Spinoza: Philosophical views of Spinoza. Biography of Benedict Spinoza

Spinoza: The Philosophical Views of Spinoza

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza is one of the greatest rationalist philosophers of the 17th century. He was born on November 24, 1632 in Amsterdam into the Portuguese-Jewish community. Spinoza was an unusually gifted student, and his mentors trained him to become a rabbi. However, at the age of 17, he had to stop studying to help in the family business. On July 27, 1656, Spinoza was expelled from the Amsterdam Sephardic community for reasons that remain a mystery (perhaps it was a reaction to the statements of Spinoza, who began to define his philosophical teaching).

Spinoza's philosophical position was radical. He held naturalistic views of morality, God and man. Spinoza denied the immortality of the human soul and the existence of God as providence. He argued that the law was not given by God and could not limit the Jews.

By 1661, Spinoza had finally lost faith in religion and faith and left Amsterdam. While living in Rheinsburg, he created several treatises. In 1663, he published the work “Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Descartes” [B. Spinoza. The Fundamentals of Descartes’ Philosophy, Proved Geometrically // B. Spinoza. Selected Works: in 2 volumes - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1957.] - the only work published under by his name during his lifetime. By 1663, Spinoza began writing one of his most famous works, the Ethics. He temporarily stopped working on it to create the “Theological-Political Treatise” [Spinoza B. Ethics / trans. from lat. N. A. Ivantsova. - St. Petersburg: Asta-press ltd, 1993; Spinoza B. Theological-political treatise. - Kharkov: Folio, 2001.], which was published anonymously in 1670 and caused a lot of controversy. Because of such a violent reaction, Spinoza decided not to publish his works anymore. In 1676 he met with Leibniz to discuss the recently completed Ethics, which he had been hesitant to publish. After Spinoza's death in 1677, his friends published his works posthumously, but his works were banned in Holland.

Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise

In his “Theological-Political Treatise,” which provoked a strong reaction from society, Spinoza tried to show what was hidden behind religion and biblical texts, and to expose the political power that was imposed by religious figures.

Spinoza's views on religion

Spinoza criticized not only Judaism, but also all organized religious cults. He stated that philosophy must be separated from religion, especially with regard to the reading of sacred texts. Spinoza called submission the goal of theology, and the understanding of rational truth as the goal of philosophy.

According to Spinoza, the only message of God is “Love thy neighbor,” and religion has become irrational superstitions and the words on paper have lost their true meaning. The Bible, in his opinion, is not a divine revelation. Rather, it should be treated like any other historical text; and since it was written over several centuries, its contents can hardly be called reliable. Miracles, according to Spinoza, do not happen: any of them has a natural explanation, although people prefer not to search for it. Spinoza believed that prophecies did come from God, but argued that they did not belong to the category of knowledge for the elect.

Spinoza believed that in order to show respect for God, the Bible must be revised to find the “true religion.” He rejected the idea of ​​"chosenness" characteristic of Judaism, arguing that all people are equal and there should be a common religion for all. Spinoza considered democracy to be the ideal form of government: it is with this political model that the abuse of power is least.

Spinoza's Ethics

In his most ambitious and significant work, the Ethics, Spinoza discusses traditional ideas of God, religion, and human nature.

God and nature

In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza began to describe his belief that God is nature and nature is God and that it is wrong to assume that God has human characteristics. In the Ethics he develops his ideas about God and nature. According to Spinoza, everything in the Universe is part of nature (and, therefore, God), and all objects of nature are subject to the same basic laws. Spinoza took a naturalistic approach (which was then considered quite radical) and argued that man can be understood and explained in the same way as any other object in nature, since he is no different from the rest of the natural world.

Spinoza rejected the idea that God created the world out of nothing and in a specific time frame. He argued that our system of reality can be considered its own basis and there is no supernatural element other than nature and God.

In the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza focused on the study of the nature and origin of man. He argued that two attributes of God that are inherent in man and are realized by him are thinking and extension. The mode of thought includes ideas, and the mode of extension relates to physical bodies, and these modes act independently. Events associated with a body are the result of a causal series of other events associated with the body and are subject exclusively to laws corresponding to extension. And ideas are the result of other ideas and follow their own set of laws. Consequently, there is no causal interaction between the mental and the physical, although they are correlated, parallel to each other, and each mode of extension corresponds to a certain mode of thinking.

Since thought and extension are attributes of God, they make it possible to understand nature and God. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not claim that there are two separate substances. Rather, he calls thinking and extension two expressions of a single whole - man.

Spinoza argues that, like God, human thinking contains ideas. These ideas, based on perceptual, sensitive and qualitative (for example, pain and pleasure) information, do not lead to true knowledge about the world, as they are perceived through the prism of nature. This method of perception is an endless source of error, “knowledge from chance experience.”

According to Spinoza, the second type of knowledge is thinking. Credible ideas are formed in a rational, orderly way and convey true understanding of the essence of things. A valid idea covers all causal relationships and shows why and how something happened. It cannot arise in a person only on the basis of sensitive experience.

Spinoza's concept of a valid idea reflects great optimism about human abilities. Man is capable of knowing everything that can be known about nature and, therefore, about God.

Actions and passions

Spinoza sought to prove that man is a part of nature. By this he meant that man has no free will: consciousness and ideas are the result of a causal series of ideas subject to thinking (an attribute from God), and actions are caused by natural events.

Spinoza divides affects (emotions such as anger, love, pride, envy, etc., which are also subject to nature) into passions and actions. If the event is a consequence of human nature (for example, knowledge or reliable ideas), then we are observing the action of consciousness. When an event occurs as a result of external influence, the person is passive. Whether a person acts or remains passive, his mental and physical abilities change. Spinoza argued that in the nature of any being there is a desire for preservation and that affect can be considered a deviation from the usual order of things.

According to Spinoza, a person should strive to free himself from passions and act. But since it is impossible to completely reject them, it is necessary to limit and pacify them. Through action and limitation of passions, a person becomes “free” in the sense that everything that happens is the result of his nature, and not of external forces. This process also helps you cope with the ups and downs of life. According to Spinoza, a person should not rely on imagination and feelings. Passions show how external objects can influence a person's abilities.

Virtue and happiness

In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that man needs to control value judgments and minimize the influence of passions and external objects. This is achieved through virtue, which Spinoza describes as the pursuit of and understanding of valid ideas and knowledge. Ultimately, this means the desire to know God (the third type of knowledge). Knowledge of God creates love for objects, which is not a passion but a blessing. It is an understanding of the universe, as well as virtue and happiness.
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GREAT PHILOSOPHERS: contents:

BENEDICT SPinoza(1632-1677) - Dutch materialist philosopher, pantheist and atheist. Two of his major works are known - “Theological-Political Treatise” (1670) and “Ethics” (1675). He saw the goal of philosophy in domination over external nature and the improvement of man.

Spinoza: The basis of his philosophical system is the doctrine of substance. Substance is a single, eternal and infinite nature. Substance is one, it is the cause of itself. It does not need anything else in order to exist. Nature is divided into creative and created natures. Creating nature is God, a single substance. By identifying nature and God, Spinoza denies existence beyond the natural, which is called pantheism. Substance has two main attributes: thinking and extension (they exist with it, but are also dissolved in it). Matter is extended by them to think. Thinking is a way of self-awareness of nature; it is more perfect the wider the range of things that a person encounters. Spinoza distinguishes finite things from substance (unconditioned being) - modes, which differ from substance in that they depend on an external cause. They are characterized not only by their finitude, but also by change and movement. Modes are processes that a substance generates.

3 levels of knowledge:

1) Imagination (characterized by disordered experience)

2) Mind (a person collects knowledge with the help of evidence)

3) Mind (knowledge is achieved through intuition, without experience and evidence)

In his socio-political views, Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, considered democratic government to be the highest form of state. He limited the omnipotence of state power to the demands of freedom and reason. Spinoza believed that power that controls people through fear cannot be recognized as virtuous. People must be led in such a way that it seems to them that they are not being led, but that they live according to their own understanding and according to their free will.

Philosophical views of R. Descartes.

