Three times loyal general. The last secret of Andrei Vlasov

General Vlasov

What was this man like, whose name is synonymous with betrayal, what events in his life made his collaboration with the Wehrmacht possible? Who is he, General A. A. Vlasov - an ideological opponent of Stalinism or a victim of circumstances?

Vlasov Andrey Andreevich was born in 1901, September 14 (1) in the village. Lomakino, near Nizhny Novgorod, in the family of a middle peasant. He was the youngest son in a large family. After studying at a rural school, the boy was sent to study at a theological seminary in N. Novgorod. But what happened in 1917 changed all plans, and 17-year-old Andrei Vlasov began studying to become an agronomist. 1919 became a fateful year, Vlasov was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army and he would never become an agronomist. Vlasov’s life will be closely connected with the army.

His military career began in 1919 after completing command courses, then - fighting on the fronts of the Civil War, after 1922 - command and staff positions, teaching, higher commander courses in 1929, joining the ranks of the Communist Bolsheviks, since 1935 A A. Vlasov studies at the Military Academy named after. Frunze. Rapid career growth! The USSR high military command trusted Vlasov so much that they sent him to China in the fall of 1938 as a military adviser. And within six months, Vlasov will become Chiang Kai-shek’s chief military consultant, and part-time, his wife’s spiritual friend, as well as the owner of 4 teenage girls, which he bought inexpensively at the market, for less than half a month’s salary. The Chinese generalissimo highly appreciated Vlasov as a military specialist and presented him with the Order of the Golden Dragon, and his wife gave him a watch, while Vlasov himself brought three more suitcases of all sorts of goods to his homeland. Chinese awards, gifts and acquired goods were taken away from the military adviser in the USSR, which Vlasov was very sad about.
After returning from a business trip to China, Major General Vlasov was sent to the 99th Infantry Division for inspection, and later he was appointed commander. Head of the 4th mech. corps located in Western Ukraine, Vlasov was appointed in the winter of 1940-41. This is where the Great War began for General Vlasov. For his skillful and competent actions, Vlasov receives positive reviews from Timoshenko and Khrushchev and is sent as commander to the 37th Army, to the Southwestern Front to organize the defense of Kyiv. The army found itself surrounded through no fault of the new commander, but Kyiv had to surrender to the enemy and leave the encirclement. Only by the end of November 1941 did the remnants of the army unite with the Soviet troops. I.V. summoned Vlasov and gave the order to form the 20th Army to ensure the defense of Moscow. The battles for Moscow were fierce, but the army under the command of Vlasov managed to push the Germans back from Volokolamsk and Solnechnogorsk. For the successful defense of Moscow, Vlasov was awarded the rank of lieutenant general and awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Chief of the General Staff G.K. spoke of General Vlasov as a completely skillful and competent commander, and he himself treated Vlasov very well and appreciated him.

Fatal for Vlasov was his appointment as commander of the 2nd Shock Army. They were appointed to command the surrounded army, whose fighters barely survived the terrible frosty and hungry winter, staggering from fatigue and exhaustion. Futile attempts were made to break through the encirclement four times. The remnants of the army got out of the encirclement in small groups. General Vlasov and his few companions, after three weeks of wandering through forests and swamps, went to the village on July 12, 1942, asked for food, while they ate, the headman reported to the Germans, who soon arrived in the village. General Vlasov, apparently, then made the decision to surrender. Subsequently, he was transported to Vinnitsa, to a camp for senior officers of the Red Army, where they conducted an interrogation, during which the general described in detail the state of affairs on the fronts, what strategic plans were being made at Headquarters. The Minister of Propaganda of the Third Reich, Goebbels, became interested in Vlasov, and he proposed using the general for agitation among those dissatisfied with the Stalinist regime and prisoners of war. Vlasov was asked to form the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). There was no full-fledged army, only two divisions, somehow staffed. The ROA never ended up on the Eastern Front, performing escort and punitive functions; the Germans, after all, did not trust the Russians. While engaged in campaigning, the general managed to resolve personal issues by marrying a millionaire widow. But the war was ending, and it was already obvious that the Nazis would not see victory, the allies would have to surrender and ask for asylum. But the allies, fulfilling the Yalta agreement, handed over the traitor general to the SMERSH detachment, and Vlasov was taken to Moscow. The investigation lasted for almost a year, although the sentence against Vlasov and his 11 accomplices was pronounced by the Politburo of the Central Committee back in 1943. The court hearing was closed, without a prosecutor or lawyer. The verdict was read out on August 1, 1946, the convicts were stripped of their titles, awards, personal property and sentenced to death by hanging.

Vlasov was captured on May 12, 1945. Already on May 15 he ended up in Lubyanka. After a short stay in the box “for new arrivals,” Vlasov was escorted to the office of the chief Abakumov V.

He stayed there for about 40 minutes. After which the head of the internal Lubyanka prison received a written instruction: “I ask you to include the half of the food card you have for additional food for prisoner No. 31.”

This same number 31 was Andrei Vlasov. As an honored visitor, he was given a separate cell. All the rest went under their own names, were in common cells, and were not entitled to any additional rations. And the ration card of the highest command staff in a country living from hand to mouth was very non-symbolic (oranges, cervelat, chocolate, and so on). Amazingly reverent attitude towards a traitor to the Motherland!

On August 1, 1946, the prisoner was sentenced to death by hanging. But Vlasov’s story does not end there.

Since Vlasov’s death is shrouded in a shadow of doubt. Nina Mikhailovna, a relative of the general, without knowing it, gave out sensational news. In her opinion, Andrei Vlasov was not hanged in Lefortovo according to the verdict. Instead of her great-uncle, a stranger ascended the scaffold. “After the war, I went to Leningrad, where I met with the Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot Alexander Pokryshkin,” she says.

Pokryshkin was a distant relative of Aunt Valya’s husband, Andrei Vlasov’s niece. Alexander Ivanovich said that he went with his wife Alexandra to the public execution of the Vlasovites. So he claimed that instead of Andrei’s godfather, they executed some little man, probably a jailer. Pokryshkin knew Vlasov well and met him more than once. And he was sure that it was not him who was hanged. And in Lomakino no one believed in Vlasov’s execution: good people, they say, are not killed. And one collective farmer, Pyotr Vasilyevich Ryabinin, also from Lomakin, after the war often went to his daughter in the Far East to sell tobacco. One day, his daughter Nastya took him to an amateur concert. And suddenly Ryabinin saw that Andrei Vlasov came on stage to play the accordion. He shouted: “Andrey! I’m Lomakinsky, I’m here!” The artist turned pale, crumpled up the end of the performance and ran away.

They ran to look for him behind the scenes, but did not find him. Then Ryabinin told me and Aunt Valya that he immediately recognized Andrey as soon as he played the instrument. And he sang his favorite song then... It is possible that Vlasov was not executed after the war, he remained alive, and moreover, died a natural death.

Nothing to add here. If you believe this evidence, then Vlasov’s “execution” was public. How then to explain the fact that the traitor was deprived of all awards by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 16, 1990. It is possible that this was indeed a well-directed performance. Let us at least remember the “executed Mikhail Koltsov,” who back in 1943 was met at the front under a false name by people who knew him well. Her Majesty History is very good at keeping her secrets.

A photograph has been preserved - Vlasov in a prisoner of war camp. In a tunic without insignia, with a crew cut of barely grown hair, with protruding ears... He stands with his hands behind his back... His appearance is very peaceful, almost indistinguishable from a village teacher. But this is at first glance... It’s worth taking a closer look, and you notice bitter folds in the corners of the mouth. Why the folds... All the muscles of the face seem to have petrified... This is a terrible photograph of a man who will take up arms against the Russian people and will not yet retain hope of salvation...

