; the goal of philosophy was to achieve practical results in human activity, to promote scientific and technological progress; in the dispute between empiricism (experiential knowledge) and rationalism (cognition through reason), he took the side of empiricism; criticized the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes; was a convinced materialist; considered the most important philosophical problem to be the issues of society and the state; developed the theory of the state; T. Hobbes believed that a person realizes knowledge mainly through sensory perception. Sensory perception is the reception by the senses (eyes, ears, etc.) of signals from the surrounding world and their subsequent processing. The problem of society and the state, according to Hobbes, is the main one in philosophy, since the goal of philosophy is to help a person achieve practical results in his activities, and a person lives and acts in society and a specific state. John Locke (1632 - 1704) developed many of the philosophical ideas of Bacon and Hobbes, put forward a number of his own theories, and continued the empirical and materialist tradition of English philosophy of modern times. The following main provisions of J. Locke's philosophy can be distinguished: the world is materialistic; knowledge can only be based on experience (“there is nothing in the thoughts (mind) of a person that was not previously in the feelings”); consciousness is an empty cabinet, which is filled with experience throughout life (in this regard, Locke’s statement about consciousness as a "clean slate" on which experience is recorded - tabula rasa); the source of experience is the external world; the goal of philosophy is to help a person achieve success in his activities; the ideal person is a calm, law-abiding, respectable gentleman who improves his level of education and achieves good results in his profession; the ideal of the state is a state built on the basis of the separation of powers into legislative, executive (including judicial) and federal (foreign policy). Locke was the first to put forward this idea, and this is his great merit.