RENE DESCARTES(1596-1650). “Never accept as true anything that I have not clearly known.” Descartes did not deny that philosophy is the path to wisdom

“All philosophy is a tree, the roots of which are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, the branches are all other sciences.”

In the history of modern philosophy, Descartes occupies a special place as the creator of dualistic philosophical doctrine. He made an attempt to build a philosophical system based on the recognition of the simultaneous independent existence of consciousness and matter, soul and body. Descartes, thus, divided the single material world into two parts independent of each other, calling each of them substance.

The main property of a spiritual substance is thinking, while that of a material substance is extension. The remaining attributes of substances are derived from these first ones: imagination, feeling, desire - modes of thinking; figure, position, movement - modes of extension. The main definition of a spiritual substance is its indivisibility, the most important feature of a material one is divisibility to infinity.

Descartes identifies material substance with nature, and therefore everything in nature, including the bodies of animals and humans, obeys purely mechanical laws and is considered as complex machines.

The dualism of substances allows Descartes to create materialistic physics and idealistic epistemology as the doctrine of thinking substance.

“I think, therefore I am.” But a person’s “I” is not his body. After all, one can doubt the existence of the body. The body is not part of the “I”. “I” is a soul - an incorporeal entity, that is, spiritual. The soul, according to Descartes, has two abilities: thinking and will. Thinking, in turn, is the result of the implementation of two other abilities: intuition and deduction. INTUITION is the action of the soul, with the help of which it finds simple and clear concepts in itself. Clarity and distinctness of concepts is the criterion of truth.

However, a person has not only simple, but also complex knowledge. He receives them with the help of the second cognitive ability - deduction. DEDUCTION is an action of the soul that connects simple, intuitive concepts into long chains of reasoning.

Descartes argued that, apart from intuition and deduction, the mind should not allow other sources of knowledge. Concepts are given to a person along with the soul, that is, from birth (innate ideas, axioms). Deduction also does not introduce anything from the outside, but only connects concepts discovered by intuition. The mind, therefore, receives true knowledge from itself.

The philosophical position, according to which the mind finds the beginning of knowledge in itself and develops a complex system of knowledge, is called rationalism (from the Latin rationality - mind). Descartes became its founder in the philosophy of modern times. His ideas had a significant influence on the subsequent development of philosophy.

Heresy and herem

After the death of his father (1654), Baruch and his brother Gabriel took over management of the company. Spinoza’s statements of “unorthodox” views, his rapprochement with sectarians ( colleagues, a movement in Protestantism) and the actual departure from Judaism soon led to accusations of heresy.

In early 1656, Spinoza's heretical views, which were shared by the physician Juan de Prado (1614–1672?) and the teacher Daniel de Ribera, attracted the attention of the community leadership. Spinoza questioned, among other things, that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, that Adam was the first man, and that the law of Moses had superiority over "natural law". Perhaps these heretical views reflected the influence of the French freethinker Marrano I. La Peyrera (born 1594 or 1596 - died 1676), whose work The Preadamites (People Before Adam) was published in Amsterdam in 1655 G.

J. de Prado was forced to renounce his views. Spinoza refused to follow his example, and on July 27, 1656, a herem was imposed on him. The herem document was signed by S. L. Morteira (see above) and other rabbis. Members of the Jewish community were prohibited from any communication with Spinoza.

After his excommunication, Spinoza apparently studied at Leiden University. In 1658–59 he met in Amsterdam with H. de Prado. About them, in a report from Amsterdam to the Spanish Inquisition, it was indicated that they rejected the law of Moses and the immortality of the soul, and also believed that God exists only in a philosophical sense.

According to contemporaries, the Jewish community's hatred of Spinoza was so strong that attempts were even made to kill him. The hostile attitude of the community prompted Spinoza to write an apology for his views (in Spanish; not preserved), which, apparently, formed the basis of the “Theological-Political Treatise” he later wrote.

Spinoza took the name Benedict (the Latin equivalent of Baruch, a diminutive of Bento), sold his share in the company to his brother and left for the Amsterdam suburb of Overkerk. However, he soon returned and (while he was still allowed to stay in Amsterdam) became a student at the private college of the ex-Jesuit “jolly doctor” van den Enden.

Spinoza was familiar with the works of such philosophers as Abraham ibn Ezra and Maimonides, Gersonides, as well as with the treatise “The Light of the Lord” (“ Ohr Adonai") by Hasdai Crescas. He was particularly influenced by the book Puerta del Cielo (Gate of Heaven) by the cabalist Abraham Cohen Herrera, who lived in Amsterdam and died when Spinoza was very young. To these authors it is necessary to add Leon Ebreo (that is, Judah Abarbanel with his “Dialoghi d'Amore”), al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes. S. Dunin-Barkovsky also pointed out the existing connection between the “strange”, as he put it, work of Ibn Tufail “Hayy ibn Yaqzan” and the concept of Spinoza.

Grouped around Bento was a circle of devoted friends and students - Simon de Friis ( Simon Joosten de Vries), Jarikh Yelles ( Jarig Jelles), Pieter Balinh ( Pieter Balling), Lodewijk Mayer ( Lodewijk Meyer), Jan Reuwertz ( Jan Rieuwertsz), von Schuller ( von Schuller), Adriaan Kurbach ( Adrian Koerbagh), Johannes Kurbach ( Johannes Koerbagh), Johannes Bouwmeester ( Johannes Bouwmeester) and etc.

In 1670, Spinoza's Theological and Political Treatise was published anonymously, containing a critique of the religious idea of ​​revelation and a defense of intellectual, religious and political freedom. This rationalistic attack on religion caused a sensation. The book was banned everywhere, so it was sold with false title pages. Due to constant attacks, Spinoza refused to publish the Treatise in Dutch. In a lengthy letter to one of the leaders of the Sephardi community in Amsterdam, Orobio de Castro (1620–87), Spinoza defended himself against accusations of atheism.

Published anonymously in Amsterdam, The Theological and Political Treatise (1670) created a strong impression of Spinoza as an atheist. Spinoza was saved from serious persecution by the fact that the de Witt brothers, who were favorable towards the philosopher, were at the head of the state (Jan de Witt was a Cartesian). In parallel with the treatise (and in many ways for it), he wrote “Jewish Grammar”.

In May 1670 Spinoza moved to The Hague (from 1671 he lived in a house on the Paviljunsgracht canal ( Paviljoensgrachts); now this house has a Latin name Domus Spinozana), where he remains until his death.

Social upheaval and Spinoza

Although Spinoza tried not to interfere in public affairs, during the French invasion of Holland (1672) he became involuntarily drawn into political conflict when Spinoza's friend and patron, Jan de Witt (the de facto head of the Dutch state), was killed by an angry mob who considered him and his brother was responsible for the defeat. Spinoza wrote an appeal in which he called the inhabitants of The Hague “the lowest barbarians.” Only thanks to the fact that the owner of the apartment locked Spinoza and did not let him out into the street, the philosopher’s life was saved.

In 1673, the Elector of the Palatinate offered Spinoza the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, promising complete freedom of teaching on the condition that he would not attack the dominant religion. However, Spinoza rejected this proposal, wanting to preserve his freedom to express his thoughts and peace of mind.

Spinoza also refused the offer to dedicate his work to the French king Louis XIV, transmitted along with an invitation to Utrecht on behalf of the French commander, Prince L. de Condé. Dedication to the king would have guaranteed Spinoza a pension, but the philosopher preferred independence. Despite this, upon returning to The Hague, Spinoza was accused of having connections with the enemy; he managed to prove that many of the state dignitaries knew about his trip and approved of its goals.

In 1674, Spinoza completed his main work - “Ethics”, which in a systematized form contains all the main provisions of his philosophy. An attempt to publish it in 1675 ended in failure due to pressure from Protestant theologians who claimed that Spinoza denied the existence of God, although handwritten copies circulated among his closest friends. Having refused to publish his work, Spinoza continued to lead a modest life. He wrote a lot, discussed philosophical issues with friends, including G. Leibniz, but did not try to instill his radical views in anyone.