“I will fight against Bolshevism until the last drop of blood.” These words were terrible in their consequences, everyone who spoke them doomed themselves to the path to camps and prisons.

General Vlasov is responsible for tens of thousands of soldiers. But wasn’t he thinking about them when the death sentence was handed down? Wasn’t it these soldiers that A.A. Vlasov saw when an awkward loop moved his glasses and the NKVD soldier tore them off the former general? Was it not these soldiers that the former seminarian prayed for when the bench was knocked out from under his feet? And immediately the brick walls jerked sharply upward, and then seemed to fall down. When there were no walls around, only the blue sky, only a cloud floating below.

Later, when it became known that Vlasov had gone over to the side of the Germans, the amazed and dejected Stalin threw the following reproach to N.S. Khrushchev: “And you praised him, nominated him!” Most likely, they were talking about Vlasov’s promotion to the Volkhov Front. This is not the first time that the name Khrushchev appears in connection with Vlasov. It was Khrushchev who recommended that Stalin appoint Vlasov as commander of the 37th Army near Kiev. It was Khrushchev who was the first to meet Vlasov after the general left the encirclement near Kiev. It was Khrushchev who left us memories of Vlasov coming out “in peasant clothes and with a goat tied on a rope.”

So, on March 8, 1942, Stalin summoned Vlasov from the Svatovo station in the Voroshilovgrad region, where the headquarters of the Southwestern Front was located, and appointed him deputy commander of the Volkhov Front. Soon, the front commander, General K. A. Meretskov, sent Vlasov as his representative to the 2nd Shock Army, which was supposed to improve the situation of besieged Leningrad. Meanwhile, the 2nd Shock Army was in a critical situation, and the main responsibility for this lay with Meretskov. As Meretskov himself wrote, “I and the front headquarters overestimated the capabilities of our own troops.” It was Meretskov who drove the 2nd Shock Army into the German “sack”. Without establishing its supply, Meretskov misinformed Headquarters that “the army’s communications have been restored.”

It is Meretskov who advises Stalin to send Vlasov to save the 2nd Shock Army instead of the wounded army commander N.K. Klykov. After all, Vlasov has experience in withdrawing troops from encirclement, Meretskov explained, and no one else but Vlasov will be able to cope with this difficult task. On March 20, Vlasov arrived at the 2nd Shock Army to organize a new offensive. On April 3, near Lyuban, this offensive began and ended in complete failure. This failure led to the encirclement of the 2nd Shock Army and the surrender, under very dark circumstances, of General Vlasov.

What motives guided Vlasov when he surrendered to the Germans? Vlasov’s apologists are trying to assure us that, wandering through the Volkhov forests, seeing all the horror and all the futility of the death of the 2nd Shock Army, Vlasov understood the criminal essence of the Stalinist regime and decided to surrender. Actually, these motives for surrender were given by Vlasov himself in 1943.

Of course, you can’t get into a person’s head and you won’t recognize his thoughts. But it seems that, having written these words in the spring of 1943, already in the service of the Germans, Vlasov, as usual, was lying. In any case, there is no reason to trust these words of the former commander of the 2nd Army, since two months before his capture, before his appointment to the Volkhov Front, he described his second meeting with Stalin in a letter to his wife: “Dear and dear Alik! You still won’t believe how much happiness I have. I was once again hosted by the biggest man in the world. The conversation was conducted in the presence of his closest students. Believe me, the big man praised me in front of everyone. And now I don’t know how I can justify the trust that HE places in me...”

Of course, they will again tell us that Vlasov was “forced to write like that,” that it was a device against Soviet censorship, etc. But even if this is so, then who gave guarantees that in 1943 Vlasov once again did not “disguise himself”, this time from German “censorship”? The arguments of a person who is constantly deceiving cannot inspire any confidence.

The second explanation for the surrender of Vlasov, which his apologists offer us, is the assertion that the army commander was afraid to go out to his own people, because he understood that Stalin would immediately shoot him for the ruined army. Proving this, Vlasov’s apologists do not stop at the most incredible speculations. “His military career,” writes E. Andreeva, “no doubt came to an end, he was the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, which was defeated, and regardless of who was responsible, he will have to pay. Other commanders in similar situations were shot.”

By “other commanders” E. Andreeva means the executed generals in the case of the “Conspiracy of Heroes”, as well as in the case of General D. G. Pavlov. E. Andreeva does not say a word that the real reason for the execution of these people was not their military failures (many of them did not even have time to take part in hostilities), but the treason charged against them in the form of organizing a conspiracy and deliberate sabotage in the troops of the Western front.

As for Vlasov, he was not guilty of the death of the 2nd Army; the main blame for this lay with Meretskov, or, in extreme cases, with the leadership of Headquarters. Vlasov could not help but know that Stalin was not at all inclined to reprisals against innocent subordinates. The best example of this is Vlasov himself, when he, in civilian clothes, emerged from encirclement near Kiev, having lost most of the army entrusted to him. As we remember, he was not only not shot or tried for this, but on the contrary, he was sent to command the 20th Army. What was the fundamental difference between Vlasov’s Kyiv encirclement and his entourage in the forests of Myasny Bor? Moreover, from the documents we see that Stalin was very worried about the fate of the Soviet generals of the 2nd Shock Army, who were surrounded. The leader ordered everything to be done to save the Soviet generals. It is characteristic that while in captivity, Vlasov boastfully declared that Stalin had sent a plane to rescue him.

Precisely to save, because no reprisals were applied to the survivors. For example, the evacuated communications chief of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General A.V. Afanasyev, not only was not subjected to any repression, but was awarded and continued to serve. In addition, Stalin was skeptical for a very long time about the very fact of Vlasov’s betrayal. The investigation into this fact lasted for a whole year. By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR dated October 5, 1942, Vlasov was listed as missing in action, and was listed as such until April 13, 1943, when the circumstances of his betrayal were clarified and this order was canceled.

The third reason why Vlasov surrendered could be his cowardice and fear of death. It was this reason that the Soviet authorities propagated in every possible way, it was the one that was highlighted in the investigation materials, and it was cowardice that the defendant Vlasov explained his behavior at the trial. However, it must be admitted that there are no compelling reasons to consider Vlasov a coward. On the contrary, at the front he more than once demonstrated contempt for death, calmly being in the artillery shelling zone.

There is, however, another version by V.I. Filatov, that Vlasov was a secret employee of the GRU and was sent by our military intelligence to the Germans in order to prevent the emergence of a possible anti-Soviet movement. Despite all the visual appeal of this version, it has several major flaws that make it impossible. The main reason why this version is untenable is that, in the event that Vlasov was sent to the Germans to create a controlled anti-Soviet army, Stalin would have planted a time bomb under his power. The situation with Vlasov's army, even if he were a Soviet agent, would initially have been uncontrollable. Who would give guarantees that Vlasov would not play by German rules because of a hopeless situation? In the event of the creation of an anti-Soviet army, Stalin with his own hands would have created a force that threatened to add to the external war - the Civil War. Then Stalin would have become the initiator of a most dangerous adventure. Stalin was never an adventurer and would never have taken an adventure.

Thus, Filatov’s version seems to us completely untenable. We believe that it is very likely that Vlasov was sent to the Germans by Stalin’s enemies from among the Soviet Trotskyist party and military leadership, to conspire with the German generals to overthrow Stalin’s power.

Close ties between the Reichswehr generals and the Red Army existed even before Hitler came to power. The German Field Marshal General, and then the Reich President P. von Hindenburg, openly favored the army commanders I. E. Yakir and I. P. Uborevich. Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky also had the closest ties with German military circles. “Always think about this,” Tukhachevsky told the German military attaché General Koestring in 1933, “you and we, Germany and the USSR, can dictate our terms to the whole world if we are together.”

Moreover, most of the military leaders of the Red Army, who were in a confidential relationship with the German generals, were accused of the 1937 conspiracy. Tukhachevsky, in his suicide letter to Stalin, known as the “Plan for Defeat in the War,” acknowledged the existence of a conspiracy between the Soviet and German military.

German generals, conspiring with the Soviet military in 1935-37, pursued the same goal as them: Tukhachevsky and company wanted to overthrow Stalin, and German generals wanted to overthrow Hitler and the Nazis. In 1941, internal contradictions between Hitler and the German generals did not disappear. Among a large number of German generals, including the Chief of the General Staff F. Halder, there were people who believed that a further war with the USSR would be disastrous for Germany. At the same time, they believed that Hitler and the Nazis were leading the Reich to disaster. To end the war with Russia according to our own scenario, and not according to Hitler’s scenario - that was the plan of part of the German generals. Under these conditions, it was extremely necessary for the Wehrmacht generals to come to an agreement with part of the Soviet generals, striving for their political goals and the overthrow of Stalin.

For their part, the conspirators from among the generals of the Red Army, coming into contact with the Germans, could pursue their far-reaching goals. The conspirators could hope that the anti-Soviet army of prisoners of war created by German generals, led by their accomplice Vlasov, would be able to radically change the course of the war. Vlasov on the German side, and the conspirators on the Soviet side would have done one thing - opened a front and overthrown the Stalinist government. At the same time, both German and Soviet conspirator generals believed that Hitler would have no reason to wage war against the new outwardly anti-Soviet regime, and he would be forced to make peace with it. This peace, on the one hand, would be honorable and victorious for Germany, on the other, it would be concluded according to the scenario of the German generals and would preserve Russia as a controlled by Germany, but still a “sovereign” state. Such a state, the German General Staff believed, could become an ally of the German military in confronting Hitler.

On the other hand, the Soviet conspirators could believe that by concluding peace with Germany, they would be able, by establishing a so-called “democratic” government that would be recognized by the United States and England, to ensure for themselves full power in the country. Thus, the fifth anti-Stalinist column in the USSR, oriented toward Trotskyist circles in the West, cleared its way to power at the cost of dismembering the territory of the USSR and concluding peace with its worst enemies. What did not work out in the summer of 1937 should have happened in 1942 or 1943. In 1937, Tukhachevsky was a candidate for “dictator”; in 1942, Vlasov was supposed to become him. Vlasov had to establish contacts not only with the Germans, but also with the Western allies.

Of course, there is no direct documentary evidence of this version today. It must be remembered that all archives relating to the processes of the 30-40s are still classified and are known only in fragments. But even from these passages one can judge the scale of conspiratorial activity in the ranks of the Red Army. The version of Vlasov the conspirator is also supported by the fact that Vlasov’s main protégés from among the German military later ended up in the camp of the anti-Hitler opposition.

So, captured under very strange and unclear circumstances, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, was taken under strong guard to Siverskaya, to the headquarters of the 18th German Army. He was immediately received by the army commander, Colonel General Georg von Lindemann. Vlasov gave Lindeman a number of important information that constituted state secrets of the USSR.

From Lindeman, Vlasov was sent to the Promenent prison camp in Vinnitsa. When we hear the word Nazi “prisoner of war camp,” we immediately rightly draw a picture of a death camp. But the camp in Vinnitsa was not like that at all. This was a special camp, subordinate directly to the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces (OKH), in which high-ranking Soviet prisoners of war were kept. By the time Vlasov arrived at the Vinnitsa camp, captured Soviet generals Ponedelin, Potapov, Karbyshev, Kirillov, as well as Stalin’s son Ya. I. Dzhugashvili, were already being held there. And this camp was led by... an American of German origin, Peterson. What a strange thing! Well, the Germans didn’t have enough normal Germans, so they started inviting American fellow tribesmen to serve? Vlasov’s apologist K. Alexandrov gives us amazing information about the camp. He writes that the camp in Vinnitsa “was under the actual control of representatives of the anti-Hitler opposition.”

In August, Vlasov had a meeting with the camp leadership, a representative of the German Foreign Ministry and intelligence representatives. What is noteworthy: Foreign Ministry Advisor Gustav Hilder, at a meeting with Vlasov, discussed the possibility of his participation in the puppet government of Russia, which was supposed to officially transfer the territories of Ukraine and the Baltic states to Germany. Note that a high-ranking official of the German Foreign Ministry arrives for a meeting with Vlasov, who conducts a conversation in the presence of a person from the United States! He and Vlasov had very interesting conversations about his inclusion in the Russian government! Why did it happen? Who is Vlasov to negotiate with him on this topic?

But the most interesting thing is that Hilder arrived not only to see Vlasov. At the same time, a regimental commissar, a certain I. Ya. Kernes, was in the Vinnitsa camp. Kernes voluntarily went over to the German side in June 1942 in the Kharkov region. Having been captured, Kernes turned to the German authorities with the message that he had extremely important information.

Kernes said that after the defeat of the Trotskyist-Bukharin bloc and the groups of Tukhachevsky, Egorov and Gamarnik in the USSR, their remnants united into a widely branched organization with branches both in the army and in government institutions. He, Kernes, is a member and envoy of this organization.

The information that Kernes gave the Germans about the conspiratorial organization indicated that in the USSR there was an anti-Stalinist secret organization that stood on the platform of “continuing the true teachings of Lenin, distorted by Stalin.” The organization aims to overthrow Stalin and his government, restore the NEP policy, destroy collective farms and focus its foreign policy on Nazi Germany.

When asked whether there were representatives of the “organization” in the NKVD, Kernes replied that there were even in the central apparatus, but did not name anyone.

It is curious that these provisions, which Kernes spoke about, almost exactly coincide with the “Manifesto of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia,” signed by Vlasov in November 1944.

The conditions for contact between the German side and the conspirators were agreed upon with Kernes, and it was also guaranteed that the response from the German side would be conveyed through the same Kernes. Field Marshal von Bock personally met with Kernes even before the Vinnitsa camp.

And although the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hilder, in his official report doubted the seriousness of Kernes’ powers, it is not difficult to guess that this was done with the desire to distract the tenacious eye of the Nazi leadership from the commissar. As we understand, the plans of the German generals did not include Hitler knowing about the negotiations with the Red conspirators.

As is easy to see, the same people met with Vlasov as with Kernes. It is quite possible that both of them were present at the meeting. It is also possible that they knew each other: both fought in Ukraine in 1941. After a meeting with representatives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence, Vlasov writes the following note: “The officer corps of the Soviet Army, especially captured officers who can freely exchange thoughts, are faced with the question: in what way can Stalin’s government be overthrown and a new Russia created? All are united by the desire to overthrow Stalin's government and change the form of government. The question is: who exactly should we join - Germany, England or the United States? The main task - the overthrow of the government - suggests that one should join Germany, which has declared the fight against the existing government and regime as the goal of war. However, the question of Russia's future is unclear. This could lead to an alliance with the United States and England if Germany does not clarify this issue."

Amazing document! The Soviet general sits in German captivity, which, as we know, was not a resort, and freely discusses who post-Stalin Russia should join: the USA, England or Germany! In the end, Vlasov graciously agrees to join Germany, but warns that if the latter behaves badly, Russia may join the Western Allies! It is simply impossible to imagine that the Nazis would tolerate such antics from some “Untermensch”, a captured communist. And this is possible only in one case, if Vlasov wrote his note not for the Nazis, but for the generals opposed to the Hitler regime. Vlasov’s note is an appeal, no, not to him personally, but to the leaders of the anti-Stalin conspiracy, to the entire West hostile to the USSR. This is a call for immediate cooperation, this is evidence of readiness to oppose Stalin.