In 1675, Spinoza met the German mathematician E. W. von Tschirnhaus, and in 1676, G. W. Leibniz, who stayed in The Hague, often visited Spinoza.

On Sunday, February 21, 1677, Spinoza died of tuberculosis (a disease from which he suffered for 20 years, unwittingly aggravating it by inhaling dust when grinding optical lenses, smoking - tobacco was then considered a remedy), he was only 44 years old. The body was provisionally buried on February 25 and was soon reburied in a common grave.

They made an inventory of the property (which includes 161 books) and sold it; some of the documents (including some correspondence) were destroyed. The works of Spinoza, in accordance with his wishes, were published in the same year in Amsterdam Rieuwertsz with a preface by Jelles, without indicating the place of publication and the name of the author, under the title B. d. S. Opera Posthuma (in Latin), in 1678 - in a Dutch translation (Nagelate Schriften). Also in 1678, all of Spinoza's works were banned.

Historical significance of Spinoza

Spinoza was the first modern thinker who did not belong to any church or sect. Spinoza's Ethics was published for the first time in the book Posthumous Works (in Latin, 1677; simultaneously in Dutch translation). The “Posthumous Works” also included the unfinished work “Treatise on the Improvement of the Human Mind” (written in Latin around 1661), “Political Treatise” (completed shortly before the author’s death), “A Brief Exposition of the Grammar of the Hebrew Language” (unfinished) and selected letters.

Non-philosophical works of Spinoza

Most researchers admit that although Spinoza differed with Descartes in his views on a number of the most important issues of philosophy, he adopted from him the ideal of building a unified philosophical system based on clear and distinct “self-evident” knowledge - modeled on the principles of mathematics; From Descartes he learned the basic concepts of his system, although he gave them new, original content.

Metaphysics

Spinoza builds his metaphysics by analogy with logic in the Ethics, his main work. What it involves:

• (1) setting the alphabet (definition of terms),
• (2) formulation of logical laws (axioms),
• (3) derivation of all other provisions (theorems) through logical consequences.

This form guarantees the truth of the conclusions if the axioms are true. The goal of metaphysics for Spinoza was for man to achieve peace of mind, contentment and joy. He believed that this goal could be achieved only through man's knowledge of his nature and his place in the universe. And this, in turn, requires knowledge of the nature of reality itself. Therefore, Spinoza turns to the study of being as such.

This study leads to the primary being from both ontological and logical points of view - to infinite substance, which is the cause of itself (causa sui).

In relation to Spinoza's Ethics, it should be mentioned, however, that while clearly focusing on this ideal, it does not always fully satisfy it (this applies to the proof of individual theorems).

Substance

Substance in Spinoza, that which “exists in itself and is represented through itself” (E:I, def.). Every finite thing is only a particular, limited manifestation of an infinite substance. Substance is the world or nature in the most general sense. Substance (aka “nature”, aka “god” - “Deus sive Natura”) there is only one, that is, it is All existing.

Thus, Spinoza’s God is not a personal being in the traditional religious understanding: “neither mind nor will have a place in the nature of God” (E: I, sch. to v. 17). Substance is infinite in space and eternal in time. Substance, by definition, is indivisible: divisibility is only the appearance of finite things. Any “finite” thing (a specific person, a flower, a stone) is a part of this substance, its modification, its mode.

There is one substance, since two substances would limit each other, which is incompatible with the infinity inherent in substance.

This position of Spinoza is directed against Descartes, who asserted the existence of created substances along with the substance of their Creator.

Attribute

Created substances" of Descartes - extended and thinking - are transformed by Spinoza into attributes of a single substance. Attribute - what constitutes the essence of a substance, its fundamental property. According to Spinoza, substance has an infinite number of attributes, but only two of them are known to man - extension and thinking.

Attributes can be interpreted as real active forces of the substance that Spinoza calls God. God is a single cause, manifesting itself in various forces expressing His essence.

The attributes are completely independent, that is, they cannot influence each other. However, both for the substance as a whole and for each individual thing, the descriptions through the attribute of extension and thinking are consistent: “The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things” (E: II, vol. 7).

This interpretation brings the relation of God-substance to attributes closer to the relation of the transcendental Deity (see Ein-sof) to His emanations (see Sephiroth) in Kabbalah. The paradox of the relationship of the infinite Divinity to the extra-divine world is overcome in Kabbalah with the help of the concept of God’s self-limitation (tzimtzum).

Evidence for the Existence of God

The three proofs of the existence of God given by Spinoza are based on the so-called ontological proof, which Descartes also used. However, Spinoza's God is not the transcendent God of theology and theistic philosophy: He does not exist outside the world, but is identical with the world. Spinoza expressed this pantheistic view in the famous formula “Deus sive Natura” (“God or Nature”).

Spinoza's God cannot be ascribed any personal properties, including will. Although Spinoza says that God is free, he means that God is subject only to his own nature, and therefore in God freedom is identical with necessity. Only God, as causa sui, has freedom; all finite beings are conditioned by God.

The fact that out of the infinite number of attributes of God we know only two - extension and thinking - follows exclusively from the limitations of our mind. Each individual thing is a partial revelation of substance and all its attributes; the infinite mind of God knows them completely. According to Spinoza, every thought is only a part or mode of an attribute of thinking. It follows that every single thing - not just the human body - has a soul. Every material thing finds expression in the attribute of thought as an idea in the Divine mind; this expression is the mental aspect of the thing, or its “soul.”

God also has the attribute of extension, but this attribute is not identical to the material world, since matter is divisible, and the infinite God cannot be divided into parts. God has extension in the sense that He is expressed in the very fact of the existence of the material world and in the pattern to which this world is subject. A different pattern prevails in the field of thinking. Each of these areas is infinite in its own way, but both of them are equally attributes of the one God.

The result of dividing attributes into parts is modes. Each mode is a separate thing in which a certain final aspect of a single substance finds expression. The set of modes is infinite due to the infinity of substance. This multitude is not external to God, but abides in Him. Each individual thing is a partial negation within an infinite system. According to Spinoza, "every determination is a negation." Attributes are divided into modes of varying degrees: direct and indirect.

In God, or substance, Spinoza distinguishes two aspects: creative nature (Natura naturans) and created nature (Natura naturata). The first is God and His attributes, the second is the world of modes, infinite and finite. Both natures, however, belong to a single substance, which is the internal cause of all modes. In the realm of modes, strict determinism reigns: each finite mode is determined by another mode of the same attribute; the entire set of modes is determined by substance.

Stretch

Stretch is the defining feature of the body; all “physical” characteristics of things are reduced to it through the “infinite mode of movement and rest.”

Thinking

However, the world is not only extended, it is characterized by at least one more attribute - thinking.

The term “thinking” Spinoza designates the entire content of consciousness: sensations, emotions, the mind itself, etc. Substance as a whole, as a thinking thing, is characterized by the “mode of infinite reason.” And since thinking is an attribute of substance, then any individual thing, that is, any modification of substance, possesses it (not only humans, and not even only “living” things) are conscious: all things “albeit in different degrees, however, all are animated” (E:II, sketch to volume 13). At the same time, Spinoza calls a specific modification of the attribute of thinking idea.

At the human level, extension and thought constitute body and soul. “The object of the idea that makes up the human soul is the body, in other words, a certain mode of extension that acts in reality (actually) and nothing more” (E:II, vol. 13), therefore the complexity of the human soul corresponds to the complexity of the human body. Naturally (this follows from the independence of the attributes), “neither the body can determine the soul to thinking, nor the soul can determine the body either to movement, or to rest, or to anything else” (E: III, vol. 2).

Such a “structure” also makes it possible to explain the process of cognition: The body changes - either as a result of the influence of external agents (other bodies), or due to internal reasons. The soul as an idea of ​​the body changes with it (or, which is the same thing, the body changes with the soul), that is, it “knows” about the changes in the body. Now a person feels, for example, pain when the body is damaged, etc. The soul has no verification of the acquired knowledge except for the mechanisms of sensation and reactions of the body.

Causality

Spinoza's extreme determinism excludes free will; the consciousness of freedom is an illusion arising from ignorance of the causes of our mental states. Spinoza's determinism also excludes chance, the idea of ​​which is also the fruit of ignorance of the causes of a particular event. Spinoza builds his ethics on the basis of strict determinism.

Causality . Everything must have its causal explanation, “nam ex nihilo nihil fit (for nothing comes from nothing).” Individual things, acting on each other, are connected by a rigid chain of mutual causation, and there can be no breaks in this chain. All of nature is an endless series of causes and effects, which in their totality constitute an unambiguous necessity, “things could not have been produced by God in any other way and in any other order than they were produced” (E: I, vol. 33). The idea of ​​randomness of certain phenomena arises only because we consider these things in isolation, without connection with others. “If people clearly understood the order of Nature, they would find everything as necessary as everything that mathematics teaches”; “God’s laws are not such that they can be broken.”

At the human level (as well as at the level of any other thing), this means the complete absence of such a phenomenon as “free will”. The opinion about free will arises from the imaginary apparent arbitrariness of people’s actions, “they are aware of their actions, but they do not know the reasons by which they are determined” (E: III v. 2). Therefore, “the child is convinced that he is freely seeking milk, the angry boy is convinced that he is freely seeking revenge, the coward is convinced of flight. A drunk is convinced that, by the free determination of his soul, he says what a sober person would later wish to take back” (E:III, vol. 2). Spinoza contrasts freedom not with necessity, but with coercion or violence. “A person’s desire to live, love, etc. is by no means forced upon him by force, and, however, it is necessary.”

Anthropology (the study of man)

Man, according to Spinoza, is a mode revealed in two attributes; soul and body are different aspects of one being. The soul is the concept of the body, or the body as it is conscious. Every event in the world is simultaneously a mode of the attributes of extension and thought. The material system - the body - is reflected in the system of ideas - the soul. These ideas are not only concepts, but also different mental states (feelings, desires, etc.).

Man, like all other creatures in the Universe, has an inherent desire (conatus) for self-preservation. This desire expresses the infinite Divine power. The only criterion for evaluating phenomena is the benefit or harm they bring to humans. It is necessary to distinguish between what is really useful to a person and what only seems useful. Ethics is thus made dependent on knowledge.

Theory of knowledge

Spinoza's theory of knowledge is based on the position that human thinking is a partial revelation of the Divine attribute of thinking. Spinoza considers the criterion of the truth of thinking not to be the correspondence of a concept to an object, but its clarity and logical connection with other concepts. The correspondence of a concept to its subject is ensured only by the metaphysical doctrine of the unity of all attributes in a single substance. The error lies in separating the concept from the whole.

Spinoza distinguishes three stages of knowledge: opinion (opinio), based on idea or imagination; rational knowledge (ratio) and intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva). The highest level of knowledge is intuitive comprehension, which considers reality “from the point of view of eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis), that is, in a supra-temporal logical connection with the whole - God, or nature. However, even the highest level of knowledge does not in itself ensure the deliverance of a person from passions and suffering; to achieve this, cognition must be accompanied by a corresponding affect (affectus).

Psychology: affects

Spinoza's teaching on the affects, which occupies more than half of his Ethics, is based on the concept of the desire (conatus) for existence, expressed in parallel in the bodily and mental spheres. To prove the ability of the mind to resist affects is the main task of Ethics.

Affect refers to both the state of the human soul, which has vague or unclear ideas, and the associated state of the human body. There are three main affects experienced by a person: pleasure, displeasure and desire.

Affects-passions can fill a person’s entire consciousness, persistently pursue him, to the point that the person under their influence, even seeing the best in front of him, will be forced to follow the worst. Spinoza calls man's powerlessness in the fight against his passions slavery (E: IV preface).

Affects, having arisen from one reason or another, can be combined with each other in numerous ways, forming more and more new varieties of affects and passions. Their diversity is caused not only by the nature of this or that object, but also by the nature of the person himself. The power of affects over people increases due to the general prejudice that people freely control their passions and can get rid of them at any time.

Natural desires are a form of violence. We don't choose to have them. Our desire cannot be free if it is subject to forces outside ourselves. Thus, our real interests are not in the satisfaction of these desires, but in their transformation through knowledge of their causes. Reason and intuition (clear direct comprehension) are called upon to free a person from submission to passions.

Affects are the expression of this desire in the mental sphere. Spinoza subjects various affects to analysis (which in many ways anticipates modern psychology). Man emerges in this analysis as a largely irrational being, to whom most of his motives and passions are unknown. Knowledge of the first stage leads to a clash of different aspirations in a person’s soul. This is the “slavery of man,” which can only be overcome with the help of affects stronger than those that dominate him.

Purely theoretical knowledge is not enough to change the nature of affect. But the more a man uses the power of his mind, the more clearly he understands that his thoughts flow necessarily from his essence as a thinking being; this strengthens his specific desire for existence (conatus), and he becomes freer.

Good for a person is what contributes to the disclosure and strengthening of his natural essence, his specific life aspiration - reason. When a person recognizes the affects that enslave him (which are always accompanied by sadness or suffering), when he recognizes their true causes, their power disappears, and with it sadness disappears.

At the second stage of knowledge, when affects are recognized as necessarily arising from the general laws prevailing in the world, sadness gives way to joy (laetitia). This stage of cognition is accompanied by an affect that is stronger than the affects characteristic of sensuality, since the subject of this affect is the eternal laws of reality, and not the private, transitory things that constitute the objects of the first stage of cognition.

The highest good is known, however, at the third stage of knowledge, when a person comprehends himself in God, “from the point of view of eternity.” This cognition is associated with the affect of joy that accompanies the concept of God as the cause of joy. Since the strength of the joy that love brings depends on the nature of the object of love, love for an eternal and infinite object is the strongest and most constant.

At the intuitive stage of knowledge, a person knows himself as a private mode of God, therefore the one who knows himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God. This is the “intellectual love of God” (amor Dei intellectualis). Spinoza uses the language of religion: he speaks of the “salvation of the soul” and the “second birth,” but his views are far from the traditional position of the Jewish and Christian religions. Spinoza's God is identical with eternal and infinite nature. He does not have personality traits, so a person cannot expect reciprocal love from God.

Intellectual love for God, according to the teachings of Spinoza, is the property of the individual; it cannot have the social or moral expression that characterizes historical religions. Spinoza recognizes the immortality of the soul, which he identifies with a particle of God's thought. The more a person comprehends his place in God, the more part of his soul achieves immortality. Man's self-knowledge is part of God's self-knowledge.

Once we know that we are part of the system of the world and are subject to rational necessary laws, we realize how irrational it would be to want things to be different from what they are - "all things are necessary... there is neither good nor evil in nature" . This means that it is irrational to envy, hate and feel guilty. The existence of these emotions presupposes the existence of distinct, independent things acting in accordance with free will.

Affect is a reflection of feeling. The definition of “Absence of affect” is used in psychiatry.

Political philosophy

Political philosophy is expounded in Spinoza's Ethics, but mainly in the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise. To a large extent, it follows from the metaphysics of Spinoza, but it also reveals the influence of the teachings of T. Hobbes. Like the latter, Spinoza distinguishes between the state of nature, in which no social organization exists, and the state of government.

Social contract

According to Spinoza, there are no natural rights except one, which is identical with force or desire (conatus). In the natural state, people are like fish: the big ones devour the small ones. In the state of nature, people live in constant fear. To save themselves from constantly threatening danger, people enter into an agreement with each other, according to which they renounce their “natural rights” (that is, the ability to act as they please in accordance with their natural forces) in favor of state power.

This agreement does not, however, have a morally binding force - agreements should be respected as long as they are useful. Therefore, power depends on its ability to force people to obey. The identification of law with opportunity or ability, which was characteristic, according to Spinoza, of the natural state of people, is recognized as characteristic of the relationship between state power and subjects.

The subject must submit to authority as long as it enforces social order by force; however, if the government forces its subjects to commit unseemly acts or threatens their lives, rebellion against the government is a lesser evil. A reasonable ruler will try not to lead his subjects to rebellion. Spinoza considers the best form of government to be a republic based on the principles of reason. This form is the most durable and stable, since the citizens of the republic submit to the authorities of their own free will and enjoy reasonable freedom.