The note from Vinnitsa is the most important and most interesting document issued from the pen of Vlasov. This is not propaganda or a demagogic appeal, which he will write later. This is a proposal for cooperation with the West, a proposal coming from a person who feels strong behind him. Noteworthy are the words Vlasov said to a German officer of Russian origin and career intelligence officer, Captain V. Strik-Strikfeldt: “We decided on a big game.”

The same Strik-Strikfeldt, who supervised Vlasov, gives us an idea of ​​the essence of this “big game”. Vlasov’s curator recalled that the captive general called to follow “Lenin’s path,” that is, to take advantage of the war to “liberate the people and the country from the Bolshevik regime.” After all, during the First World War, Lenin and Trotsky helped the Germans defeat Russia and for this received power in the country. Why not now, in the name of overthrowing Stalin, not enter into an agreement with Hitler and buy peace from Germany, giving it the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine?

“Will they give us,” Vlasov asked Shtrik-Shtrikfeld, “the opportunity to field the Russian army against Stalin? Not an army of mercenaries. She must receive her assignment from the national Russian government. Only a higher idea can justify taking up arms against the government of one's country. This idea is political freedom and human rights. Let's remember the great freedom fighters in the USA - George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. In our case, only if we put universal human values ​​over nationalist values ​​is our consent to your help in the fight against the Bolshevik dictatorship justified.”

Isn’t it true, dear reader, that in our recent history we have already heard these calls for the priority of “universal human values” over “nationalist” ones; we have already been told somewhere about “human rights” and “about freedom fighters” in the USA? If you don’t know that the above words belong to the traitor to the Motherland Vlasov in 1942, then you might think that this is a speech by A. N. Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1990. Apparently, in 1942, the German General Staff began a major game to actually overthrow Stalin and replace him with a Trotskyist-liberal regime. But this game was broken by Adolf Hitler.

Hitler did not like all this fuss with the “Russian liberation movement” at all. And the point here is not only Hitler’s zoological Russophobia. Hitler could not help but see that the manipulations with the “new Russian government” were started by his old enemies from the general corps. This alone could not arouse any enthusiasm in the Fuhrer. In addition, the formation of an independent Russian army threatened Nazi Germany with unpredictable consequences. Arm several hundred thousand Soviet prisoners of war with German weapons, so that they would then go over to Stalin and turn the issued weapons against Hitler?! No, Hitler was not a fool. But even if the anti-Stalinist conspiracy won, Hitler gained absolutely nothing. On the contrary, his power was again under threat. After all, then the main pretext for war disappeared - the Bolshevik threat to Europe. With the new “Russian” government, willy-nilly, peace would have to be made. And this would mean the end of all Hitler’s predatory and savage plans regarding Russian territory and the Russian people. At the same time, the new “Russian” government could easily conclude a peace treaty with the West. And then in the name of what did Hitler begin such a difficult campaign in June 1941? Not to mention the fact that such an outcome made the opposition generals a real force capable of carrying out a coup in the Reich, relying on the help of their “Russian allies.” No, Hitler did not smile at this development of events at all. And therefore he categorically refuses to not only see, but even hear about Vlasov. And Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, without hiding, calls him a “Slavic pig.” Vlasov is sent under house arrest, then released, he lives in Berlin, in good conditions, but still he remains in the position of a semi-prisoner. Vlasov was expelled from the big game and did not return to it until the end of 1944.

The plan of the Soviet and German conspirators collapsed before it began to be implemented. This was facilitated first by the successes of the German troops at Stalingrad, when it seemed that the Soviet Union was about to fall, and, starting in 1943, by the successes of the Soviet troops, when the power and authority of I.V. Stalin in the country and in the world, as the main leader of the anti-Hitler coalition , become indisputable.

Abandoned by both his fellow conspirators and the German generals, Vlasov found himself in a terrible situation. In his ambitious plans, he was supposed to become the commander-in-chief of the “new Russian army”, and perhaps even the “dictator” of Russia, but he became a German puppet, dressed in either a Russian or a German uniform. In vain Vlasov continued to rush around with the ideas of the ROA, an independent Russian government - all this, in essence, was no longer needed by anyone. Hitler did not allow the formation of independent Russian military units, allowing the formation of only SS national units with Russian symbols. Like a mannequin, Vlasov at parades raised his hand in a semi-Nazi salute addressed to “Russian” soldiers dressed in Wehrmacht uniform, like a parrot he repeated demagogic slogans about “free Russia without the Bolsheviks.”

Meanwhile, these units began to become increasingly disillusioned with the Nazis. On August 16, 1943, soldiers and officers of the 1st Russian National SS Brigade (“Druzhina”), led by former Red Army lieutenant colonel V.V. Gil-Rodionov, went over to the side of the Soviet partisans. For this transition, during which the newly minted partisans killed many Germans, Gil-Rodionov was reinstated in the army with the assignment of another military rank and, moreover, awarded the Order of the Red Star, and his unit was renamed the 1st anti-fascist partisan brigade.

But it cannot be said that Vlasov did not play any role at all in the Third Reich. According to the recollections of one of the leaders of the Abwehr, W. Schellenberg, “we entered into special agreements with General Vlasov and his headquarters, even giving him the right to create his own intelligence service in Russia.” What kind of service was this? What sources did she use? This question is still waiting for its researcher.

In the second half of 1944, the Germans again needed Vlasov in a big game. Now, however, this game was intra-German. In July 1944, almost all of Vlasov's German patrons (Field Marshal von Bock, Colonel General Lindemann, Colonel Stauffenberg and others) turned out to be indirect or direct participants in the conspiracy against Hitler. As it turns out, Vlasov and his non-existent “army” played an important role in the plans of the conspirators. Here is what Shtrik-Shtrikfeldt writes about this: “Vlasov knew quite well about the independent and active role intended by the ROA conspirators. According to their plan, immediate peace was envisaged in the west, and in the east the continuation of the war, turning it into a civil war. For this, a well-prepared and powerful Vlasov army was needed.”

That is, the German generals were preparing for Vlasov the same role: the role of the leader of a fratricidal war. And Vlasov happily agrees to this plan.

“I know,” he assures the German generals, “that even today I can win the war against Stalin. If I had an army consisting of citizens of my fatherland, I would reach Moscow and end the war by telephone, simply by talking with my comrades.”

Vlasov speaks to his accomplices in the ROA about the need to support the German conspirators.

However, in the case of the anti-Hitler conspiracy, everything is not easy for Vlasov. On July 20, 1944, Vlasov persistently sought a meeting with Reichsführer Himmler. The meeting did not take place then due to the assassination attempt on Hitler and the outbreak of a coup d'etat, which was suppressed by J. Goebbels and the SS apparatus. What did Vlasov want to tell Himmler? It’s difficult to say about this now, but it is known that after the failure of the July 20 plot, Vlasov demonstratively turns away from his yesterday’s allies - the generals who turned out to be conspirators. This unscrupulousness of Vlasov amazed even Shtrik-Shtrikfeld. When the latter, in a conversation with Vlasov, called Stauffenberg and other rebels “our friends,” Vlasov sharply interrupted him: “They don’t talk about such dead people as friends. They are not known."

After the failure of the conspiracy, Vlasov realized that the work of the generals was over and the only real force in Germany was the NSDAP, and more specifically, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, whose power and capabilities increased incredibly after the failure of the putsch. Vlasov again hurries to see “Black Henry” and asks for a meeting. Such a meeting took place on September 16, 1944. It is curious that the meeting between Vlasov and Himmler took place behind closed doors, one on one. The result of this meeting with Himmler was the recognition of Vlasov as an “ally” of the Reich and commander-in-chief of the ROA. On November 14, 1944, the founding meeting of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) was solemnly held in Prague, which addressed the people of Russia with a “manifesto”. Vlasov was elected Chairman of the Committee.