In this Spinoza differs from Hobbes, a supporter of absolute monarchy. In a reasonably structured state, the interests of an individual coincide with the interests of the entire society. The state limits the freedom of action of a citizen, but cannot limit his freedom of thought and freedom to express his opinions. Independent thinking is an essential property of a person. Thus, Spinoza defends the idea of ​​freedom of conscience, which predetermined his entire fate.

Religion and State

However, he makes a distinction between the theoretical and practical sides of religion: faith is a personal matter for everyone, but the fulfillment of practical instructions, especially those relating to a person’s relationship with his neighbors, is a matter of the state.

According to Spinoza, religion should be state; any attempt to separate religion (practical) from the state and create a separate church within the state leads to the destruction of the state. State authorities have the right to use religion as a means of strengthening public discipline.

Exploring the relationship between religion and state, Spinoza critically describes the Jewish state during the First and Second Temple eras. Some researchers believe that Spinoza's criticism was actually directed against attempts by the Protestant clergy to interfere in Dutch state affairs. Others, however, believe that the object of Spinoza's criticism was the leadership of the Jewish community, as a result of the conflict with which the free thinker was placed outside the framework of Judaism.

According to Spinoza, the Jewish state in ancient times was the only attempt of its kind to put into practice the idea of ​​theocracy, in which God is given the place occupied in other government systems by the monarch or the aristocracy. God could not rule the Jewish people except through His messengers.

The legislator and supreme interpreter of the will of God was Moses, and after his death two systems of power arose - spiritual (priests and prophets) and secular (judges, later kings). The first temple fell due to the struggle between these authorities, the second - due to attempts by the clergy to subordinate state affairs to religious considerations. Spinoza comes to the conclusion that theocracy cannot exist at all, and that the seemingly theocratic regime is in reality the disguised domination of people who are considered messengers of God.

TANAKH study and its results

Spinoza is generally considered the founder of biblical criticism. He tried to find in the text of the Bible evidence that it is not a revelation from God that surpasses the powers of human reason. Spinoza believes that the Bible does not contain evidence of the existence of God as a supernatural being, but it shows how to instill beneficial fear in the hearts of ordinary people who are incapable of abstract thinking.

The impetus for critical study of the Bible came from Spinoza's acquaintance with the writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra, who for the first time (albeit in the form of a hint) expressed doubt that Moses was the author of the entire Pentateuch. Spinoza claims that certain parts of the Bible were written after the death of Moses by another author. According to Spinoza, other books of the Bible were written not by the people to whom their authorship is attributed, but by those who lived later.

In his research, Spinoza relies on biblical, talmudic and other sources (for example, on the writings of Josephus). Spinoza's research was far ahead of its time and did not evoke a response from his contemporaries - Jews did not read the works of the “heretic,” and Christians were not ready to accept his ideas.

The first and for a long time the only author who drew ideas from Spinoza's book was the French Hebraist, Catholic monk R. Simon. His work “A Critical History of the Old Testament” (1678) caused heated controversy and brought persecution on the author by church authorities; however, his critical study of the Bible is not deep enough compared to Spinoza's.

The direct or indirect influence of Spinoza on the critical study of the Bible was felt much later. The difference discovered by Spinoza in the names of God found in the books of the Bible became one of the main postulates of biblical criticism and formed the basis of the so-called documentary hypothesis of the composition of the biblical text.

Biblical criticism also adopted Spinoza's idea of ​​​​the special character of Deuteronomy, although it attributed the publication of this book to the era of Joshua, and attributed to Ezra the compilation of the so-called priestly code (Priestercodex). Spinoza's rationalistic approach to the Bible, consistent with his philosophical views, made him the founder of a new scientific discipline - biblical criticism.

Spinoza and Kabbalah

Solomon Maimon, who studied Kabbalah in his youth, drew attention to the closeness of Spinozism to it: “Kabbalah is only an expanded Spinozism” (“erweiterter Spinozismus”). Subsequently, K. Siegwart, A. Krochmal, J. Freudenthal, G. Wolfson, S. Dunin-Borkowski, I. Sonn, as well as G. Scholem, were very attentive to the Kabbalistic traces in Spinoza’s philosophy.

As the Jewish researcher Isaiah Sonn noted, in the 17th century. Spinoza's opponents argued that the philosophical content of his "heretical" philosophy was drawn from the Kabbalah, while its mathematical form was inherited from the philosophy of Descartes. Spinozism is thus “Kabbalah in geometric clothing.” At that time, Spinozism's connection with Kabbalah was used as a basis for its severe criticism. For example, the Cartesians believed that Spinoza distorted the philosophy of Descartes due to his dependence on Kabbalistic ideas, and even such an outstanding thinker as N. Malebranche agreed with this accusation.

One of the first and most famous attempts to connect Spinoza's philosophy with Kabbalah was announced by two books by I. G. Wachter, published at the very beginning of the 18th century. The first - “Der Spinozismus im Judenthums, oder, die von dem heutigen Judenthumb und dessen Geheimen Kabbala, vergoetterte Welt, an Mose Germano sonsten Johann Peter Spaeth von Augsburg geburtig befunden under widerleget” - appeared in Amsterdam in 1699. In it, Wachter took a very negative position towards Kabbalah, and thereby also condemned the heretic Spinoza and the atheistic philosophy supposedly stemming from Kabbalah. However, in the second book - "Elucidarius Cabalisticus sive reconditae Hebraeorum philosophiae recensio" (Romae, 1706) - Wachter gives a brief outline of Jewish occult philosophy and its connection with Spinoza. In this book, he argues that Kabbalah is “Spinozismo ante Spinozam,” and thereby exonerates Spinoza from his previous accusations.

Leibniz was also interested in this problem. In “Theodicy” he writes: “One German, a native of Swabia, several years ago became a Jew and spread his dogmatic teaching under the name of Moses Germanus, mixing this teaching with the views of Spinoza, thought that Spinoza revived the ancient Kabbalah of the Jews; It also seems that one scholar [Wachter], who refuted this Jewish proselyte, shared this opinion about Spinoza.”

Spinoza himself admitted that he studied Kabbalistic books, but expressed an extremely negative attitude towards them: “I also read and, in addition, knew some chatterbox Kabbalists, whose madness I could never be sufficiently amazed at.” However, Dunin-Borkowski correctly commented on this passage: “Contrasts are sometimes a source of incitement and excitement.” Spinoza's disparaging remark in the Theological-Political Treatise was directed at the Kabbalistic exegesis of the Bible; it has nothing to do with the question of the influence of Kabbalah on his philosophy, for example, on the concept of immanence. (See: Nechipurenko V.N. Spinoza in the mirror of the Jewish philosophical and mystical tradition // News of higher educational institutions. North Caucasus region. Public Sciences, 2005, No. 1, pp. 13-21).

Spinoza's philosophy and Israel

Some Jewish thinkers considered Spinoza the first Jew to adhere to secular, national and even Zionist views (Spinoza wrote about the possibility of restoring a Jewish state in the Land of Israel). N. Sokolov called for the abolition of the herem once imposed on Spinoza; his opinion was shared by I. G. Klausner and D. Ben-Gurion.

In 1977, an international philosophical congress was held in Jerusalem, dedicated. 300th anniversary of the death of Spinoza. A scientific center for the study of Spinoza's philosophy was established at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In modern philosophy, interest in Spinoza does not wane: the studies of the English philosopher S. Hampshire (“Spinoza”, Harmondworth, 1951), the Israeli philosophers S. Pines (“Theological and Political Treatise” of Spinoza, Maimonides and Kant”, Jer., are devoted to him). 1968) and J. Yovela (born in 1935; “Spinoza ve-kofrim acherim” - “Spinoza and other heretics”, T.-A., 1989) and others.

Philosophy of Spinoza in Russia

Such Russian authors as Feofan Prokopovich, Alexander Galich and Nikolai Nadezhdin were interested in Spinoza’s philosophy and mentioned it in their works.

N. N. Strakhov, V. S. Solovyov, A. I. Vvedensky, L. M. Lopatin, N. Ya. Grot, B. N. Chicherin, V. S. Shilkarsky, V. N. devoted their research to the philosophy of Spinoza. Polovtsova, S. L. Frank, E. N. Trubetskoy, L. M. Robinson, S. N. Bulgakov, L. Shestov and others.

V. Solovyov, polemicized with the neo-Kantian A. Vvedensky, who wrote about the “atheism of Spinoza.” Soloviev viewed Spinoza's teaching as a philosophy of unity, which in many ways anticipated his own religious philosophy. L. Shestov saw in Spinoza's rationalism and objectivism a perfect example of traditional philosophy, generated by the Fall and expressing the enslavement of man by abstract truths.

Currently, such Russian scientists as T. A. Dmitriev, N. V. Motroshilova, S. V. Kaidakov, K. A. Sergeev, I. S. Kaufman, A. D. Maidansky are studying the philosophy of Spinoza in Russia. It should be noted that the number and breadth of topics of Russian Spinoza studies is still inferior to foreign ones (since the late 1960s, the “Spinozian renaissance” has led to quantitative and qualitative growth in all major European and world languages ​​- English, Spanish, Italian, German and French).

Translators of Spinoza into Russian

• Brushlinsky, Vladimir Konstantinovich
• N. A. Ivantsov
• V. I. Modestov
• M. Lopatkin
• G. Polinkovsky
• Polovtsova, Varvara Nikolaevna
• S. M. Rogovin
• E. V. Spectorsky

Essays

• OK. 1660 “About God, Man and His Happiness”
• 1662 "Treatise on the Improvement of the Mind"
• 1663 “The Foundations of Descartes’ Philosophy, Proved Geometrically”
• 1670 "Theological-Political Treatise"
• 1677 "Political treatise"
• 1677 "Ethics Proved in Geometric Order and Divided into Five Parts"
• 1677 "Hebrew Grammar"

Literature

• Kovner S. R. Spinoza, his life and writings. Warsaw, 1897.
• Dittes F. Critical studies on the moral philosophy of Spinoza. St. Petersburg, 1900.
• Dittes F. Ethics of Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. St. Petersburg, 1902.
• Robinson L. Metaphysics of Spinoza. St. Petersburg, 1913.
• Kechekyan S. F.. Spinoza's ethical worldview. M., 1914.
• Luppol I.K. Benedict Spinoza. M., 1924
• Mankovsky L. A. Spinoza and materialism. M., 1930
• Belenky M. S. Spinoza. M., 1964.
• Konikov I. A. Spinoza's materialism. M.: "Science", 1971. - 268 p.
• Sokolov V.V. Spinoza. - M.: Mysl, 1973. - (Thinkers of the past).
• Maidansky A. D. Geometric order of proof and logical method in Spinoza’s Ethics // Questions of Philosophy. M., 1999. No. 11. P. 172-180.
• Kaufman I. S. The philosophy of Spinoza in Russia. First part. 1774-1884. // Historical and philosophical yearbook 2004. M., 2005. P.312-344.
• Lunacharsky A.V. Spinoza and the bourgeoisie 1933 Notification: The preliminary basis for this article was the article by SPINOZ Baruch in EEE

  Notification: The preliminary basis for this article was a similar article in http://ru.wikipedia.org, under the terms of CC-BY-SA, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0, which was subsequently changed, corrected and edited.
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SPINOZA, BENEDICT(Spinoza, Benedictus) (1632–1677), or Baruch d'Espinoza, famous Dutch philosopher, one of the greatest rationalists of the 17th century. Born in Amsterdam on November 24, 1632. Spinoza's parents were Jewish emigrants who moved from Portugal, and he was raised in spirit of Orthodox Judaism. However, in 1656, after a conflict with the city authorities, Spinoza was subjected to the “great excommunication” by the Jewish community for heretical views (mainly related to Christianity - the community feared a deterioration in relations with the authorities), and in 1660 he was forced to leave Amsterdam and moved to several years to the village of Rheinsburg near Leiden, where he continued to maintain connections with the circle of collegians - a religious brotherhood that later united with the Mennonites. From Rheinsburg he moved to Voorburg - a village near The Hague, and from 1670 until his death on February 21, 1677 he lived in The Hague itself. Spinoza earned made his living by making and grinding lenses for spectacles, microscopes and telescopes, and by giving private lessons; in subsequent years his income was supplemented by a modest pension, which was paid by two noble patrons. Thanks to this, he led an independent lifestyle and could afford to study philosophy and correspond with leading scientists of the time. In 1673, he was offered a position as a professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but Spinoza refused the offer, citing hostility towards him from the official church. His main works are Theological-political treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus), published anonymously in Amsterdam in 1670, and Ethics (Ethica), begun in 1663 and completed in 1675, but published only in 1677 in Latin in a book Posthumous works (Opera Posthuma) together with unfinished treatises on the scientific method ( Treatise on the Improvement of the Mind, Tractatus de Emendatiae Intellectus), about political theory ( Tractatus Politicus), Hebrew grammar ( Compendium Grammatics Linguae Hebraeae) and letters. The only book published during Spinoza's lifetime and under his name was the work The Principles of Rene Descartes' Philosophy, Parts I and II, Proved Geometrically (Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II, More Geometrico Demonstratae, per Benedictum de Spinoza, 1663).

The years of Spinoza's life coincided with the beginning of the modern era. In his work, he carried out a synthesis of scientific ideas of the Renaissance with Greek, Stoic, Neoplatonic and scholastic philosophy. One of the difficulties faced by researchers trying to comprehend the ideas of his most famous work is Ethics, is that Spinoza often uses scholastic terms in a completely different sense, not accepted in scholasticism. Therefore, in order to understand the real meaning of this work, it is necessary to take into account the significantly new scientific and ontological premises on which the philosopher relied.

Spinoza's main area of ​​interest is philosophical anthropology, the study of man in his relation to society and the entire universe. The originality of his ideas lay in his attempt to extend the “Copernican revolution” to the fields of metaphysics, psychology, ethics and politics. In other words, Spinoza considered nature in general and human nature in particular objectively and impartially - as if they were geometric problems, and tried, as much as possible, to exclude the humanly understandable desire for wishful thinking, for example, to assume the existence of ends or final causes in nature. “Geometric method”, which sets out Ethics, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid accusations of partiality to certain views. Following Giordano Bruno, Spinoza viewed the cosmos not as a finite but as an infinite system and adhered to the heliocentric rather than the geocentric hypothesis adopted in scholasticism. Nature, according to Spinoza, is the cause of itself (causa sui). Spinoza considered man to be a part of the natural order, and not a special creation not subject to the universal laws of nature. God is a dynamic principle immanent in nature as a whole (natura naturans , generative nature), rather than some transcendent creator of the natural order. As a dynamic principle, Spinoza's God is essentially the impersonal God of science - a God who is the object of "intellectual love" (amor Dei intellectualis), but, unlike the biblical God, does not reciprocate human love and is not particularly concerned with well-being individuals under his care.

Starting from Cartesian dualism, Spinoza put forward a theory of parallelism between body and consciousness, according to which consciousness, like the body, also obeys certain laws. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza considered “extension” and “thought” as attributes of a single substance. He considered consciousness to be a kind of “spiritual automaton” that obeys its own necessary laws, just as the body obeys the laws of motion. In addition, Spinoza, along with Hobbes, was one of the first to apply Galileo’s law of inertia to psychology and ethics, expressing the idea that, by the nature of things, every form of life strives to remain in its existence and maintain it indefinitely, until it encounters an obstacle in the form of some superior strength. Spinoza's introduction of the concept of the primacy of the conatus for self-preservation - later developed by Darwin from an evolutionary biological point of view - marked a complete break with the theory of the scholastics, who believed that all natural forms are directed towards predetermined goals, or final causes, and that human nature exists for the sake of some transcendental, supernatural goal.

IN Ethics Spinoza attempts to construct a psychology of emotions as dynamic forces subject to laws that can be logically deduced from the three primary affects or emotions, namely pleasure (joy), displeasure (sadness) and desire. Spinoza's idea that emotional life is subject to a certain logic, and that emotions are not simply irrational forces or illnesses that must somehow be suppressed or overcome, found recognition only after the emergence of psychoanalysis.