Meanwhile, the agony of Hitler's Germany began. The Thousand-Year Reich collapsed under the blows of the Red Army.

Once again Vlasov is trying to change owners. He betrays the Germans and stabs them in the back in Prague in May 1945. However, he cannot stay there for long - the Red Army is approaching Prague.

Vlasov runs to the Americans, who seem to agree to accept his services. But the Americans do not tell Vlasov that they already had an agreement with the USSR on the extradition of Vlasov and his associates. Having tricked the ROA commander into allegedly going to the American headquarters as part of a tank column, the Americans took Vlasov exactly the opposite - to the SMERSH capture group.

On this, in fact, Vlasov’s life ended. This life was terrible and black. Vlasov betrayed everyone and everything all his life. The Church, to whose service I wanted to devote my life, Stalin, to whom I swore allegiance and “admired”, the Motherland, to which I owed everything, the soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army, from whom I ran away, my patrons, German generals, new patrons - Himmler and the SS . Vlasov betrayed his wives, betrayed his mistresses, betrayed leaders, generals and soldiers. Betrayal became the norm of life for him, defined by its internal content. The result of such a life could be one - a rope around the neck in the Lefortovo internal prison.

But the investigation and trial of traitors to the Motherland Vlasov and his accomplices were closed. The protocols of these interrogations have not yet been fully declassified. Therefore, it remains a mystery who stood behind Vlasov in the tragic days of 1942?

Concluding our article about Vlasov, let’s say the following. It looks to the present and future rather than to the past. There, in the past, everything was put in its place long ago. Loyalty was called Loyalty, Valor - Valor, cowardice - cowardice, treason - treason. But today there are extremely dangerous tendencies to call treason Valor and cowardice Heroism. The Vlasovs gained hundreds of admirers, apologists who mourned their “martyrdom.” Such people are doing a criminal thing; they insult the Holy Memory of our soldiers, the true martyrs who died during the Great Patriotic War for the Faith and the Fatherland.

Once upon a time, back in 1942, Vlasov enthusiastically read the book “Grozny and Kurbsky”, more than once admiring the words and actions of Andrei Kurbsky. He managed to continue the work of his idol. Well, Vlasov and others like him will find a “worthy” place in the shameful row of traitors and traitors to Russia.

The transition of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov, to the side of the Germans in the summer of 1942 seems so surprising that many today's historians are sure: it was a conscious choice made long before he fell into the hands of the Germans. Only earlier historians condemned Vlasov for this, suspected that he was recruited by German intelligence, but now they believe that he always condemned the crimes of the Soviet system and was only waiting for a convenient reason to speak out in defense of the “oppressed Russian people.”

At the turn of the century, in the process of revising the past, the temptation arises to change the assessment to the opposite. Stalin's justice was completely lawless. The general was sentenced even before the trial at a Politburo meeting. And in general, since he was a conscious enemy of the Stalinist regime, how can he not be considered a victim of political repression? But let's figure out whether the shameful execution on the gallows was reprisal, Stalin's revenge, or still a fair punishment for a traitor?

Was the shameful execution on the gallows a reprisal, Stalin’s revenge, or still a fair punishment for a traitor?

High confidence of the leader

On the eve of the war, Major General Vlasov, one of the most prominent commanders in the Red Army, favored by his superiors and awarded the Order of Lenin, was given command of the 4th Mechanized Corps. In the first months of the war, he gained fame as a good general who knew how to build a defense and strike at the enemy. In mid-July, the corps was taken to Kyiv. General Vlasov impressed Nikita Khrushchev, who was a member of the military council of the Southwestern Front, with his calmness, fearlessness and knowledge of the situation.

When the Germans approached Kiev, Khrushchev said, and we literally had nothing to plug the hole, we appointed Vlasov commander of the 37th Army, and, it must be said, the troops under his command fought well.

But the front was destroyed. In the twentieth of September, the headquarters of the 37th Army was surrounded. A few days later, only two remained with Vlasov - senior political instructor Evgeny Sverdlichenko and military doctor of the headquarters medical post Agnessa Podmazenko.

In 1926, the young commander of the Red Army, Vlasov, married fellow villager Anna Voronina. With the beginning of the war, she went to the Gorky region to live with her parents. Vlasov drew attention to the female doctor sent to his army. The general hid from Agnes Podmazenko that he was married. At army headquarters, Agnes was given documents and certificates as the wife of an army commander. And she herself considered herself the wife of General Vlasov, indicated his last name in questionnaires and applications, which subsequently ruined her. When Vlasov went over to the side of the Germans, his wife was sentenced to eight years in the camps, his mistress to five years.

Vlasov and Agnes were incredibly lucky; they never ran into German troops. On November 1, they reached their own... Stalin entrusted Vlasov, who had emerged from encirclement, with the 20th Army, which defended the capital. Andrei Andreevich told his mistress about his visit to the Kremlin: “The biggest and most important owner called me to him. Imagine, he talked with me for a whole hour and a half. You yourself can imagine how lucky I was. You won’t believe that such a big man is interested in our little family affairs. He asked me: where is my wife and about health in general. This can only be done by HE, who leads us all from victory to victory. With him we will defeat the fascist vermin."

In December 1941, the 20th Army took part in the counterattack that drove the Germans back from Moscow. The troops of Vlasov's army advanced from the Krasnaya Polyana area and, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, drove the Germans out of Solnechnogorsk and Volokolamsk. In the Sovinformburo report about the defeat of German troops near Moscow, the name of General Vlasov was mentioned along with the names of future Marshals Rokossovsky and Govorov. The newspapers, under the headline “Failure of the German plan to encircle and capture Moscow,” published photographs of the generals who defended the capital, including Vlasov.

Vlasov received the second Order of the Red Banner, and on January 24, 1942 he was promoted to lieutenant general. This was the peak of his military career. On March 8, Stalin appointed him deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Death of the 2nd Army

The Volkhov Front was formed in December 1941 with the task of disrupting the German offensive on Leningrad, and then, together with the Leningrad Front, liberating the city from the blockade.

The hastily formed troops of the Volkhov Front were poorly trained and did not have the necessary weapons, tanks, aircraft, or communications equipment. Headquarters (that is, Stalin) believed that heavy equipment was not needed in forests and swamps. The troops were sent on the offensive before they were ready. Front commander Meretskov, who was in the hands of the security officers, who was beaten and humiliated, did not find the strength to object.

Headquarters (that is, Stalin) believed that heavy equipment was not needed in forests and swamps. Troops were sent on the offensive before they were ready

The offensive began on January 7, 1942. The 2nd Army broke through the German front near the village of Myasnoy Bor and rushed forward 40 kilometers in five days. The headquarters demanded to take the city of Lyuban and unite with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front. This would mean breaking the blockade of Leningrad. But the forces of the 2nd Army were not enough for a new strike. She was almost completely drawn into the breakthrough and, exhausted, stopped. Its configuration was extremely unfortunate: communications were stretched out, and the breakthrough neck was very narrow. Immediately difficulties arose with supplies, and the frosts that winter were unprecedentedly severe, the temperature dropped to 40 degrees. The soldiers were freezing. It became clear that the Germans would try to cut through this narrow corridor with flank attacks, and then the army would be surrounded.

Ignoring this danger, Headquarters demanded that the commander of the 2nd Shock Army attack. He was unable to carry out the order. The commander was changed. Vlasov accepted the army. Cut off from sources of supply, the exhausted army could no longer defend itself. The worst thing began in the spring, when the snow melted.

“The trenches were flooded with water,” the veterans recalled, “corpses were floating around. The soldiers and commanders were starving, there was no salt or bread. There were cases of cannibalism.”

On June 8, General Meretskov was urgently summoned to Moscow. In his field uniform and dirty boots, he went straight to the Politburo meeting.