In ethics, Spinoza's originality was manifested in his revaluation of traditional moral values ​​- a fact later recognized by F. Nietzsche - and the interpretation of virtue as a state of freedom. Spinoza's moral theory is naturalistic and appeals to this world; it opposes religious transcendentalism, which claims that earthly life is only a preparation for the afterlife. Not sadness and feelings of sin or guilt, but joy and peace of mind are the main motives of Spinoza’s philosophy of life. In his entire psychological and ethical theory, a central role is played by the idea that we must understand human nature in order to learn how to manage it (an idea that F. Bacon expressed in relation to all of nature as a whole).

In Spinoza's teaching, ethics and religion are interconnected. His philosophy of life represents a classic modern attempt to build a rational, universal system, dispensing with supernatural sanctions and any appeal to biblical revelation. This approach made Spinoza's views especially attractive to people of science, such as Einstein, poets - Goethe and Wordsworth, who were looking for unity with nature, and many free-thinking people who did not accept the dogmatism and intolerance of official theology. Spinoza's views had a huge influence on the development of philosophical thought of the New Age, in particular on German classical philosophy.

Benedict Spinoza(Baruch de Spinoza; Benedictus de Spinoza; 1632-1677) - Dutch materialist philosopher, pantheist, atheist, naturalist, one of the main representatives of modern philosophy.

Born in Amsterdam in the family of a merchant who belonged to the Jewish community. Having headed his business after the death of his father (1654), Spinoza simultaneously established scientific and friendly connections outside the Jewish community of Amsterdam, especially among people opposed to the Calvinist church that dominated in the Netherlands. Spinoza was greatly influenced by his mentor in Latin, van den Enden, a follower of Vanini, an anti-monarchist and supporter of democratic reforms, as well as Acosta, a representative of Heb. freethinking. Leaders of the European The communities of Amsterdam subjected Spinoza to the “great excommunication” (herem). Fleeing from persecution by the leaders of the Jews. community, as well as the Amsterdam magistrate, Spinoza lived in the village, forced to earn money by grinding lenses, then in Rijnsburg, a suburb of The Hague, where he created his philosophical works.

In the struggle against the oligarchic leadership of the Jewish community, Spinoza became a decisive opponent of Judaism (“Theological-political treatise”, in the book: Izbr. proizv., vol. 2, M., 1957, pp. 60–62). The proximity of Spinoza to the small towns. The movement of Rheinsburg pantheist sectarians (partly the English Quakers) explains the echoes of some ideas of utopian communism in his writings (see ibid., vol. 1, M., 1957, pp. 323–24, 583–84, etc. 2, pp. 51, 559–60). In the ideological and political views of Spinoza, a supporter of the republic. rule and an opponent of the monarchy, was also reflected in his closeness to the party of de Witt (a scientist mathematician and the de facto head of the then Dutch state), which fought against the Orange-monarchist. parties.

Spinoza's philosophical views were initially formed under the influence of Heb. Middle-century philosophy (Maimonides, Crescas, Ibn Ezra). Its overcoming was the result of Spinoza's assimilation of Bruno's pantheistic-materialistic views, the rationalistic method, mechanistic and mathematical natural science, as well as the philosophy of Hobbes, who had the greatest influence on Spinoza's sociological doctrine. Based on mechanics and mathematics. methodology, which he considered the only scientific one, Spinoza strove to understand “... the root cause and origin of all things” (ibid., vol. 2, p. 388). At the same time, Spinoza thought of the creation of a holistic picture of nature as the simultaneous disclosure of the genesis of all objects and phenomena. Continuing the traditions of pantheism, Spinoza made the central point of his ontology the identity of God and nature, which he understood as the one and only, eternal and infinite substance, excluding the existence of humanity. other beginning, and thereby - as the cause of itself ( causa sui). Recognizing the reality of infinitely diverse departments. things, Spinoza viewed them as a set of modes - individual manifestations of a single substance.

In this regard, Spinoza put forward the famous dialectic. position: “...limitation is negation...” (ibid., p. 568): every thing as a mode, in its certainty, must be thought of as a result of the limitation of infinite substance.

Understanding the integrity of nature, Spinoza developed the categories of whole and part, revealing the universal correspondence of natural things to each other. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Spinoza considered it impossible to decompose the whole into parts (see ibid., p. 525) and believed that one should, on the contrary, go from the whole to its parts. At the same time, Spinoza did not overcome the mechanistic. views on the phenomena and processes of nature only as a result of spaces. moving things. In his ontology t.zr. actually infinite substance, outside of time generating the world of its modifications and interpreted as generating nature (natura naturans), is combined with the so-called. potentially infinite individual things changing in time and interpreted as generated nature ( natura naturata).

A qualitative characteristic of a substance is given by Spinoza in the concept of an attribute as an integral property of a substance. The number of attributes is in principle infinite, although only two of them are revealed to the finite human mind - extension and thinking. In contrast to Descartes, who dualistically contrasted extension and thought as two independent substances, the monist Spinoza saw in them two attributes of the same substance.

When considering the world of individual things, Spinoza acted as one of the most radical representatives of determinism and opponents of teleology, which was highly appreciated by Engels (see K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, 2nd ed., vol. 20, p. 350). At the same time, interpreting determinism only as mechanistic, identifying causality with necessity and considering chance only as a subjective category, Spinoza came to the so-called. mechanistic fatalism. Spinoza was convinced that the whole world is mathematical. system and can be fully understood geometrically. way. According to Spinoza's plan, the infinite mode of motion and rest should connect the world of individual things that interact with each other with substance, conceivable in the attribute of extension. Dr. The infinite mode is the infinite mind (intellectus infinitus), which must connect the world of individual things with the substance conceivable in the attribute of thinking. Spinoza argued that in principle all things are animate, although to varying degrees. However, the main the property of infinite reason - “to always know everything clearly and distinctly” (Izbr. prod., vol. 1, p. 108) - Spinoza applied only to man.

Spinoza interpreted man in a naturalistic-materialistic way as a part of nature, considering from this perspective. his body and soul. Understanding the soul as a particle of the “infinite mind of God” (see ibid., p. 412), Spinoza defined it as an idea, the object (ideat) of which is the human body. In fact, the soul always consists of a collection of ideas. Spinoza decided on psychophysics. a problem in the spirit of mutual independence of human bodily and spiritual actions, derived from ontological. independence of two attributes of a substance. He combined this view with materialism. a tendency in the explanation of thinking and human activity associated with the concept of a single substance. Dependency thinks. human activity from his bodily state is revealed, according to Spinoza, at the stage of sensory knowledge. Spinoza defined the latter as idea or imagination ( imagine) and considered unity. source of vague ideas. Sensory knowledge constitutes the first kind of knowledge, also called opinion ( opinio). It breaks down into two modes of perception: through disordered experience ( ab experientia vaga) and by hearsay ( ex audit). Without experience, according to Spinoza, people's everyday life is impossible; Sciences such as medicine and pedagogy are also based on it. However, being a supporter of rationalism, Spinoza did not highly value the theoretical significance of experimental, sensory knowledge alone, associating error with it. Believing that any error contains a certain element of truth, Spinoza defined a false idea as inadequate, since it pretends to be a complete and complete truth, but in reality reflects its object only partially, in one aspect or another, in accordance with sensory determination. Spinoza's criticism of the limitations of sensory knowledge is complemented by a criticism of abstract knowledge, which is based both on perception from disordered experience and on hearsay. Spinoza gave a profound critique of scholastic universal concepts, or universals ( notions universals) is an example of the imperfection of generalizations based on sensory experience. The criticism of scholasticism here develops in Spinoza into a criticism of the abuse of language. Considering words to be “signs of things,” as they “...exist in the imagination, and not in the mind...” (ibid., p. 350), Spinoza called for a distinction between “images, words, and ideas” and a clarification of philosophical terminology to avoid the misuse of names to things.