We made a big mistake,” Stalin admitted. - The Germans managed to cut off the army’s communications and encircle it. We instruct you, together with Comrade Vasilevsky, to go there and rescue the 2nd Shock Army at all costs.

But this was beyond the power of even such a military leader as the future Marshal Vasilevsky. On June 21, 1942, they managed to break through the narrow corridor, and the encirclement poured through it. But the Germans cut him off again. On June 23, Vlasov made a final attempt to fight his way out. Throwing everyone into battle, including the headquarters guards, the army commander himself led the attack. However, German artillery scattered the fighters of the 2nd strike and destroyed the army communications center. Control of the remnants of the troops was lost. According to the plan, the army headquarters was supposed to be the last to leave, so Vlasov did not have time to escape.

In total, during the entire operation, 150 thousand people died here - this is the population of a large city. All the blame for the death of the army was placed on General Vlasov. But he was sent to command troops that were already virtually surrounded, and he fought to the last. Who is to blame for the death of the 2nd Shock Army? The front command, the leadership of the General Staff and Stalin himself, who, while it was still possible, did not allow the army to withdraw and doomed it to destruction.

German camp

Vlasov was surrounded for the second time. Then they wrote that he did not try to go out to his own people. But everything was different. For almost three weeks, trying to get out of the German cauldron, Vlasov wandered through the swamps. He probably hoped that he would be rescued, that a plane would be sent for him, or that he would run into a partisan detachment. In September 1941, he already found himself in the same desperate situation, but escaped...

For almost three weeks, trying to get out of the German cauldron, Vlasov wandered through the swamps. He probably hoped that he would be rescued, that a plane would be sent for him, or that he would run into a partisan detachment

This time, only two remained from the headquarters group - General Vlasov and the chef of the canteen of the military council of the 2nd shock army, Maria Voronova. On July 11, they tried to take refuge in the village of Tukhovezhi. The local headman promised to help, but locked them in a windowless barn and told the Germans that he had caught the partisans. The next day, the Germans arrived from the intelligence department of the 39th Corps.

On the day when the Germans took Vlasov, he cut off the past from himself. He knew how Stalin treated those who were captured, and he realized that his career in the Red Army was over in any case. He was sent to a prisoner of war camp in Vinnitsa, where senior officers of the Red Army were kept. The camp administration treated them with some reverence; the general was entitled to a separate room. But it was still a meager life with an uncertain future. Most likely, the initial impulse for cooperation with the Germans was for Vlasov the desire to stay alive.

There is something else to keep in mind. The encircled person, even if he is a general, has a feeling of catastrophe, defeat, complete defeat. In a camp that was constantly replenished with new prisoners, the defeat of the Red Army must have seemed inevitable.

Another motive is also quite obvious. Vlasov was extremely ambitious. And he decided to try his luck in the political field.

Through the camp commandant, Vlasov proposed that the German command take advantage of the anti-Soviet sentiments of prisoners of war and the population in the occupied territories and create a Russian army that would fight alongside the Wehrmacht. According to historians, 80 generals and brigade commanders were captured by the Germans.

Five escaped from captivity. Twenty-three Germans died. Twelve joined the Germans. Lieutenant General Vlasov was considered a more respectable figure than all the other Russians who offered their services to the Germans. The propaganda department of the Wehrmacht ground forces headquarters became interested in Vlasov. Leaflets were prepared on his behalf and dropped over the Red Army.

On August 8, 1942, Vlasov was interrogated by the former adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, Gustav Hilger. The son of a Moscow manufacturer, he was considered the best expert on Russia. Hilger explained to Vlasov that “the revival of Russian statehood would be contrary to German interests.”

Vlasov, and this says a lot, agreed that Germany does not have to maintain an independent Russian state. Various solutions are possible - "for example, a dominion, protectorate or client state with temporary or permanent German military occupation." In other words, Vlasov was told in plain text that there would be no more Russian state, that Russian land would be occupied, and yet he agreed to serve the Germans.

Myopic Fuhrer

Hitler was openly irritated when he heard that Russian nationalists were claiming an alliance with him. He didn't need such allies! That is why Hitler could not understand General Vlasov and other Russians who wanted to serve him and came forward to offer their services.

General Vlasov actually began to consider himself the savior of Russia, but he accepted the ideology and practice of the Nazi state, he was not disgusted by fascism

Perhaps General Vlasov really began to consider himself the savior of Russia, but he accepted the ideology and practice of the Nazi state, he was not disgusted by fascism. This is what was said in the Smolensk appeal of the Russian Committee (December 1942), signed by Vlasov: “Germany is waging war not against the Russian people and their homeland, but only against Bolshevism. Germany does not encroach on the living space of the Russian people and their national-political freedom. National “The socialist Germany of Adolf Hitler sets as its task the organization of a New Europe without Bolsheviks and capitalists, in which every nation will be provided with an honorable place.”

Vlasov already knew perfectly well how the Germans behaved in the occupied territories. The general and other captured officers who joined him rejected democracy and liberalism and fully accepted National Socialism. They wanted to be Russian National Socialists, but unfortunately for them, Hitler did not want to have them in his train.

When the Nazi regime collapsed, Vlasov tried to go to the Americans. On May 12, 1945, Soviet officers intercepted the general and sent him to Moscow. The head of the military counterintelligence department of Smersh, Colonel General Abakumov, ordered to keep Vlasov in solitary confinement and provide him with additional food. Perhaps they initially prepared an open trial and wanted the general to look good.

But a year later, on June 23, 1946, the Politburo decided: “The case of the Vlasovites will be heard in a closed court session chaired by Colonel-General of Justice Ulrich, without the participation of the parties - the prosecutor and lawyer. All accused ... be sentenced to death by hanging, and "The sentence will be carried out in prison. The progress of the trial should not be covered in the press."

The Kremlin was afraid, as some historians say, they were afraid that Vlasov would tell the whole truth. Naive assumption. The pre-war Moscow trials shocked the world by the fact that the defendants diligently incriminated themselves and did not even try to defend or justify themselves. The technique for carrying out such processes was developed at Lubyanka. Yes, only Stalin at some point completely refused to conduct open trials.

The trial of Vlasov and his accomplices lasted two days. On the night of August 1, the defendants were announced a predetermined sentence: deprived of military ranks, subjected to death by hanging, and confiscation of their personal property. They were hanged that same night.

Denikin's warning

Some historians ask the question: was it possible to go along with Hitler in the name of the fight against Stalin? To overthrow communism, accept national socialism? First with Hitler against Stalin, and then with the people - against Hitler?

This sounds rather naive. If Hitler managed to crush the Soviet army, then what force could cope with him?

In December 1938, the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Anton Denikin, made a report in France.

“I would like to say,” General Denikin emphasized, “to those who, in good faith, are going on a campaign with Hitler. At the same time, to justify their anti-national work, the explanation most often put forward is: this is just for the build-up, and then they can turn the bayonets... Forgive me, but this is already too naive. You will not turn your bayonets, because, having used you as agitators, translators, jailers, perhaps even as a fighting force, this partner will in due time neutralize you, disarm you, if not rot in concentration camps. And you will shed not “Chekist” blood, but simply Russian blood in vain, not for the liberation of Russia, but for its further enslavement...

With amazing accuracy, less than a year before the start of World War II, Denikin foresaw what cooperation with Hitler would lead the Russian people to. There is a difference between the Soviet generals who agreed to serve Hitler and the Germans who rebelled against Hitler. Anti-fascist Germans opposed the ruling Nazi regime because liberation from Hitler was the salvation of Germany and the German people.

But Hitler did not wage war against Bolshevism for the liberation of Russia. The victory of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army would not at all mean the revival of Russia

But Hitler did not wage war against Bolshevism for the liberation of Russia. The victory of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army would not at all mean the revival of Russia. Quite the opposite. Hitler wanted, firstly, to defeat the Soviet Union as a dangerous geopolitical rival and remove Russia from the political map of the world.

Secondly, to drive the Russians away from fertile lands, which, along with oil fields and mineral deposits, were intended to be included in the Third Reich. Thirdly, to condemn the Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union to vegetation, so that they never pose a danger to Germany.

Therefore, General Vlasov, his entourage, everyone who joined the Wehrmacht, who of their own free will served the German occupation authorities in one way or another, actually fought not against the Stalinist regime, not against the Soviet regime, but against their own people and the Russian state. And they understood this.

In June, under the auspices of the Federal Archival Agency, a two-volume collection of documents “General Vlasov: a history of betrayal” was published. It presents over 700 documents from 14 Russian and foreign archives. The compiler of the collection, Tatyana Tsarevskaya-Dyakina, told the magazine “Historian” about how Vlasov’s movement appears in the light of new archival publications. The conversation was conducted by Oleg NAZAROV.

What myths are refuted by the documents you published?

- First of all, they refute the myths about the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). In fact, ROA is a kind of generalized name for pointwise scattered Russian collaborationist formations, which was used exclusively for propaganda purposes. It began to take shape as a kind of unified structure, as an army, only at the end of 1944.

- But the battalions of Russian collaborators appeared much earlier?

- Certainly. In the occupied territory of the USSR, until the fall of 1943, they were mainly involved in punitive operations against partisans. After the Battle of Kursk, mass escapes began from them, and the Germans transferred the remnants of the Russian battalions to the Western Front. They fought in Italy against partisans and in Normandy against the allies. And only at the end of 1944 it was decided to form two divisions of the ROA. The order appointing General Vlasov as commander of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) was signed at the end of January 1945.

At the same time, it is important to understand that everything that was called the ROA was a German propaganda campaign. The Germans began playing the ROA card at the end of 1942, from the moment the famous “Smolensk Appeal” of the Russian Committee was published, signed, by the way, by Andrei Vlasov and Vasily Malyshkin not in Smolensk, but in Berlin.

We publish documents that show Vlasov’s trip to the north-west of the country - Pskov, Luga, Vitebsk, Mogilev, etc. It was started to demonstrate Vlasov’s independence to the population of the occupied territories. He called himself the commander of the ROA. But in reality, all the Russian battalions that fought on the side of Germany were commanded not by Vlasov, but by Wehrmacht officers. Vlasov did not command them for a single minute.

- How did Vlasov’s voyage through the cities of the USSR end?

- Vlasov, who dreamed of creating a real ROA, turned out to be not entirely controllable. In his speeches, he said not only what the Germans wanted, and in connection with this, the propaganda campaign was quickly curtailed. The general was sent to live in a dacha on the outskirts of Berlin. Thus, he was transported for a short time around the cities of the USSR, and then assigned to the outskirts as unnecessary. There he spent a year and a half, complaining to the German officer assigned to him that he, the commander of the Russian Liberation Army, had only one pair of underwear and torn underpants.

- But he really wanted to fight with the Red Army?

- That's exactly what he wanted. But let's separate what we want from what we actually do. Russian battalions fought. What did Vlasov personally do? I was sitting out my pants at a dacha in Germany. He had his headquarters there. But he didn’t have any real business until July 1944.

In July 1944, after the second front was opened and the Red Army entered the territory of European states, the situation of Nazi Germany became greatly complicated. Then, surrounded by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, there were people such as Gunther d'Alken, who decided that all means were good for victory. They began to prepare the ground for the meeting between Himmler and Vlasov. Unfortunately for Vlasov, it was scheduled for July 21, which, as it later turned out, was exactly the day after the assassination attempt on Hitler. Naturally, under the current conditions, the meeting was cancelled.

- Why did Vlasov have no real business for so long?

- Adolf Hitler was skeptical about the idea with Vlasov. In their circle, the Germans spoke quite frankly about who Vlasov really was for them. And Heinrich Himmler in October 1943, speaking at a meeting in Poznan before the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters, named the price for which the general was bought. Vlasov was told approximately the following: “The fact that you cannot go back now is, of course, clear to you. But you are a very prominent person, and we guarantee you that when the war ends, you will receive the pension of a Russian lieutenant general, and from now on and for the near future - schnapps, cigarettes and women.”

I repeat, only at the end of 1944 did Himmler decide to create KONR. The Germans put Vlasov in charge. A new stage has begun in the general’s life. Although Vlasov was and remained until the end a puppet in the hands of the Nazis. The question of Vlasov’s political independence did not arise in November 1944. Even the famous manifesto on the creation of KONR was edited by the Germans.

- An extremely interesting fact. Especially considering that some “friends” of Russia assure us that Vlasov fought for freedom of speech, conscience, religion, for accessibility of education, medicine and social security. And how did they manage to do this under the watchful eye of the Nazis?

- The Vlasovites even began to write the Russian constitution. I saw a draft of it in the Boris Nikolaevsky fund in the archives of the Hoover War Institution. Several hundred points. Some Russian emigrants of the first wave then managed to express their comments and at the same time, by the way, accused the Vlasovites of having taken many provisions from them.

- Was this constitution also ruled and edited by the Germans?

- No. It was already 1945. The Nazis now had no time to edit such texts. Although in one of the German documents I came across a mention of the Vlasov Constitution of Russia.

- What did the Vlasovites actually fight for? Why did they take up arms and point them at their fellow citizens? What were the motives for taking the path of betrayal?

- This can be judged from the interrogation protocols in the investigative file of Vlasov and his supporters. Many of those who went over to the side of the enemy simply chickened out. At the beginning of the war, it seemed to someone that the German colossus would crush any resistance, and there was no point in resisting. Sergei Bunyachenko, who had already been arrested once, was afraid of being arrested again. Fear of arrest pushed Major General Vasily Malyshkin onto the path of betrayal.

Some traitors to the Motherland explained their choice by ideological and political reasons, and rejection of Stalinism. Thus, Fyodor Trukhin, in June 1941, deputy chief of staff of the North-Western Front, after being captured - first in the fall of 1941, and then in the spring of 1942 - wrote several memos with proposals for ideological and subversive (including sabotage) work in Soviet rear. Former Red Army Air Force colonel Viktor Maltsev voluntarily surrendered in occupied Yalta and went to serve in the German commandant's office. Vladimir Boyarsky, Georgy Zhilenkov, Pavel Bogdanov were imbued with the anti-Soviet spirit.

If we talk about the rank and file, we must keep in mind that the Red Army soldiers who were captured in the first year of the war were in German camps in appalling conditions. The death toll from hunger, cold, wounds and bullying ran into the millions! It is not surprising that among the prisoners were those who were ready to save their lives at any cost, just to escape the nightmare that surrounded them. This fact is indicative. At the end of the war, the most difficult conditions of imprisonment were in the camps of Norway. The harsh climate and unbearably difficult working conditions resulted in a high mortality rate. So, it was to Norway in the winter of 1944 - 1945 that Grigory Zverev went to gather those who wanted to join the 2nd Division of the ROA. And he brought people from there - not only privates, but also senior officers.

At the very end of the war, the desire to remain as a combat-ready and armed army was dictated by the hope that this would help to go over to the side of the Americans if they wanted to use the Vlasovites against the Bolsheviks. They hoped that the Americans would give them the opportunity to escape and provide them with work. Hopes were not justified. The Americans behaved very carefully towards the Vlasovites. In principle, they were not averse to using Russian collaborators for their own purposes. But they understood perfectly well that a person who betrayed once is capable of betraying again. In the documents, they openly wrote about their uncertainty that there were no Soviet intelligence agents among the Vlasovites. Therefore, fearing getting into trouble, they chose not to spoil relations with their allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition and handed over the Vlasovites who were captured by them to the Soviet Union.