Spinoza's rationalism manifested itself most forcefully in its opposition to understanding ( intellectio) as units. source of reliable truths to sensory knowledge. Understanding appears in Spinoza as the second kind of knowledge, constituting reason ( ratio), as well as the mind ( intellectus). Only at this stage is adequate truth expressed in general concepts (notiones communes) possible. The latter are fundamentally different from sensory ideas of representation in that they relate to geometric. and mechanical properties of bodies, i.e. to what might be called primary qualities. General and abstract concepts, or universals, express only our sensory attitude towards them. The achievement of adequate truths, according to Spinoza, becomes possible due to the fact that the human soul, as a mode of attribute of thinking of a single substance, is capable of comprehending everything that follows from the latter. It is also possible due to the fundamental thesis of rationalism. panlogism, which identifies the principles of thinking with the principles of being: “the order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things” (ibid., p. 407). Adequate truth presupposes the coherence of all truths in the mind, which, in contrast to random associations of representation based on memory, develops its provisions according to strict laws of deduction, acting as “a kind of spiritual automaton” (see ibid., p. 349).

The third type of knowledge is intuition, which is the foundation of reliable knowledge.

Genetically, Spinoza's teaching on intuition is connected with the teachings of mystical pantheism about the “inner light” as the source of the non-discursive, immediate. communication with God and with Descartes’ teaching about the axioms of a “clear and distinct mind” as an expression of its “natural light” and the foundation of all other knowledge. At the same time, the Cartesian understanding of intuition prevailed in philosophy. development of Spinoza: he interprets intuition as intellectual. An adequate idea, achieved through the activity of intuition and deduction, expresses its truth in the analytical. judgments. The latter overcome skepticism and provide an immanent criterion of truth: “Just as light reveals both itself and the surrounding darkness, so truth is the measure of both itself and lies” (ibid., p. 440). With the help of intuition as holistic knowledge that gives the concept of the general, adequate knowledge of the particular is possible. Intuition gives knowledge of things sub specie aeternitatis(from the point of view of eternity) - not as random and isolated objects that change over time and appear to our imagination as such, but as absolutely necessary, identical to the whole modes of a single substance.

In anthropology, Spinoza rejects the idea of ​​free will, which Descartes adhered to. Spinoza's will coincides with reason. Extending the laws of mechanism to human behavior. determinism, Spinoza proved the necessary nature of all human actions without exception. Affects, or passions, manifest a person’s enslavement, unconscious dependence on the external circumstances of his life; at the level of representation, this dependence is illusory perceived by consciousness as freedom. Spinoza opposed freedom not to necessity, but to coercion. At the same time, he substantiated the dialectic. the idea of ​​compatibility of necessity and freedom, expressed by the concept of free necessity ( libera necessitas) – the center, the concept of its ethical. doctrines. Freedom, achieved by Spinoza with the help of reliable knowledge, does not eliminate affects - this is impossible, but clarifies them thanks to the awareness of their place in the chain of universal world determination. Since freedom is identified in Spinoza with knowledge, the desire for self-knowledge becomes in Spinoza the strongest of human drives. In this regard, Spinoza puts forward the famous thesis about intellectual love of God ( amor Dei intellectualis) and the idea of ​​the eternity of the human soul. This idea is associated with rationalist-panlogical. epistemology of Spinoza and pantheistic. ideas about human death as a return to a single substance. Spinoza rejected religion. dogma of personal immortality: the death of each person, according to Spinoza, means the destruction of his memory, thanks to which ideas are combined in the individual activity of the individual.

Ethics completes Spinoza's philosophical system. Rationalism, determinism, naturalism led the thinker to the principles of a completely secularized morality, with its center. the concept of a “free person”, guided in his activities only by reason. This concept is adjacent to the traditions of both Stoicism and Epicureanism. In the spirit of Epicurus, Spinoza believes that “a free man thinks of nothing so little as death, and his wisdom consists in thinking not about death, but about life” (ibid., p. 576). The principles of hedonism and utilitarianism are combined in Spinoza with the principles of ascetic contemplation. ethics.

Like other representatives of the theory of natural law and social contract, Spinoza deduced the laws of society from the characteristics of unchangeable human nature and considered it possible to harmoniously combine the private egoistic interests of citizens with the interests of the whole society.

Pantheistic in appearance, Spinoza's philosophy contained a deeply atheistic philosophy. content. Spinoza's overcoming of the concept of dual truth gave him the opportunity to lay the foundations of science. criticism of the Bible. Fear, according to Spinoza, is the cause of religion. superstitions Spinoza's anti-clericalism is associated with his awareness of politics. the role of the church as the closest ally of the monarchy. board. At the same time, in the spirit of the ideas of “natural religion,” Spinoza argues that one should distinguish between true religion, which is based on philosophical wisdom, and superstition. The Bible is superfluous for a “free person”, guided only by reason, but necessary for the vast majority of people, for the “crowd”, who live only by passions and are not capable of being guided by reason.

Spinoza's atheism had a huge influence on advanced freethinking in Western countries. Europe in the 17th–18th centuries. Atheistic and naturalistic Spinoza's ideas were continued by Diderot and other Frenchmen. materialists of the 18th century, but even more directly. had an influence on him. philosophy of the late 18th - early. 19th centuries, especially on Lessing, Goethe, Herder, and then on Schelling and Hegel (especially panlogism, the dialectic of a holistic interpretation of the world and the dialectical concept of freedom in its connection with necessity), as well as on Feuerbach. Supporters of romanticism and Schleiermacher made an attempt to interpret Spinoza's teachings in religious mystical. spirit. Later, at the end of the 19th–20th centuries. in a crisis of religions. consciousness a number of bourgeois. philosophers - Renan, Brunswick, Delbos, Gebhardt, Hessing and others tried to interpret the teachings of Spinoza in the spirit of the ideas of a “new” religion, free from the limitations of the so-called. positive religions.
V. Sokolov. Moscow.

Essays

• "Ethics"- Spinoza's main work. Written in Latin. language in 1662–1675. Its construction is similar to a geometry textbook. Each of the five parts consists of definitions, axioms and postulates, theorems and lemmas, corollaries (conclusions) and scholia (explanations), etc. First edition in 1677 in the book: “Opera posthuma” and at the same time in the Dutch translation. under the name "Zedekunst". Lat. The original text has been reprinted many times. There are translations: on it. language (1868, 1875; 5 Aufl., 1893, etc., best – 1955); English language (1883, 1884, 1949, 1951); French language (1842, in the book: Oeuvres, t. 2; 1861, ibid., t. 3; 1872, ibid., t. 3; 1909); Spanish language (1913, 1920. 1940); Italian language (1914, 1928, 1938, 1941); Bulgarian language (1955); Polish language (1914); Czech language (1925); Hungarian language (1918, 1952); tour. language (1934); Hebrew (1885); Yiddish (1923). In Russian language There are two translations: V. I. Modestov (1886, 4th ed. 1904) and N. A. Ivantsov (1892, 2nd ed. 1911; reprint 1932, 1933 with a foreword by A. Toporkov, and in 1957 in 1 volume. "Selected productions").
• "Treatise on the Improvement of the Mind"- Spinoza's early work - contains mainly Spinoza's views on the theory of knowledge. Probably intended to serve as an introduction to Ethics. Written in Latin. language OK. 1661, published in 1677 in one volume "Opera posthuma" under the name "Tractatus de emendatiae intellectus". Converted to Dutch. language (1677, 1897); French language (1842, in the book: Oeuvres, t. 2; 1861, ibid., t. 3; 1937); English language (1895); Czech, lang. (1925, in the book: Spisy filosofické); Yiddish (1932, in the book: I. Shatsky, Spinoza buh); rus. language (1893, translated by G. Polinkovsky; 1914, introduced and note by V. N. Polovtsova; 1934, translated by Ya. M. Borovsky, introductory article and note by G. S. Tymyansky. The same translation included in 1 volume “Selected Works”). L. Azarkh. Moscow. Opera, Bd 1–4, Hdlb., 1925; Oeuvres complètes, P., 1954; Oeuvres, t. 1–3, P., 1964–65; Correspondence, N.Y., 1928.

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