- How did the Red Army soldiers treat the Vlasovites?

- One of the published documents gives an example of the behavior of the Vlasovites at the front. They shouted in Russian: “Don’t shoot! We are our own." And when the Red Army men approached, the Vlasovites shot them point blank. Our soldiers, who at least once encountered such vile methods, had the same reaction to the Vlasovites until the end of the war: “If you see a Vlasovite, kill him!”

- Do the documents published for the first time allow us to learn something new about the relationship between Vlasov and Stalin?

- Stalin knew Vlasov and valued him as a military leader. For military operations during the Battle of Moscow, Vlasov, then commander of the 20th Army, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner at the beginning of 1942, at the suggestion of Georgy Zhukov. Having learned that Vlasov was surrounded, Stalin ordered to immediately find him and take him to the “mainland”, if necessary, “putting the entire front aviation to carry out this task.” We publish documents that reflect Moscow's efforts aimed at saving the general. Having received unconfirmed information about Vlasov’s presence in one of the partisan detachments, Stalin sent several planes to search for him. Not all of them returned: the pilots who tried to pull Vlasov out of the Volkhov swamps died. Moreover, attempts to find Vlasov were not abandoned even when, as it turned out later, he was already in captivity. Contrary to the claims of Vlasov’s fans and the general’s own statements that he was captured in battle, in fact he surrendered to the Germans without firing a single shot or any resistance.

In 1943, the Germans launched a huge propaganda campaign around Vlasov, in modern terms, a PR campaign, the purpose of which was to lure Red Army soldiers to the enemy’s side and create from them military formations, which received the general name ROA. As a response measure aimed at exposing Vlasov, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army prepared a leaflet “Who is Vlasov.” Stalin personally made changes to the draft document in red pencil. He replaced the original wording with harsher ones and made the text more rude, harsh and offensive. In this form, the leaflet, with a circulation of several thousand copies, was published and distributed among the Red Army soldiers. It was translated into many languages, making it accessible to Soviet soldiers of different nationalities. This is how Stalin expressed his personal attitude towards the general’s betrayal.

Vlasov's defenders say he had no choice. In the appendix to the first volume we have given protocols of interrogations of other Soviet generals who were captured. They answered questions quite frankly. However, most of them did not cooperate with the Nazis. The example of the former army commander, Lieutenant General Mikhail Lukin is typical. During interrogations, he scolded collectivization, the Bolsheviks and their policies, but categorically refused to cooperate with the Germans. This is about the question of whether Vlasov had a choice. Even after he surrendered, he had a choice - to cooperate with the Germans or not. And Vlasov made his choice.

- How did he behave during the investigation and trial?

- Vlasov was broken. He was aware of what awaited him. He told many things quite openly. The revelation of the truth was facilitated by the testimony of other defendants, confrontations, etc. We also present these materials in the book.

- Some publicists assure us that the defendants were tortured...

- Allegations that they were tortured to extract testimony necessary for the investigation are made without evidence. The records show that those interrogated, especially towards the end of the investigation, were completely frank.

- The preface to the two-volume book notes that “all post-war memoirs and literature created by former collaborators are predominantly exculpatory in nature.” Do you know of any exceptions to this rule?

- Yes. We publish the memoirs of Nikolai von Erzdorf, in which a certain negative attitude towards Vlasov and the ROA can be traced. They had not been published before. The author, a former White Guard officer, accused Vlasov and his entourage of imposing Soviet management principles in the ROA and paying little attention to the needs of the soldiers. And this is quite understandable. When the ROA divisions began to be formed at the end of 1944, former Soviet officers were appointed to command and staff positions. They commanded as they knew how and as they were taught.

- How does modern historiography evaluate the phenomenon of the Vlasovites and attempts to justify them?

- Many Western authors see the Vlasovites, first of all, as fighters against Stalinism. The authors who describe Soviet collaboration in rosy tones are united by a common methodological flaw: they recognize the fight against Bolshevism (USSR, communism) as the most important strategic task, a “liberation mission”, which in itself justifies any methods and means, including an alliance with the Nazis. Their interpretation of collaboration during the Second World War is a typical example of assessments from the standpoint of a “double standard”: refusing the allegiance to France and serving the Nazis (Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain) is treason, but refusing the allegiance to the Soviet Union and serving the same Nazis (General Vlasov) - this is, if not a feat, then a “liberation movement.”

Post-Vlasov structures began to emerge in the West immediately after the end of World War II. In our country, Vlasov had not yet been hanged, but in the West, the general and his supporters were already being glorified, portrayed as a victim of two regimes. The people who remained in the West after the war needed their own hero...

- The Vlasov story continues today. Last November, a conference was held in the capital of the Czech Republic to mark the 70th anniversary of the creation of KONR and the promulgation of the Prague Manifesto. At it, both Europeans and individual Russian citizens remembered Vlasov sympathetically. According to one of Vlasov’s apologists, the main idea and call of that “manifesto is an irreconcilable and decisive struggle against totalitarianism, against the communist dictatorship.” And what considerations guide Russian historians - such as Kirill Alexandrov - in whitewashing Vlasov?

- Today there is an opportunity to go to work in foreign archives. The field of activity is vast. Aleksandrov collected enormous archival and bibliographic material, evidence of which is his book “The Officer Corps of the Army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasova, 1944 - 1945,” published in 2009. It is a detailed directory of the people surrounding the general. However, the collected information can be analyzed in different ways. The researcher can reconstruct the outline of events by strictly following the documents. Or maybe, having your own concept, select documents to confirm it. The latter is exactly what Alexandrov does. His work leaves no doubt on whose side the author's sympathies lie. It is no coincidence that he avoids the term “collaborationism”, knowing that since the time of the international Nuremberg Tribunal this phenomenon has been subject to condemnation.

- Are there still unsolved mysteries surrounding the case and personality of General Vlasov?

- Questions that await their researchers remain. The same Alexandrov periodically mentions documents, without giving a link to where they are located, in which archive and in which fund. While looking for some documents, I had the opportunity to follow Alexandrov’s trail more than once. As a result, I came to a dead end. The question inevitably arose: do these documents actually exist in nature?

I have been working as a publisher for 25 years now. During this time, I have not published a single document that I have not seen. I must definitely get either the original or a copy of the original. Until I see them, I cannot say whether such a document existed in reality. Nowadays, many copies of copies are traveling around the world and on the Internet, which researchers are actively using. Not all of them are reliable.

In addition, there remain unstudied documents. For example, not all materials on Vlasov’s investigative case were provided to us. There is another source that no one has reached yet. In New York, in the Bakhmetyev Archive of Columbia University, all funds are available, except for the Mikhail Shatov fund.

- Who was he?

- Shatov’s real name is Kashtanov. He was an ROA officer, then hid in the French occupation zone under an assumed name. In 1950 he emigrated to the USA, where he had to become a painter, a bricklayer, and a taxi driver. In 1955 - 1971, when Shatov was already working at the library of Columbia University, he collected the ROA archive: memoirs, leaflets, information of any nature. He knew many people and corresponded with many. Shatov created and published a bibliography of publications about the ROA. They denied access to researchers to use the documents in his collection. His heir (son) has for the time being ordered to keep his father’s fund in closed storage. It cannot be ruled out that when these documents are finally opened, we will find something interesting in them. There are other mysteries. Archivists and historians still have work to do.

But even if some new documents are found or someone’s letters or memoirs are discovered, they will not change the overall picture. The main conclusion will remain unchanged: Vlasov was a traitor and a puppet in the hands of enemies with whom not only the Soviet Union, but also other countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition fought.

Magazine "Historian". 2015. No. 7 - 8. P. 90 - 95.